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ABSTRACT
Interdisciplinary work is of the essence of pastoral theology, most obviously where theology and 
the human sciences interact. Such work carries with it a number of risks that are not always 
addressed or even recognised. The principal risk is that a facile attempt to forge links between 
disciplines may lead to serious distortions of the meanings of both. This thesis examines gestalt 
therapy and feminist theology as possible candidates for interdisciplinary work. By reading and 
interrogating the literature of both disciplines, it identifies their origins and analyses their core 
ideas. The thesis affirms disputed links between gestalt philosophy, psychology and the later 
therapy, and examines other contributors to the development of gestalt and its core ideas. It next 
examines the development and scope of feminist theology before analysing core ideas across the 
range of voices in feminist writing. From these core ideas it is possible to establish the values that 
writers and practitioners find important in their lives (practical-values). On this basis, it is shown 
that these two disciplines, despite differences of history and purpose, are compatible with each 
other and therefore suitable candidates for interdisciplinary work.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Aim of thesis and its context
The aim of this thesis is to establish that a particular school of (psychotherapeutic) psychology is 
compatible with the theological discipline of feminist theology. It seeks to establish this 
compatibility on the basis of what are termed "practical-values". The question of compatibility is 
expanded to include a wider question about interdisciplinary work in pastoral theology.
The thesis is written at a time when there is an increasing and ongoing critical public debate 
about science and religion. This is often discussed as a clash of two cultures although it is more 
exact to see it as a philosophical clash entailing ontology and epistemology. What is at stake is 
the reality or otherwise of important propositions about the way the universe is and about how we 
can know what we know. One of the major themes of the public debate about science and 
religion is a question about the status of religious language and thought. This question becomes 
figural in the mass media principally when it is seen against the background of (the public 
understanding) of scientific thinking. Is too much reliance placed upon scientific enquiry and 
theory, and, if so, where are the limits of the authority of the scientist? This question is of 
particular importance for pastoral theology where people are engaging simultaneously in 
disciplines as diverse as politics, economics, sociology and psychology as well as theology.
This thesis concerns interdisciplinary work entailing psychology and theology. For some time, 
and particularly since the end of the Second World War, an increasing number of writers engaged 
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in pastoral ministry and pastoral theology, have developed new ideas and practices related to their 
understandings of theology and to the psychology of counselling and psychotherapy. Demands 
for training in pastoral counselling in the USA rose dramatically during the 1950s and remain 
high. In the UK, this same phenomenon appeared in the early 1960s, and demand is still high, 
especially in ministerial training courses and colleges where it is often seen as the most practical 
and appealing element of practical or pastoral theology.
To assert that there is common ground between the disciplines of theology and psychology is 
nowadays to make a commonplace observation. To state that, in some circumstances, the two 
disciplines may be addressing the same situation and even saying the same things, albeit in 
different languages, requires justification. Such an argument has important implications for both 
disciplines at the levels of theory and of practice1.
Given the wide scope of this subject area, it is necessary to set some boundaries around the work. 
The foci for this thesis are those of gestalt therapeutic psychology and feminist theology. There 
are a number of reasons for defining the area in this manner. First, these two disciplines fit an 
overall aim of the thesis to make a contribution that may offer critical support to interdisciplinary 
work in the field of pastoral theology. To further this aim, it is arguably more useful to focus on 
two subjects with at least a prima facie likelihood of compatibility than to search for 
compatibility where it seems improbable. Conclusions derived from the former can later be 
applied in other contexts of interdisciplinary enquiry.
Second, the chosen methodology for the thesis - that of studying two bodies of literature - has 
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only recently become possible from the gestalt side. In its early days (1960s), gestalt was 
notorious for its scepticism about intellectual enquiry, so that the connections, established later in 
the thesis, between gestalt philosophy, psychology and therapy might have been impossible to 
establish at an earlier date.
Third, it is arguable that feminist theology is now so firmly established that it is no longer 
possible to dismiss it as a protest theology. It is an established discipline critically engaged with a 
number of other disciplines including that of psychology, though, admittedly, principally with 
psychoanalysis. As will be seen, this focus on psychoanalysis is by no means an obstacle when 
considering gestalt therapy.
Fourth, as will be shown, there is a critical chronological and geographical coincidence between 
second-wave feminism and the development of gestalt therapy. Although both have long roots, 
they both emerged into public consciousness in the USA in the early 1960s.  
The thesis shows that these two disciplines are not monolithic entities, but that each has drawn on 
– and continues to draw on - many sources in its development. Partly because of this varied and 
complex background, each discipline speaks with many voices and promotes a range of 
viewpoints. It is nonetheless possible to identify within each discipline certain core ideas. These 
core ideas are analysed and certain values are derived from them that are central to each 
discipline. These values are more than ideas, in the sense that they inform the practice and lives 
of those to whom they are important. They are therefore termed practical-values2. Because of 
their centrality in the practice of those for whom feminist theology and gestalt therapy are of 
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crucial importance, they offer means by which the two disciplines can be compared and their 
similarities and differences noted.
The thesis is founded upon the argument that compatibility in the matter of practical-values is a 
positive and sufficient test of compatibility for the purposes of interdisciplinary study and 
practical work. The development of a practical-values approach, though devised for the purposes 
of this thesis, has applications for people whose primary concern is getting theory into practice. 
However, as will be seen, the elements of practice and theory are inseparable.
Now it may be argued that a more usual approach would be to examine the history of the two 
disciplines and the ways in which they have been brought into proximity in the past. But such an 
approach would not address, for example, Pattison's criticism concerning the potential for 
skewdness or sheer arbitrariness in interdisciplinary work that can produce unreliable 
juxtapositions or syntheses3. This is a valid criticism that points up the uncritical way in which 
pastoral practitioners have sometimes looked for support in disciplines outside theology without 
interrogating their theoretical or other bases or contexts. The historical approach may prove 
helpful, but what is more useful as a basis for doing pastoral theology is not an argument from 
what has been, but an argument about the basis on which two disciplines operate in practice. We 
cannot assume, for example, that the words and phrases used in one context will carry the same 
range of meanings in the other. What is important here is a correspondence between disciplines at 
the level of such vital elements as their scope, or range of interests. Other key factors would 
include their views of what it is to be human, of what it is to live in community, and of what 
might transcend the more obviously quantifiable goods for an individual or a community. This is 
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the realm of practical-values.
This promotion of practical-values represents both a novel basis for compatibility (contrasting, 
for example, with a Faith and Order approach to beliefs held) and a potentially useful tool for 
those engaged in pastoral theology in other areas of study and practice. Although the term 
"practical-values" is a neologism of this thesis, it has its ancestry in biblical wisdom ("by their 
fruits shall ye know them") as well as in Christian ethics and pragmatism. It entails the analysis 
of core ideas in each of the partner disciplines, from which practical-values may be deduced.
The thesis concludes that the identity or the complete convergence of the two disciplines studied 
here is impossible and, for practical purposes, unnecessary. The methodology developed provides 
a useful and powerful means of examining compatibility in this instance and may provide means 
for testing compatibility between other disciplines within the fields of practical and pastoral 
theology.
Methodologically, the thesis proceeds by examining the literatures of gestalt therapy and feminist 
theology. The decision to adopt this approach rather than, say, an empirical one based upon 
questionnaires and interviews, reflects the new situation in which it has recently become possible 
to speak of a growing body of gestalt literature to be set alongside that of feminist theology. This 
is a further original feature of the thesis, in that, so far as can be ascertained, no other such work 
has been undertaken.
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As was stated above, this is a large area to study in depth and each of its contributory disciplines 
is intrinsically complex. Therefore it is necessary to focus on defined areas. For present purposes, 
therefore, reference is made to feminism and feminist theology in Europe and North America.
Feminism, what people mean by it and what they do about it, has been one of the drivers of social 
change in the past century. Its impact is perhaps comparable to the industrial "revolutions" which 
have transformed societies since the late eighteenth century. Legislation, working practices, pay 
structures, shopping patterns, child-rearing, educational syllabi, ecclesial governance, the fashion 
industry, understandings of literature, history, biology, health and medicine have all been 
influenced by feminist critiques. This chapter continues with some introductory comments 
concerning ways in which feminism has influenced theology and psychology, the two disciplines 
most central to the thesis.
1.1 Theology
First, let us consider theology. In the present context, the term refers to the theologies of 
mainstream Western Christians. Feminist critiques have exposed the patriarchal nature of the 
church and of its theologies and have shown that theology, like all other aspects of ecclesial life, 
is a gendered discipline. Feminist theologians offer radical critiques of Christian thought and 
practice. To understand how such critiques have so radical an effect upon theology, they must be 
seen in context. This is not to dilute the impact of those critiques but to demonstrate some 
contextually important antecedents.
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In the past fifty years, theological activity has been influenced by a number of historical 
processes. The main processes are identified here and each is briefly illustrated in turn. Each has 
a direct bearing on theological discourse as well as on much else in the cultures concerned.
First, in the past fifty years, there have been major political changes involving the collapse of 
empires, de-colonisation and realignment around new political and trading relationships. For 
example "the kingdom of God" was once understood by imperialists to be more or less 
coterminous with the status quo. This view became untenable as political changes altered the 
mind-set of once colonised peoples and colonisers. 
Second, the post-Holocaust situation has caused many Christians to re-examine Jewish-Christian 
relations4. Dyson, challenged by Ecclestone’s The night sky of the Lord, asserts that there is 
something unidentified in Christianity which is inimical to Jews, something intrinsic that gives 
rise periodically to anti-semitism, pogroms and the Holocaust5. Yet Christian theology, which 
claims to address the question of evil, says little or nothing about its own capacity for spawning 
evil6.
Third, theology, at its most healthy, engages with the philosophical and other influences that 
shape human cultures. One such philosophical influence is existentialism7. In particular, one 
should consider the influence of Martin Buber's I and thou8 and linked to Buber, Paul Tillich. 
Tillich was, in the late 1920s, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Frankfurt, a principal 
centre of European existentialism. Ronald Gregor Smith points to an intricate connection 
between Buber's work and that of Tillich although he eschews "mere ‘influence’" in that 
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connection9. There are clear echoes of the holism of I and thou in Tillich's work10. Buber's and 
Tillich's existentialism had a profound influence in theological circles which widened with the 
publication, in 1963, of Honest to God11. In undermining the hegemony of traditional 
metaphysics it paved the way for further critiques in philosophical theology and ethics that 
feminists (and others) were able to develop.
Fourth, existential theology’s God-as-ground-of-being fed into the "death of God" movement 
whose putative leader, Thomas J.J. Altizer, was certain that his thinking was founded on the 
more radical teachings of Tillich12. The death of God theologians were part of a broad spectrum 
of what are sometimes termed post-Christian or post-religious movements. What they have in 
common is a perception that the metaphysics that were the vehicle of Christian communication 
into the twentieth century could not carry it into the twenty-first. There are some parallels with 
the post-Christian positions occupied by writers such as Daphne Hampson whose critique of 
Christianity offers a serious challenge to those who stay within the fellowship of the Church13. 
Fifth, and under the same broad heading, one might include Don Cupitt and the Sea of Faith 
network. But it may be more useful to see Cupitt's thinking14 in the light of the The myth of God 
incarnate debate15. Now, it may be argued in this latter case that the loss of confidence in earlier 
metaphysics was not the major influence and that the growing impact of other religions upon the 
consciousness of previously Christian cultures constituted the greater impulse. But the Preface 
states that the need for the book
arises from growing knowledge of Christian origins, and involves a recognition that Jesus 
was (as he is presented in Acts 2.21) "a man approved by God" for a special role within 
the divine purpose, and that the later conception of him as God incarnate, the Second 
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Person of the Holy Trinity living a human life, is a mythological or poetic way of 
expressing his significance for us.16
The changes that came out of the end-of-metaphysics coincided with the work of second-wave 
feminist theologians who were challenging received images of God as gendered and patriarchal17. 
The critique of Hick and others is neither coterminous with nor intrinsically inimical to feminist 
approaches: it serves to undermine a specious metaphysical hegemony and affirms some new 
work on imaging God.
Another major influence on theological thinking, sixth in this account, has been the ecumenical 
movement. The 1910 World Missionary Conference focused on relations between missionaries, 
their sending churches and “native” churches18.  The reports of some of the 1200 participants 
(although only eighteen were from the new churches19), mark the beginning of a new 
consciousness about interfaith and intercultural relations. Attitudes of openness, respect and 
generosity for other traditions and viewpoints laid the foundation for ecumenical work at local, 
national and international levels. They opened the way for agreements between churches that 
support joint witness and service20. Ecumenical work at the international level has enabled 
churches to engage politically in, for example, South Africa, Cambodia and Chile. Some of the 
politics have been explicitly gender politics, and cultures more open to the leadership of women 
have influenced faith, order and worship in the World Council of Churches and in Europe.
Seventh, and linked to the ecumenical dynamic, is a growing awareness of religious pluralism. 
This has led to changes in religious and secular life. Religious education in schools has changed, 
and some departments of theology in universities (certainly in the UK) have become departments 
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of religious studies. The history of church relations with people of other faiths is a mixed one. 
The gospels show both a tendency to Christian exclusivity as well as an openness to people of 
goodwill as exemplars of the Kingdom of God. In recent times, liberal theologians have taken 
very seriously the claims of other religions21 to the point where they can induce in the student a 
sense of the arbitrariness of Christian belief22. Ninian Smart's essay in Soundings was a 
provocation to many Christians who felt that, if Christianity were not the final revelation, then it 
had no salvific power23. What was not so evident at the time of Soundings was that the entry into 
dialogue with other religions also entailed a dialogue with other elements of the cultures. Each 
faith community has, for example, its own traditions concerning sexuality and gender, and the 
new dialogue began to open up gender issues. The ethics of inter-sexual relationships in Western 
cultures may not have exact equivalents in other cultures24.
Eighth, there is the dialogue with the human sciences25. Theology is a discipline in a living 
context, which is the subject of other disciplines including anthropology, sociology, psychology, 
economics and politics. Once it is accepted that theology does not have a monopoly on 
understanding human experience, the need for dialogue is apparent. Dialogue between two 
parties, if we are to follow Buber, suggests that both are opening themselves to the possibility of 
change. This is not to suggest that they had previously been wrong in their ideas and practices, 
but rather that dialogue promotes new thinking and practice that, ipso facto, constitutes 
development.
The ninth important influence on the recent development of theology is that of liberation 
theology. This wave of theological praxis arose in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America. 
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Stephen Pattison defines it thus:
...liberation theology is complex, subtle, and pluriform. At its base, however, it is 
relatively easy to identify and define. All liberation theology is theology done from a 
position of active involvement with the oppressed in their struggle for liberation. 
Liberation theology starts with an a priori commitment to the liberation struggle and 
option for the poor. In Gutiérrez's graphic term, it is theology done from the perspective 
of the "underside of history" where the poor are attempting to become subjects of their 
own destiny. It is a second order activity which accompanies and reflects upon the 
experience of the struggle for liberation in the light of faith - action and commitment first, 
theological reflection afterwards. Its purpose is to fortify, inspire and inform Christian 
action within the overarching struggle of the poor.26
Pattison argues that liberation theology is not to be regarded as a “there and then” movement 
which happened in the 1970s and can now be consigned to the past. Its importance reaches 
beyond the base communities27 where it first developed. Pattison places it in the category of those 
great ideas and movements that have yet to be understood and taken up with sufficient 
seriousness28. 
When feminism made its first impact on theology, it seemed to be another form of liberation 
theology. The intellectual and action critiques of women obliged theological writers and 
practitioners to heed their criticisms. Theologians who understood theology as constituting a 
reflection upon engagement in a changing world were bound to respond. Church and world are 
not watertight compartments and feminist pressures were exerted from within the church as well 
as from outside it. During the 1960s, for example, the ratio of women to men undertaking formal 
theological training began to increase. During the 1970s and 1980s this trend increased and, as 
feminist consciousness also increased, theology began to change. This was evident across the 
various sub-disciplines such as Old and New Testament studies, historical theology, church 
history, pastoral theology and ethics.
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Feminist theological critiques spring from and shape understandings of Christian faith and life as 
shaped by historical forces, chief of which is that of privileging men and masculinity. In 1960, 
Valerie Saiving published an article on the Christian interpretations of sin and love. In it she 
wrote:
It is my contention that there are significant differences between masculine and feminine 
experience and that feminine experience reveals in a more emphatic fashion certain 
aspects of the human situation which are present but less obvious in the experience of 
men. Contemporary theological doctrines of love have, I believe, been constructed 
primarily upon the basis of masculine experience and thus view the human situation from 
the male standpoint. Consequently, these doctrines do not provide an adequate 
interpretation of the situation of women -- nor, for that matter, of men ....29
From such a perspective, familiar intellectual and emotional landscapes look different. Old 
standard (actually, masculine) responses to such a critique would have missed the point, because 
the critique starts from the premise that theology, like everything else which human cultures have 
created, is inevitably gendered.
Much of the new theological work came from the universities and seminaries of North America, 
although Christian feminists in Europe were soon mobilised to do their own work. There is now a 
large body of literature marking new thinking and practice that has arisen out of feminist 
experience and reflection30. Elaine Graham points out that:
Critical theories of gender confront fundamental philosophical questions about the nature 
of human existence, agency and social organization: whether it is possible to talk about a 
single or universal 'human nature' (ontology); what are the foundations and sources of 
personal consciousness and selfhood (subjectivity); whether knowledge of the world is 
innate or phenomenologically - or even politically - constructed (epistemology); how 
purposeful and everyday transformation of the world around us effects the material and 
symbolic relations that underpin social systems (agency); and what might be the 
possibilities and grounds for an emancipatory knowledge and action based on some 
notion of ultimate good (teleology).
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Finally, such a perspective portrays a 'human nature' that is not essential, but 
existential...... Whatever human nature may be, it is inaccessible to our understanding 
beyond the medium of our own culture and agency.31
Graham's account of areas of discourse impacted by such critiques encompasses most of what 
theology engages in. It suggests a fundamentally different perspective, one that parallels the 
process of liberation theology in which theologians were also establishing a new hermeneutic. 
The liberation theologians were looking at everything in solidarity with and from the perspective 
of poor and oppressed people32. Many of the liberation theologians have remained, with whatever 
private difficulties, within the fold of a church that is often shaken by the secular and 
ecclesiastical political fallout they occasion33.
Feminist theologians have often been treated with hostility and suspicion by the church. 
References to gender studies and to the experience of women have frequently elicited hostility 
and suspicion rather than curious interest. Some theologians, for example Hampson, find that the 
structures of theology, like those structures of the church, are irredeemably patriarchal in nature, 
and they move across the boundaries of the church into other religious practices or none. Other 
feminist theologians such as Fiorenza, Heyward, Plaskow and Ruether, have found ways to stay 
within the church and, working from within, seek to change ecclesiastical structures and, more 
importantly, to change the theological (including the sexual-social-political) ground from which 
they have grown. 
1.2 Psychotherapeutic psychology
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By contrast with the ancient discipline of theology, psychology, as the term is used here, is of 
more recent origin. One could argue that Plato and Aristotle had important things to say about 
psychology, or that psychology became a conscious discipline in the work of Descartes. 
However, the term is used here to denote that discipline that developed in the late nineteenth 
century with the work of people such as Wundt, Stumpf and their colleagues. The word 
psychology is used to indicate a scientific discipline that emerged in the 1890s as a discipline in 
its own right. Moreover, in this thesis the use of the word indicates, unless otherwise stated, that 
branch of psychology concerned with psychotherapy and its adjuncts such as psychological 
understandings of human development.
The history of modern psychotherapeutic psychology begins with Freud. Psychoanalysis is the 
oldest of modern psychotherapies and its story is paradigmatic for others. Freud's thinking and 
writing, with that of the International Psychoanalytic Congress, has exercised a profound 
influence upon psychoanalysts and other therapists, and also upon wider cultures. It has 
contributed to current understandings of self and society, and has helped to shape attitudes to 
relationships, suffering, health, and personal and social good.
At first reading, it may seem that the developments of which Freud and his colleagues wrote, 
grew solely from reflection upon clinical data. The reality is more complex. Referring to the work 
of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, J.A.C. Brown shows that sociology and anthropology have 
influenced Freudian and post-Freudian thinking. 
..[I]f the observations described are even approximately valid, then clearly they give a 
much more optimistic view of the possibilities for the human race than one obtains from 
Freud and Melanie Klein. The Neo-Freudian schools too reject Freud's biological 
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approach and are more concerned with the influence of society and culture in building 
personality than with its instinctual foundations, and amongst psychologists today one 
finds at the one extreme the orthodox Freudians with their biological theory of a 
relatively fixed personality dependent upon the instinctual drives and originating in the 
early years of life, and at the other extreme the thoroughgoing sociological schools ..... 
which assert that personality traits are not to be viewed as "inside" the individual, being 
merely consistent modes of behaviour organized around the roles the individual plays in 
society.34
Freud himself, as a creature of his time, was influenced by contemporary events. One of the great 
developments of his thinking was published in 192035. In “Beyond the pleasure principle”, he 
recognised that the earlier instinct and drive theories (which located the origins of neuroses in the 
traumas of early childhood, and especially in the modifications of sexuality) were inadequate to 
account for the repetitive nightmares of ex-combatants from the First World War. It was the war 
and its impact on those engaged in it, which led him to take seriously aggression - as well as 
sexuality - as formative of personality, and its repression as correspondingly significant in 
neurosis. He also took seriously the repetitive nature of the war-related nightmares and began to 
see them as a means of dealing with aggression. Indeed the war, which had nearly destroyed a 
generation of men, is directly linked to Freud’s proposing the Life and Death "instincts" and to 
his later definition of the self-structure of id, ego and super-ego36. 
Another influence on the development of psychology is that of national and cultural difference. 
Brown points to some of the developments of psychoanalysis that took place outside Germany 
and beyond Freud's immediate influence. He shows how contemporary American psychotherapy 
is evident in the psychoanalytic work of H.S. Sullivan, J.F. Brown and their colleagues. For 
example, Karen Horney set up in New York City a Society for the Advancement of 
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Psychoanalysis which, whilst considering itself neo-Freudian, was unlike its German counterparts 
in its avowedly sociological flavour. Sullivan's approach to psychoanalysis is heavily indebted to 
Freud, but contains novel elements from his own practice and thinking. These concerned social 
theories of child development, the place of culture and society in the formation and satisfaction of 
the self, and the centrality of empathy in child development. There are foretastes here of the so-
called Third Wave or humanistic psychologies which developed thirty years later in the USA37. 
Brown, charting these developments, notes that neither Sullivan's nor Horney's work seems to 
have taken root elsewhere38. In an analogous development, the British school most closely related 
to psychoanalysis is that of object-relations. In his doctoral thesis, Guntrip follows the 
development of this school. It is, to many minds, an ingenious and elegant structure that gives 
both theoretical satisfaction and is also of great importance in practice39, and yet it is barely found 
outside Great Britain. It is reasonable to suppose that there is something about these schools that 
indicates some elements of the cultural peculiarities where they have grown.
A further example of important influences on the development of psychotherapeutic psychology 
can be seen in the process which psychoanalysts referred to as "the great debate"40. In the 1930s, 
Melanie Klein and others engaged with Freud and others in a debate concerning the differences 
between women and men, the aetiology of psychological sexual difference and what one would 
nowadays call gender construction. These considerations arose in part out of dissatisfactions on 
the part of some analysts with the theoretical constructs that they brought to their work. Whilst 
these dissatisfactions arose in part from clinical considerations, there was also discontent with the 
way in which women were plainly thought to be secondary to men. The early psychoanalytic 
theories were based upon male assumptions. The development of children was discussed as 
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though all children were male, and the central doctrine of the oedipal conflict was articulated, as 
the name suggests, with a focus on a male child. Later, thought was given to girl children whose 
development was considered in the light of an adjusted oedipal phase: in other words, girls were 
treated as boys manqués. Klein sought to establish an understanding of child development that 
had at its heart the assumption that girl children and boy children develop in ways that are similar 
and also significantly different, and with an assumption that both have to be understood on a 
basis of parity.
The assumptions that Freud and his colleagues made in their original formulations have exposed 
them to criticism, particularly from feminist writers. It must be conceded that, in his early 
thinking about the development of girls and in his understanding of women, Freud made many 
mistakes. He was also willing to accept the limits of his own awareness, and was open to the 
criticisms of Klein and her supporters. The "great debate" led to theoretical developments within 
psychoanalysis that influenced most modern psychological theories about development, sexuality 
and gender41.
As in the field of theology, so in psychology, what seemed (and often was) a male preserve42 was 
affected by the input of women. From the beginning of psychoanalysis, large numbers of women 
came into therapy43 and into the routes then open to practise psychotherapy. Their evidence as 
patients and their understanding as practitioners opened up the discipline and triggered further 
development. Second wave feminism has brought further changes of which four have especial 
importance in theory and practice.
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First, most schools of therapy understand the nature and historical significance of patriarchy as a 
form of social oppression shaping the personalities and consequent lives of women and men44. 
Second, psychotherapeutic practice and theory increasingly acknowledge power as an important 
factor not just between therapist and patient but between women and men in therapeutic and 
other contexts. Third, there is an increasing awareness of the joint responsibility of male and 
female parents in bringing up their children. There are some discrete foci in this area, for 
example, clearer understandings about the ways in which power can be abused in families, 
including the abuse of power in sexual ways45. Fourth, feminist critiques have led to the 
development of specific therapeutic approaches for women including feminist therapies46.
The psychotherapeutic school at the centre of this thesis is not psychoanalysis, but gestalt, 
although gestalt therapy, in terms both of its theory of the self and of its historical antecedents, is 
closely related to psychoanalysis47.  Gestalt was first developed in the late 1940s by Laura and 
Fritz Perls and came to public notice on the West coast of California in the late 1960s. Since that 
time, there has been both consolidation of an earlier charismatic movement, some revision and 
much conceptual and technical development. Some of that development has been a growth over 
time, analogous to growth from brash youth to a more reflective adulthood. Other change is, as 
might be expected, cultural: that is to say, one would not expect a psychotherapeutic approach 
developed in New York City and California to flourish unchanged in European countries. In all 
of these places, there have been other forces for change, shaping the wider culture and, with it, 
gestalt.
One of those forces has been feminism and, in the theory and practice of gestalt, as in 
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psychoanalysis, feminism has made its mark. There are both internal and external reasons for 
this. The internal reasons arise from the nature of the underlying gestalt philosophy and 
psychology that militates against an individualistic therapeutic approach and favours a view of 
the person as a point or focus in a fluid and complex field of events and relationships. A gestalt 
approach is socially and politically contextual, and feminism is part of the current social and 
political process. A more external reason for the impact of feminism is, as in the case of 
psychoanalysis, the participation and leadership of feminist women. The majority of practitioners 
of gestalt therapy in Great Britain are female48. Initially, their critical contributions were focused 
upon such matters as the dominant styles then adopted by male practitioners and teachers49. 
These were based upon an over-masculine understanding of power and, moreover, were 
incongruent with the overt liberationist aspirations of the gestalt approach. More feminine styles 
of leadership have contributed to a change in the climate of training institutes as well as group 
and individual therapeutic practices. This effect should not be underestimated: it is the style of a 
person's early teachers that tends to shape the experience, learning and later practice and teaching 
of a psychotherapist. Many of the influential gestalt teachers since the 1980s are women. In the 
gestalt network in the British Isles, more women than men are publishing about gestalt theory and 
practice50.  It is also true to say that the teaching of gestalt therapy nowadays has a critical stance 
which assumes that it is no longer necessary to spell out feminist arguments. The absence of such 
arguments on teaching handouts and syllabi is evidence of their acceptance. 
1.3 Scope of the project
As these preliminary remarks have indicated, this thesis examines theory and practice in the 
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fields of theology and psychology. Both of the disciplines may be understood as clusters of inter-
connected sub-disciplines. The sub-discipline of pastoral or practical51 theology is inter-
disciplinary. In this instance, pastoral theology consists in the meeting of Christian traditions and 
practice with other aspects of human experience. These aspects can arise in any part of the life of 
an individual, a community, a state or a race, and they may be treated within one or more 
definable areas of discourse. In the present study, pastoral theology entails engagement with 
gestalt philosophy, psychology and therapy. None of these three sub-disciplines is itself pastoral 
theology. It is the dialogue between the (sub-) disciplines that constitutes pastoral theology52.
This consideration indicates one dimension of the complexity of the task ahead. However, there 
is more. As was noted in the Introduction to this chapter, Pattison warns53 of the danger of 
unawarely skewed choices in the selection of that other discipline (or school within a discipline) 
that could lead to an unbalanced view of life and to some unwarranted conclusions. Given these 
strictures, close attention will be paid later in the thesis (chapter 7) to the compatibility or 
otherwise of the two central disciplines involved.
The practical-values of gestalt are derived from its core ideas. It has been necessary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the roots of gestalt therapy. Because gestalt is closely related to many other 
schools of psychotherapy, care is taken to indicate these links. As was stated above, gestalt owes 
most, among its psychological forbears and siblings, to psychoanalysis. This debt is not only to 
Freud and some of his colleagues, but also to current psychoanalytic theorists54.
But the roots of gestalt do not lie only in psychoanalysis, for it is itself a changing amalgam of 
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ideas. Many practitioners hold that to call gestalt a therapy is to limit unduly its scope. Some 
prefer to describe gestalt as a philosophy, others as an educational method, and yet others as a 
process-orientated psychology55 of particular relevance in organisation development.
Opinions vary as to the strength or significance of the links between gestalt therapy and gestalt 
psychology56 and little work has been done on the links further back into gestalt philosophy until 
the research for this thesis. One necessary part of the thesis is to test these links and to show how 
gestalt therapy is rooted in those - and other - disciplines. The picture of gestalt that emerges is of 
a discipline that is fluid, dynamic, multi-faceted - and of most meaning and worth when it 
interacts with other aspects of human experience.
1.4 Methodology
The method used in this thesis relies on research into the literature and applying the findings to 
the disciplines of theology and psychology. This method involved a literature review, but, on the 
gestalt side, has also required searches for books and papers long out of print and often referred 
to obscurely or erroneously. The choice of a literature-based approach is governed by the nature 
of the thesis. Each discipline addresses itself, for example, to human relationships as they are 
lived in small groups as well as larger communities and nation states. They are concerned with 
the phenomenology of everyday life and with the spiritual aspirations and potential of people.
The aim is to examine the compatibility or otherwise of gestalt therapy and feminist theology as 
two disciplines concerned with fundamentally important areas of human existence. The first step 
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in the method is to represent each discipline as concisely as possible. This is done differently in 
each case since the intellectual history of gestalt is little known and contested, whereas the 
difficulties of representing feminist theology are more connected with the wealth of available 
material and its great variety. In both cases, the second step is to analyse from the presentations, 
the core ideas of each discipline. In the third step of the method the core ideas of the two 
disciplines are examined for practical-values upon which the compatibility of gestalt and feminist 
theology is established. This approach is a means of interrogating both gestalt and feminist 
psychology, not simply as examples of intellectual discourse, but as lived experiences. The term 
practical-value also suggests possible further applications in the field of pastoral studies and 
practice.
The method begins by focusing on gestalt. Much of the material presented in Part One of the 
thesis is referred to in text books of gestalt therapy. A critical reading of the literature 
demonstrates, however, that some of these references do not stand scrutiny. For example, little 
work has been done on the links between gestalt philosophy, gestalt psychology and gestalt 
therapy. Some writers, indeed, deny that there are any significant links, while others suggest links 
but do not examine their significance. Some work has been done in German on the links between 
gestalt philosophy and gestalt psychology, and there is other work in German on links between 
gestalt psychology and gestalt therapy. What was lacking, from the point of view of English 
readers, was a comprehensive study of the links between all three.
Before gestalt can be compared with feminist theology, its own qualifications as a world-view of 
comparable breadth and depth must be established. This is done by a detailed examination of its 
    23
roots in gestalt psychology and, ultimately, in gestalt philosophy. But that task alone would not 
be sufficient to satisfy a theologically informed reader that gestalt has the complexity and cultural 
elaboration required of a discipline that seeks to encompass the matters that concern feminist 
theology. Gestalt is a hybrid with many parents. Part of the work of Part One is to identify and, 
where necessary, argue what is inherited from each of those sources. In this way, it can be shown 
that gestalt has a broad scope and cultural riches, not simply as a therapeutic approach but as 
what may be called a philosophy of life.
In Part Two, where the focus changes to feminist theology, the task is different to that undertaken 
with regard to gestalt. In the past thirty years, many writers have written about the roots, the 
importance and the necessity of feminist theology. The argument of this part of the thesis is built 
upon their work. Due references are made as the thesis moves forward. In the case of feminist 
theology, and because of the greater corpus of literature available, attention is paid to a number 
of conflicting voices with the field: this is especially the case where core ideas are analysed since 
it is these that lie at the core of the thesis. It is from the core ideas that the practical-values of 
feminist theology are deduced. Some of these practical-values are also problematic and require 
critical evaluation.
The thesis engages with two disciplines but a number of discourses. Both terms are imprecise, 
but for the purposes of the thesis their distinction is useful in what follows. The term “discipline” 
is used to denote theology or psychology, within both of which one can discern both sub-
disciplines (e.g. New Testament studies) and also schools of thought (e.g. psychoanalytic 
psychology). The term “discourse” is reserved for the mode or tenor of the language in which that 
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discipline most commonly proceeds. Thus, some sub-disciplines of psychology, e.g. artificial 
intelligence, are part of a scientific discourse, whereas theology might be part of a philosophical , 
historical or literary discourse.
Even within the apparently unitary structure called gestalt therapy, it is necessary to venture into 
philosophical discourse, most obviously when exploring the gestalt philosophy of the late 
nineteenth century. Gestalt was first articulated at a time when philosophy and psychology were 
not discrete disciplines, but psychology was one sub-discipline within a philosophical discourse 
and a discipline concerning Mind. Furthermore, the practice of gestalt therapy, as with much of 
psychology, rests upon philosophical assumptions and raises philosophical questions. 
The discussion about gestalt, most especially where it touches upon perception, necessitates some 
reference to the discipline of neuroscience which is part of the discourse of science. Whilst this 
aspect of gestalt constitute only a small part of the work, it is nonetheless an indication that, 
throughout the thesis, there is an assumption that the discourse of, for example, philosophy may 
connect directly to that of (medical) science. Certainly, it is assumed that the discipline of 
psychotherapeutic psychology is and must be compatible with that of medical science. Some 
branches of psychology, e.g. neuropsychology, are contiguous with neuroscience, and the history 
of modern psychotherapy began with the work of a neuropsychiatrist with a biological turn of 
mind. Moving from one discourse to another is part of the challenge of interdisciplinary research.
There are other discourses relevant to this thesis. If feminism may be described as a discipline, 
then it is a complex one, embracing, for example, historical considerations, philosophical ones, 
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practical concerns, political thought and action, social theory and literary studies. It may be better 
to think of feminism as a movement of the human spirit, bridging all disciplines and partaking in 
several discourses. If that is true of feminism, then it might also be true of theology - or, to be 
more accurate, of some theologies. In practice each discipline is conducted across a number of 
different discourses, and each discipline, closely examined, contains much that is 
multidisciplinary. This is very much the case where theology connects with psychotherapy in the 
field of pastoral theology.
Pastoral theology is intrinsically a process. It represents points of contact, conflict or convergence 
between different disciplines and discourses. The method of this thesis entails bringing together 
the relevant discourses and disciplines in dialectical fashion. The movement from Part One to 
Part Two represents a boundary between disciplines. There are boundaries between discourses 
within both Part One and Part Two. Care is taken when moving between discourses and 
disciplines to establish the legitimacy of the connection57 and acknowledgement is made of the 
boundary crossed.
1.5 Pattern and main lines of argument
The thesis is in three parts. Part One concerns gestalt philosophy, psychology and therapy. Part 
Two examines feminism and feminist theology. In Part Three the two are disciplines are brought 
together and tested for their compatibility. Some conclusions are drawn.
The present chapter introduces the thesis and the disciplines under consideration. In chapter 2, 
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there is an extended examination of gestalt philosophy, psychology and therapy. This opens the 
way for consideration of the major influences in the formation of gestalt therapy (chapter 3). Part 
One ends with a chapter that deals first with the self and then goes on to analyse core ideas in 
gestalt (chapter 4). This paves the way for a derivation of the practical-values of gestalt that 
support the principal argument of the thesis, namely that compatibility between gestalt and 
feminist theology can be established on the basis of compatible practical-values.
Part Two opens with a chapter on feminist perspectives and feminist theology (chapter 5), 
followed by one (chapter 6) which analyses core ideas in feminist theology. These will later be 
used to derive practical-values of feminist theology.
In the third Part of the thesis, the two disciplines, gestalt therapy and feminist theology, are 
brought together. In chapter 7, practical-values are drawn from the core ideas of gestalt and of 
feminist theology in order to assess the compatibility or otherwise of the two disciplines. From 
this discussion flow the conclusions that make up chapter 8.
What follows now is an outline of the principal arguments of the thesis, chapter by chapter. The 
aim of this thesis is to establish that a particular school of (psychotherapeutic) psychology is 
compatible with the theological discipline of feminist theology. It seeks to establish this 
compatibility on the basis of what are termed "practical-values". As was stated above, the 
discussions of developments and debates within each of the two disciplines studied lead towards 
the analysis of some core ideas. It is not proposed that such core ideas command unanimous 
support from every writer in each disciplines. Rather, out of the arguments and voices heard, key 
    27
themes emerge. Although they do not necessarily command universal support, they are Highest 
Common Factor rather than Lowest Common Denominator ideas. Where they remain 
controversial or problematic, those contrary voices are considered.
The present chapter explains the structures and methods employed and outlines the overall 
argument.  The argument is about the possibility and the legitimacy of bringing together two 
different disciplines. They have some prima facie similarities, in that both seek to deal with 
human experience, both are of value to particular constituencies, and both have developed ideas 
and norms. Some people find both disciplines important, and they tend to move in their thinking 
and talking from one to the other, often with apparent ease58. The chapters that follow lay out the 
grounds for bringing together these two expressions of human experience.
In chapter 2, it is asserted that a nineteenth century exploration into the nature of mental acts led 
to a scientifically minded philosophical enquiry which encompassed what today would be called 
perception. That exploration led to formulations about the ways in which people perceive and 
drew attention to the role of the perceiver in the experience. On the basis solely of observation 
and reflection, the gestalt philosophers formulated ideas about the interplay of subject and object. 
At one extreme, these take the reader back to Plato's notion of forms and shadows and, at the 
other, to the epistemological doubts of Berkeley and the more empirical abolition of cause and 
effect in the field theory of Kurt Lewin59. There is a direct connection between these 
philosophical enquiries and the empirical enquiries of gestalt psychologists which continued the 
quest to understand the nature of mental acts. More contentious, but demonstrably tenable, is the 
connection between gestalt psychologists and the later proponents of gestalt therapy. The 
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difference here is that gestalt therapy is not simply a development of gestalt psychology but rather 
its heir. This heir had many parents, of which gestalt psychology is clearly one. Other inherited 
strains are also discernible and they are dealt with in chapter 3. Chapter 2 concludes, however, 
with a consideration of the several disciplines and discourses discernible in gestalt therapy.
Chapter 3 opens with a consideration of the nature of psychotherapeutic language. This serves to 
underline the ways in which any psychological theory rests upon philosophy, the more so when 
philosophy concerns itself so much with language. It also serves as a caution against the 
reification of psychological language and keeps the focus firmly on human experience. Next 
follows an examination of the influence on Perls and on gestalt therapy of the major contributors 
- Freud, Reich, Smuts, Friedlaender, Goldstein, the gestaltists, Lewin and, finally, the 
existentialists.
The way is then clear for a specifically gestalt (therapy) understanding of the human person. This 
is set out in chapter 4 as a view of the self and the process of contact through which the self is 
constituted. This is the heart of the gestalt approach, both as a therapy and also as a personal 
“philosophy of life”, and it forms the basis of several types of professional practice. This chapter 
continues by analysing, from all the preceding material, the core ideas found in gestalt. That 
concludes Part One of the thesis. 
Part Two opens with chapter 5, in which are introduced the range of schools of thought found in 
second-wave feminism. These schools of feminist thought are not tightly boundaried areas of 
discourse, but tend to overlap each other. Nor do they correspond exactly to individuals or groups 
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in the field of feminist theology. Rather, the overall picture of second wave feminism provides a 
context that supports the range of work that constitutes Christian feminist theology. After an 
introductory section on feminist perspectives on theology and the church, some sub-disciplines 
are examined in depth. These concern specific feminist contributions to Old and New Testament 
studies, pastoral theology, christology and spirituality. In chapter 6, the focus moves to an 
analysis of core ideas found in feminist theology - and that will, in turn, provide the matrix from 
which practical-values can be deduced. A great deal of work has been done by feminist scholars 
and by feminist theologians on these core ideas, so that there are many voices, some of them 
offering conflicting critiques. Part of the task of chapter 6 is to weigh these arguments and to 
decide how far they affect the reliability or usefulness of the core ideas for the purpose of 
establishing compatibility with gestalt. The chapter ends by looking forward to this test of 
compatibility and it concludes Part Two of the thesis.
Part Three opens with chapter 7, in which practical-values are further defined and those of gestalt 
and feminist theology are set out in a form that facilitates their comparison. The object of this 
comparison is to see if these values are compatible not merely at the level of their language but 
more importantly as values that inform practice. This is a crucial stage of the thesis. On the basis 
of this comparison, the aim of the thesis is realised, namely that, in terms of their practical-
values, gestalt and feminist theology are shown to be compatible and thus suitable candidates for 
interdisciplinary work.
What is also evident is that there are important differences between the foci or interests of gestalt 
and feminist theology and that these differences are reflected in their practical-values. The 
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process of deriving practical-values and comparing them is problematic since at several points 
there are countervailing voices. In the discussion of these problems, it is shown that, despite 
some continuing differences, there remains an overriding sense that gestalt and feminist theology 
are, on the basis established, compatible disciplines.
The thesis concludes with chapter 8 in which are set out the conclusions of the whole work. 
Unresolved problems and areas for possible further research are identified.
                                               
1      The theoretical implications include the philosophical (e.g. what are the epistemological 
bases of the two disciplines and how may they be compared?), as well as the more 
speculative (e.g. is there a hidden metaphysic in psychological theory?). Much work has 
been done on both sides of the dialogue, for example LAKE, F. Clinical Theology. London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966; HALMOS, P. The Faith of the Counsellors London: 
Constable, 1965; WILBER, K Up from Eden: a transpersonal view of human evolution. 
New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1981; as well as numerous papers in the writings of 
Freud (e.g. "The future of an illusion" In Civilisation, society and religion. London: Penguin, 
1985, vol. 12 of the Penguin Freud Library). Jung is often cited by Christians as an ally in 
the dialogue of psychology and theology since he uses many religious ideas and images. His 
archetypes and dream analysis are shot through with Christian terminology, e.g. JUNG, C G 
(ed.). Man and his symbols. London: Picador, 1978, pp.60-61. Jung apparently saw no 
contradictions in this, although he might be thought of as using the Christian traditions in a 
somewhat eclectic manner. LINDBECK, G A. The nature of doctrine: religion and theology 
in a postliberal age. London: SPCK, 1984, takes a different view. Adopting a “cultural-
linguistic” approach (p.18), he warns specifically against assuming that different religious 
groups share some core religious experience. The experiences arise in different cultures and 
may not be taken as equivalent (pp.39-40). It is not Lindbeck’s purpose to discuss the 
experience and language of psychotherapy, but his argument may be extended to the same 
conclusion.
2      The term is more closely defined in chapter 7.
3      PATTISON, S. "The use of the behavioural sciences in pastoral studies"  In BALLARD, P 
(ed.). The foundations of pastoral studies and practical theology. Cardiff: The Board of 
Studies for Pastoral Studies, The Faculty of Theology, University College, 1986, p.80
4      PATTISON, S with WOODWARD, J  A vision of pastoral theology: in search of words that 
resurrect the dead   Contact Pastoral Monograph No.4,  Edinburgh: Contact Pastoral Trust 
Ltd, 1994, pp.16-17 points up the necessity for (pastoral) theology to face reality, however 
painful and however much in conflict with wishful views of how the world should be. It is 
apophatic in character and "lives close to the dark, unexplained and unacceptable parts of 
life and treats of a God whose face is hidden in reality....."
    31
                                                                                                                                                    
5      In view of the long history of persecution by Christians (nominal and otherwise) of Jews in 
successive centuries, it has become inadequate to see the Holocaust as another of those times 
of madness which occasionally seize (Christian) cultures. DYSON, A. This is a reference to 
an unpublished lecture to the British and Irish Association for Practical Theology, 1995. 
ECCLESTONE, A. The night sky of the Lord. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1980: 
"For a very long time the Christian churches not only accustomed themselves to not asking 
questions about a great many aspects of life and human behaviour, but discouraged those 
who felt moved to do so." (p.10) .
6      Anti-semitism has been addressed as though it were the stance and activity of wicked 
persons who do not heed the Christian message: it is disowned. But theology is forged in a 
context by contextualised people. Unless one is content with a theology which is 
ultramondane and speculative, it is difficult to imagine how that could be otherwise. Even 
when a scholar struggles for objectivity, adheres strictly to text and eschews eisegetical 
tendencies, that person can only write out of a living context. Thus SIMON, U. A theology of 
salvation: a commentary on Isaiah 40-55. London: SPCK, 1953, notes in his Introduction: 
"A commentary written in this atomic age must add the burden of its era, must take into 
account such facts as could only figure as a great unknown to those who wrote before 1914 
or even 1944. These years, few in number, have not been ordinary years for the 
understanding of the Scriptures. Our catastrophic history is now part of the prophecy which 
we wish to expound; it may explain much, but it must not dominate the exegesis". The focus 
is deutero-Isaiah: the context is the writer's consciousness of the holocausts of Europe and 
Japan.
7      Existentialism is not the only or even the principal philosophical movement affecting 
theology in the past fifty years. The point here is that existentialism as represented by Tillich 
and others made an impact on specifically theological thinking, most of all during the 1960s.
8     BUBER, M..I and Thou. English translation, second (revised) edition, Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1958.
9     Ibid. Preface, p.2.
10    E.g. TILLICH, P. The courage to be. London: Fontana, 1962, where the author sets out his 
understanding. "The existential attitude is one of involvement in contrast to a merely 
theoretical or detached attitude. "Existential" in this sense can be defined as participating in a 
situation.... with the whole of one's existence. This includes temporal, spatial, historical, 
psychological, sociological, biological conditions...... This seems to contradict the necessary 
objectivity of the cognitive act and the demand for detachment in it."  Here are echoes of the 
indivisibility of I-Thou as distinct from I-It (Buber, 1958, pp.15-16).
11     Later in the same year, John Robinson wrote in The Honest to God debate: “To stress this 
existential, experiential element behind all the Christian's affirmations is not in the least to 
say that they are purely subjective, in the sense that they represent merely his way of looking 
at things, his resolve to think or live in a certain manner. The "promise to pay" is a two-way 
process. They are expressions of trust in a Reality which is trust-worthy; and the clauses of 
the Creed, the doctrines and forms of the church, describe this Reality, not just the 
individual's inner state. But they are subjective in the sense in which Kierkegaard said that 
"Truth is subjectivity". For truth beyond the level of mere information cannot, he insisted, be 
apprehended in a purely objective, "spectator" relationship, but only as a man is prepared to 
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stand, as subject, in an I-Thou relationship of engagement, trust and commitment. It is in this 
sense that Tillich can say (in his Systematic Theology vol. 1, 1953, p.299), that "all 
theological statements are existential": they have all in the last resort to be referred back to 
this relationship, and their cash value tested by it”. (Reproduced in BOWDEN, John (ed.) 
Thirty years of honesty: Honest to God then and now London: SCM, 1993, p.15 et seq).
12     ALTIZER, T J J. The gospel of Christian atheism. London: Collins, 1967, p.10. It should be 
noted, however, that Altizer actually cites Hegel, Nietzsche and William Blake more than 
any other authors including Tillich and Kierkegaard.
13     HAMPSON, D. Theology and feminism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
14     CUPITT, D.  Taking leave of God. London: SCM, 1980; and The religion of being. London: 
SCM, 1998. There is a sense in which Cupitt (1980) picks up from Robinson's Honest to 
God, arguing for taking leave as part of a journey begun in post-war existentialism, whereas 
Cupitt (1998) is more avowedly postmodern in his tone and philosophical argument.
15     HICK, J (ed.) The myth of God incarnate London: SCM, 1977.
16     Ibid p. ix. HICK, J. The metaphor of God incarnate. London: SCM, 1993 is evidence that 
the "growing knowledge" referred to undoubtedly exists and has developed further since the 
publication of Hick (1977). However, the loss of confidence in metaphysics is also there. For 
example, the reference to the second person of the Trinity is to a metaphysical notion. Also, 
the continuing debate is about a need to say something about Jesus that does justice to what, 
in a post-metaphysical age, we have either discovered recently or can now know (but could 
not previously know because our eyes were not attuned to see what was there).
17     BØRRESEN, Kari Elisabeth. "Women's studies of the Christian tradition: new perspectives" 
In  KING, U (ed). Religion and gender. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. "... I have prepared an 
extensive review-article on women's studies of the Christian tradition. This study covers 533 
books and articles published since about 1970, which I have found of special value...." 
(p.245)
18     This conference marks the beginning of the modern ecumenical movement. The 1910 World 
Missionary Conference at Edinburgh set up a Continuation Committee with a remit to bring 
into being the International Missionary Conference, forerunner, partner and finally integral 
part of the World Council of Churches. 
19     NEILL, S. Men of unity. London: SCM, 1960, p.22.
20     An example of this may be seen in Baptism, eucharist and ministry, a Faith and Order paper 
of the World Council of Churches, 1982. It may be described as "a consensus paper" (the 
Revd Donald Reece, General Synod Council for Christian Unity: personal communication), 
setting out the common ground of member churches and with the participation of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The paper is known as "the Lima document" and is a landmark theological 
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GESTALT: ORIGINS AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONSIDERATIONS
2. Introduction
   
This chapter examines the history of gestalt as a philosophical development arising in the late 
nineteenth century that laid a foundation for modern scientific psychology. That psychology 
provided a basis for one of the humanistic schools of psychotherapy that emerged in the 1960s. 
The forging of these links is a vital stage in an argument that exposes the roots of gestalt therapy 
in a philosophical movement that has influenced much of scientific thinking since its inception. 
Gestalt, though frequently unheralded, has formed a crucial part of the intellectual structure of the 
twentieth century and continues to do so. This argument is important for this thesis because it 
demonstrates that gestalt, in its depth and breadth, is a discipline whose scope is equivalent to 
that of feminist theology and thus a suitable candidate to be considered for compatibility.
In this advancing argument there are three types of discourse, or three types of quest. Moving 
between discourses is at the heart of interdisciplinary work and, of particular interest here, of 
pastoral theology. The fundamental problem is that of language and meaning as we move 
between the discourses of theology and psychology, but the same difficulties occur even within 
the discipline of gestalt. These difficulties are discussed in section 2.1, most particularly by 
reference to psychoanalytical theory of the late twentieth century. Next comes an examination of 
the (gestalt) philosophical quest (section 2.2), followed by an examination of the (psychological) 
scientific quest (section 2.3). Section 2.4 explores the psychotherapeutic quest.  The way is then 
open for a consideration of the origins of gestalt as it was first defined in philosophical circles 
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(section 2.5). The development of the Berlin school of gestalt psychology is described in section 
2.6 and it is contrasted with the Graz school with its countervailing theories. It was from the 
Berlin school that F S Perls and L Perls derived their gestalt psychology, and the links are 
explored between their gestalt therapy and gestalt psychology and philosophy (section 2.7). 
Section 2.8 identifies some philosophical issues inherent in gestalt thinking, leading to a 
consideration (in section 2.9) of ideas from gestalt philosophy which are seminal for gestalt 
therapy. These are grouped as follows: the subject as part of the Gestalt (2.10); the relationship of 
the whole and the parts (von oben nach unten - from the top downwards) (2.11); the breadth and 
inclusiveness of gestalt thinking (2.12); the relatedness of philosophy and psychology, including 
the views of the founder of experimental psychology, Carl Stumpf (2.13). The conclusion to this 
chapter (section 2.14) contains a summary of the linkages demonstrated between the three 
disciplines bearing the name gestalt, and it looks forward to an examination in chapter 3 of other 
influences on the development of gestalt therapy.
2.1 Interdisciplinary considerations
Gestalt therapy is often defined as one of the new, humanistic schools of psychotherapy1. And 
yet, towards the end of this thesis, it is compared to the older and ostensibly wider discipline of 
theology. Theology claims to address a broad spectrum of issues concerning persons, community 
and the cosmos: as a discipline, it has deep philosophical foundations. Since gestalt is to be 
juxtaposed with theology, it is important to take account of the philosophical and historical bases 
that shape its concerns, its resources and its practical approach, and to establish the integrity of 
these with each other. Only then can the ideas and values of the two disciplines be usefully 
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compared.
The history of gestalt began in Prague in the late nineteenth century in the philosophy department 
of the German University. It is noteworthy, however, that some of that department's post-graduate 
students (e.g. Mach and Einstein) are known today as scientists. A few were psychologists whose 
work led to new developments in what became known as psychotherapy. Their work pre-dates 
the creation of separate faculties of physical sciences, psychology and philosophy. Over a century 
later, interdisciplinary work is increasing, but the clock has not been rolled back. Interdisciplinary 
work today requires that the researcher examine the validity of connections made between 
different types of discourse or quest. So far as gestalt is concerned, there are three principal types 
of discourse or quest entailed. Each quest has its particular focus2, and each is illustrated by an 
assertion. First is the philosophical quest that has at its heart a quest for certainty. Second is the 
scientific quest (including the enquiries of the gestalt psychologists) whose purpose is to answer 
specific questions. Third is the psychotherapeutic quest, which is about a negotiated and common 
reality recognised by the therapist and the patient. Each of these assertions is considered in the 
following three sections.
2.2 The philosophical quest
The dialogue between experiencing and thinking (retrospectively or speculatively) about 
experience is one of the most sophisticated achievements of the circuitry of the human cerebral 
cortex3, i.e. it is fundamental to the development of our species individually and collectively. It 
forms the basis of all philosophical discourse including that of gestalt philosophy. But, before 
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examining gestalt philosophy, it is necessary to consider some of the problems intrinsic to such 
discourse.  The dialogue between experiencing and thinking is a way of looking at awareness and 
reflective thought (crucial in gestalt therapy), but it suggests some problematic dimensions of the 
philosophical quest that are examined in recent critical thinking. 
We ask ultimate questions about being because we are the kind of creatures that are able to ask 
such questions4. Gone are claims to absolute status for ultimate questions: it is no longer enough 
to state that ontology is a form of enquiring into God, the source of all that is. Nor has the 
removal of God from any agreed frame of reference left a space for some new absolute or 
transcendent entity or subject. In fact, since the end of the medieval period it has not been 
possible to establish an intellectual consensus founded on belief in a simple cosmos under an 
agreed transcendent God. In times when those conditions did exist, there was the possibility that 
a philosophical Archimedes might recognise: it might have been possible to use those conditions 
as a fulcrum and to conceive of ideational levers with which to move or manipulate the cosmos. 
Now, no matter what levers one constructs, there is no accepted fulcrum on which they may rest.
It can be argued that many philosophical systems are, in fact, attempts to find such a fulcrum or 
basis. This point can be argued by considering three examples. If one considers, for example, 
Whitehead and Russell's Principia mathematica5, one can see how far the radical empiricism of 
William James or the idealism of Immanuel Kant had failed to satisfy some important intellectual 
needs in the period under consideration6. Whitehead and Russell were writing at a time of rapid 
scientific development: thus it was that mathematics seemed, especially to Russell, to be the tool 
of more fundamental thinking and of a more powerful logic. However the quest for a surer basis 
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and for greater certainty did not stay with mathematics, but turned to other types of language, to 
words and syntax. Out of this enquiry grew the schools of logical positivism and of linguistic 
analysis. However, this same fascination with language and its meanings as possible foundations 
for a new philosophical approach - that is, for a baseline upon which to erect reliable intellectual 
structures - found expression in yet other ways. In France, for example, Lacan directed attention 
to primitive human experience and to a revision of Freud's psychoanalytic theory which created a 
new framework of and about language. Because, as will be shown, gestalt relies so heavily upon 
psychoanalysis in terms of its theoretical structures, this critique of Freudian theory is of 
particular significance for this thesis. There is one further reason for following the work of Lacan 
- and later of a colleague and critic, Julia Kristeva - and that is because both Lacan and Kristeva 
focus attention on the experiencing subject. It is that experiencing subject who is at the heart of 
later considerations in the thesis about both gestalt and feminist theology.
A strong sense of ambiguity about language and especially about psychological discourse is 
evident in Lacan's reinterpretation of Freud7. With his focus on language and meaning, he pointed 
out how Freud has been misunderstood and mistranslated. But his concern took 
psychotherapeutic terminology much further than an apparently simple search for certainty in the 
form of agreed meaning with overtones and undertones. Commenting on Lacan's terminology, 
Eagleton focuses on the notion of the infantile ego8. It is constituted, he says, by the infant's mis-
recognition of itself in the mirror of an experienced self, i.e. the mother. In the primary symbiosis 
of mother-infant, the infant has a sense of itself by identifying with the symbiotic unit. Put 
another way, it has an emerging sense of itself by experiencing its mother as an extension of 
itself. Clinically speaking this is what Freud recognised as primary narcissism9, and Eagleton 
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comments:
For Lacan, the ego is just this narcissistic process whereby we bolster up a fictive sense of 
unitary selfhood by finding something in the world with which we can identify.10
Lacan's development of the term ego does not stop at that point. For, as the child develops in this 
primary ("mirror") stage, the development is given fresh impetus and direction by the 
intervention (or by its growing awareness) of a third party in its life. It is the father who makes up 
the third corner of the oedipal triangle. Father introduces into the child's life a new principle, that 
of "law" - specifically a law that forbids the continuance or further development of the libidinal 
symbiosis of mother and child. Law for Lacan is an aspect of the phallus. It is this phallic 
principle or dynamic which simultaneously creates awareness of sexual difference, creates the 
unconscious by showing up some impulses as forbidden and to be repressed, and which begins 
the process of socialisation.
Lacan, in using the term phallus, does not mean the penis of the child's father11. Rather, phallus is 
a signifier: the signified is, inter alia, law, separation of one from another, necessary repression, 
and differentiation - not just of the sexes, but as the essence of the ordering of life and society. 
The phallus is for Lacan the supreme signifier in that its signifieds are fundamental to every 
aspect of post-oedipal life. It is no accident that this critical transition occurs around the time that 
language is developing, for language is about the ordering of life and being able to manage that 
order. As the child learns language, so it moves away from a stage in which all is experienced in 
terms of images (the "imaginary" world order of the child) to a symbolic order, one in which 
experience comes in terms of language and is manipulated by language. Whilst there are gains in 
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this development, there are also losses. What is lost, in Lacan's view, is the direct apprehension 
of reality, of mother's self. In its place is the attempt to connect with experience by using 
signifiers. We are cut off from the "real" (our primary, if narcissistic, state). Eagleton comments 
that our "imaginary" lives may be seen as "metaphorical", by which he means having stable 
meaning: whereas our "symbolic" lives are "metonymic" by which he signifies unending chains 
of signifiers which suggest yet other signifiers and whose signifieds may be repressed or 
otherwise unascertainable12.
A different view of such matters can be found in the work of Kristeva, a feminist philosopher 
who brings together political and psychoanalytic theory. She takes issue with a number of Lacan's 
central tenets including the archetypal masculine notion of the symbolic order founded on the 
transcendental phallic signifier. In her view, such a scheme is the rationale of a masculine and 
patriarchal society and represents the wherewithal of women's oppression. Further, such a 
masculine view does not offer a satisfactory account of the existence of different, i.e. feminine, 
aspects of persons, nor does it take into account direct experiences that we undoubtedly have of 
others and ourselves where we do not appear to be alienated by language. From her viewpoint as 
a feminist writer, a fuller understanding of human development must take account of both 
masculine and feminine characteristics. She does not deny the centrality of language in our lives, 
and accepts that the oedipal conflict does resolve in ways suggested by Lacan. However, within 
language itself - its usage and the richness of inherited meanings and associations - other 
dynamics are evident that challenge attempts at tight meaning, and that overthrow attempts at 
definition and fixity. Within the symbolic order Kristeva identifies something more fluid and 
anarchic which she called the "semiotic"13. In accepting Lacan's assertion of the symbolic order, 
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she distinguishes:
....two modalities of what is, for us, the same signifying process. We shall call the first 
"the semiotic" and the second "the symbolic". These two modalities are inseparable 
within the signifying process that constitutes language, and the dialectic between them 
determines the type of discourse (narrative, metalanguage, theory, poetry, etc.) involved; 
in other words, so-called "natural" language allows for different modes of articulation of 
the semiotic and the symbolic. On the other hand, there are non-verbal signifying systems 
that are constructed exclusively on the basis of the semiotic (music, for example). But, as 
we shall see, this exclusivity is relative, precisely because of the necessary dialectic 
between the two modalities of the signifying process, which is constitutive of the subject. 
Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he 
produces can be either "exclusively" semiotic or "exclusively" symbolic, and is instead 
necessarily marked by indebtedness to both.14
In the notion of semiotics (from the Greek semeion, a sign, mark, token or pledge), there is a 
clear link between the "imaginary" and what follows in normal development. It is a feminine 
principle - not confined to women, but arising from a stage before sexes were distinguished. The 
difference of sexes is not the only phallic distinction to be challenged: all the usual polarities of 
experience (e.g. sane vs. mad) are called into question. The semiotic function is often described 
as the antithesis of the symbolic order15, but to state it thus is to define it negatively and to 
suggest that it is secondary or dependent on the symbolic. The reality, however, is that it is 
continuous with the earlier state where direct access to experience is a possibility, and where the 
experience of relatedness (rather than difference and separateness) is primary. It stands directly 
on the foundation of our being and represents also our life's striving and its end or goal.
In the area of psychic structure and function, Kristeva obliges us to imagine an ego at once 
divided and united within itself. For the semiotic function exists within Lacan's symbolic order. It 
is contained by the symbolic order and exists in opposition to it. In practical experience, it is 
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often the factor that disrupts plans and schemes: and it may well prevent the masculine function 
from acting contrary to the interests of relatedness and other fundamental considerations. Even 
though the feminine is present in both male and female persons, it is probably this last 
observation more than any other which has led women and men to comment that women are a 
civilising influence relative to men. And it is probably the very chaotic or anarchic aspects of our 
semiotic selves which has led to the marginalising of femininity and the marginalising of women 
as representing that aspect of humanity. Thus, in the ego envisaged by Kristeva, we can see 
masculine and feminine, the phallic / symbolic and the feminine / semiotic in an unending 
tension. Kristeva’s "I" is thus more complex and more dynamic still than Lacan's and Freud's.
Much of the criticism levelled at Lacan and, to a lesser extent at Kristeva, turns on the difficulties 
in understanding what they are communicating. In their attempts to pin down something about 
the nature of human beings and of experience, they present images that are ambiguous, sliding 
and allusive. The visions of Lacan and Kristeva are at once intriguing and unsatisfying because, 
whatever the intellectual ferment of a particular age or culture, the philosophical quest remains 
demonstrably one to discover a basis for further construction. In this instance, the quest is to
discover if it is possible to articulate, in something more than a private language, what it is to be 
conscious, what knowing is, how we know what we know, and how to recognise the limits of our 
knowing. In short, it is, in at least two senses, a search for certainty. The first of these senses of 
certainty concerns what is reliable, sure and not to be doubted. Philosophers need to start from 
somewhere, preferably somewhere where others can also start. The second sense is a more 
interior one, linked to the first. It seems to be a human requirement that we have some (even 
arbitrary) certainties in our lives. Human beings cannot live without some fixed points: if 
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everything were unfixed and changing we should probably be unable to function and have to 
withdraw to some imaginary certainties, which would be a movement into irrationalism, 
fundamentalism or even psychosis. Somewhere between the polar extremes of everything being 
known (or, at least, defined) and nothing being known or knowable is the saving observation that 
sceptical philosophers have often been the most conservative of people. Technically doubting the 
substantiality of the material world, they have been content to own houses and take up 
gardening.. 
One implication of Lacan's understanding of the various "I" agencies is that the quest for certainty 
in the present age is unlikely to prove fruitful. The appeal to language has brought philosophers 
to a point where the glissement between the signifier and the signified renders tentative all 
foundations and a fortiori all conclusions. In the existentialist movements of the 1930s - 1950s, 
this uncertainty led some to conclude that death was the only certainty upon which a person 
might rely16. Philosophy may develop through the present period of postmodern relativism and 
discover - if not certainty - then some reliable intellectual basis for being human and being in 
relationship. The danger in a period of uncertainty is of reactive movements away from what may 
be a logically and morally necessary uncertainty into, for example, religious fundamentalism or 
political fascism. These, if one is to follow Fromm's thesis, are the likely consequences arising 
out of existential anxiety17.
This mood of uncertainty and negative expectation regarding the future should be set against 
some countervailing work. Examples of a more pragmatic - perhaps more human - certainty are 
found in the moral consensus basis of Etzioni's Communitarianism and in Habermas' notion of 
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civil society18. These both represent attempts to define a new vision for human living. They are 
part of an ongoing quest for a basis for living which gives a necessary degree of certainty, offers 
an intellectual and moral basis for community and governance, and points to epistemological and 
hermeneutical tools for testing outcomes and directing future development.
2.3 The scientific quest
Science (derived from the Latin scientia, knowledge) has overall the meaning associated with its 
Latin root. That is to say, science denotes knowledge. It also signifies something studied and 
learned, a discipline to be pursued. In the definitions of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
the so-called Natural Sciences of physics and chemistry are not indicated until one reaches 4:
A branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated 
truths or with observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by 
being brought under general laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the 
discovery of new truth within its own domain,1725.19  
The date in this dictionary entry sets this familiar and current meaning in the context of what is 
referred to as the Enlightenment. That period of intellectual and cultural development in Europe 
represents, amongst other features, the ground recovered from (or lost by) metaphysics, and the 
lengthy end process of a Weltanschauung (world view) that includes a realm of absolutes. These 
absolutes had been held to be, by definition, beyond reason and deduction. Reason had been 
secondary, and its function had been to infer or induce whatever was consequent or dependent on 
those absolutes. The Enlightenment represents an end product of philosophical and scientific 
thinking from Descartes to Hume. Of immediate concern here is the impetus it gave to the 
scientific quest.
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One may demonstrate that impetus by referring to two important figures in philosophical and 
scientific thinking, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It was Hobbes (1588 – 1679) who, in 
contrast to his near contemporary Leibniz, asserted the empirical basis of human knowledge20. He 
had met Galileo, an empirical scientist, and Descartes, upon whose rationalism his own thought 
relied. Hobbes regarded science as a deductive discipline and mathematics (a species of reason) 
as its principal tool for proofs.  Both Hobbes and Locke were opposed to what they saw as 
absolutism in contemporary thinking. Both were politically conscious and informed. At the time 
of the Restoration in England in 1669, they opposed any notion of monarchy that was not 
founded upon a contractual understanding of government and governed. This is a political 
analogue for other areas of their thinking, including, for example, theology21. It was Hobbes who 
laid down a scientific principle (one which could be upheld today only in a metaphorical sense22), 
when he asserted that all sensation derives from motion, and that philosophy is the study of 
effects arising from causes and of the causes underlying effects. His mathematical and physical 
view of the universe came too late in life for a full development, and anyway the physical 
sciences were not his primary interest. Locke (1632-1704), though he differed in important 
political respects from Hobbes, saw that the kind of philosophical empiricism they both promoted 
had material and scientific implications. He was confident that his own work supported and was 
supported by that of many eminent contemporaries23.
In sum then, the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries represented an important turning 
point in philosophy. The Enlightenment gave new value to human understanding24, and offered 
scientific learning both a philosophical basis and the stimulus of liberation from metaphysical 
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trammels that had previously undermined or discouraged confidence in empiricism and reason25. 
The expansion of science in its modern and more popular sense was a rapid one, and the 
nineteenth century brought about a further divergence into discrete sciences, e.g. physics, 
chemistry, and biological and medical sciences. The transition from the nineteenth to the 
twentieth century marked the emergence of the human sciences, e.g. anthropology, psychology 
and sociology. These new “soft” sciences based their claim to be sciences (rather than humanities 
such as literature or philosophy) upon their methods and standards. That is to say, their work is 
based upon reason and deduction, upon empirically verifiable data and, often, upon repeatable 
experiments and falsifiable hypotheses. Arguments that they are not sciences must therefore be 
treated with caution since they contain the polemics of rival interest groups. To be sure, 
psychology is not the same discipline as chemistry. But, in the field of psychology as in 
chemistry, any theory must be based upon reason.  It must, at the least, be consistent with 
empirical observation and be compatible with data from other workers in the field and from other 
sciences. It must also be sufficiently developed to interface with other disciplines touching on the 
same field of endeavour. There would be, for example, little point in clinging to a psychological 
theory that contradicted what is known about human physiology or neurological behaviour.
There can be no doubt that, for many people, science is seen as that quest which should be able to 
offer satisfactory answers to all of life's questions. However, science in the narrow sense in which 
4 of the Oxford English Dictionary entry defines it, is not the whole of science. The so-called 
"natural sciences" such as mathematics, physics, chemistry are not, by their very nature, able to 
offer answers to all questions that are important to those who ask them. If a person asks if life has 
any meaning, that is not something for which mathematics has answers. That is rather a question 
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that, however imprecise, suggests emotional need as well as intellectual curiosity. It might be a 
question for a philosopher to answer, although, on the face of it, philosophy on its own is unlikely 
to satisfy the implicit emotional search. If, however, the enquirer were to ask about the meaning 
of time, then, although philosophers, theologians and psychotherapists might have things to say, 
the most satisfying answers (to the face value of the question) are likely to come from 
mathematicians or physicists who have specialised in cosmological questions. The question about 
time is (again, at face value) a specific question about what appears to people as a phenomenon 
of the cosmos. It may contain or mask another (philosophical) question about a basis for 
certainty, but it does not present in that way and may be dealt with specifically.
The scope and limits of the scientific quest is illustrated by Stephen Hawking's A brief history of 
Time. It was an attempt by a mathematician and cosmologist to open the eyes of non-scientists 
(and other scientists) to the debate about relativity and cosmological theories. These theories are, 
of course, more than mere speculations. For a speculation or idea to be accorded in scientific 
discourse the status of a theory, it must conform to certain criteria. For example, a theory must 
rest on a base of non-selective data, i.e. it must fit the known facts. It must also be intellectually 
satisfying without reference to unknown or unknowable third terms. The deus ex machina of the 
eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, for example, would not be acceptable, nor would the 
introduction of some other scientific entity, e.g. introducing a new sub-atomic particle, unless, of 
course, the existence of such a particle can be demonstrated and is the point of the theory.
Hawking's book may well contain some of the answers to the specific questions of scientific 
cosmology: only an experienced cosmologist could offer useful criticism on that score. In the 
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present context, however, his book is open to criticism where he enters the province of the 
philosophy of religion. His notions of (the mind of) God may well indicate an attitude of 
reverence for some cosmic creator, initiator or conductor. They do not, however, do service as 
theoretical contributions to the ongoing debate about the nature of God, since Hawking 
demonstrates little experience of that debate. Theories about the nature of God are part of another 
discipline whose written corpus and oral tradition has been built up over centuries26.
In his reference to the mind of God, Hawking moves from one discourse to another as though that 
were unproblematic. There is no apparent recognition that cosmological theories are not of the 
same order as onto-theological ones, even if, as in this instance, both appear to be about 
teleology. To illustrate this, one could say that the creation narratives of the Bible were not 
intended to be scientific treatises opening the way for the emergence of 'string' theory and so are 
not invalidated by such an omission. By the same token, the absence in the Genesis accounts of 
clear references to background radiation should not be taken as a serious challenge to those 
whose business is the measurement of that radiation.
The disciplines of science are important for this thesis because gestalt therapy owes much to the 
science of experimental psychology as well as to the phenomenological enquiry and theories of 
gestalt philosophy. As a branch of psychological science, gestalt must meet the criteria of 
scientific discourse. As a scientific discipline, it attempts to answer the kinds of questions for 
which people sense that there are specific answers. Like some other branches of scientific 
discourse, it also finds itself facing ultimate questions that push its methodology into further 
development.
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2.4 The psychotherapeutic quest
The philosophical quest is ultimately one for certainty, while the scientific quest is for answers to 
specific questions about how we experience the world and what it is that we experience. The two 
quests are about different types of reality. The interactions in the psychotherapist's consulting 
room involve yet another kind of reality, one that can be perceived  - and is framed and described 
- by the patient and therapist together. The therapeutic dyad is involved in a quest that is in part 
philosophical. There are implicit philosophical questions about whatever transcends the 
immanent details of our lives, about what constitutes reality and about how we know what we 
know. It can also be argued that there is a search for certainty, perhaps here more than in most 
areas of human endeavour. However, the psychotherapeutic search is not one which can usefully 
be carried out in philosophical terms, for the answers of philosophy would not meet effectively 
the needs of most therapy patients. Philosophical reasoning, as John Stuart Mill discovered in his 
depressive illness, cannot be expected to deal effectively with emotions and matters of the 
heart27. Mill's life offers a powerful illustration of this point. He had been stunted through a lack 
of emotional nourishment in spite of his father’s care and the extraordinary philosophical and 
scientific education he gave his son. In his anxiety and melancholy, Mill had struggled to build 
up intellectual structures in an attempt to grapple with the realities of his life. The intellectual 
structures did not break down, but Mill did, and he found his healing in the warm and passionate 
relationship he made with Harriet Taylor. He had needed to find a different reality that could 
bring new meaning to his life and heal old wounds.
Perhaps the scientific approach would have something to offer a sufferer. Neuroscience, for 
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example, has much to offer in our understanding and treatment of emotional pain and mental 
illness28. The scientific quest also has much to offer to psychotherapy as a discipline. For 
example, the approaches and outcomes of various schools of psychotherapy are usefully 
subjected to scientific scrutiny. This is because it is not yet possible to define how psychotherapy 
works in the same way we know how the internal combustion engine works or how plants 
function. However, as those analogies suggest, there are limits to such methods: there is a conflict
between psychotherapeutic approaches based on an understanding of healing relationships and 
approaches which arise from the scientific quest and which assume that most questions are 
susceptible to a scientific approach. It is, for example, unsatisfactory to the scientific psychologist 
to be told that people get better "because of the therapeutic relationship". It also comes as 
unwelcome news to medical insurance companies when they are told that measurement of 
successful outcome is something between difficult and impossible. That is one important reason 
why, in recent years, there has been excitement in the psychotherapeutic press about newer, 
shorter and what are sometimes held to be more effective types of psychotherapy29. It is 
suggested that NHS managers could countenance the provision of “brief therapies” because of 
their cost / benefit profile.
However much one sympathises with the concerns of service providers, that language is 
sufficient to remind one that this presents another example of blurring the boundaries between 
different discourses. It may be right (morally and practically) for health economists and health 
service managers to operate as part of a scientific quest. But questions about what psychotherapy 
is for, what it does and how it works do not belong primarily in the discourse of economics and 
management. They stand as questions in their own right, and the answers to such questions 
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should be seen first in the context of the work done by therapists and patients, i.e. in the healing 
of those who suffer. There is thus a way in which the scientific quest may not hold sway in the 
discipline and practice of psychotherapy. The psychotherapeutic quest has its own methods and 
its own goals.  This may be illustrated by a brief consideration of the goals of its practitioners.
The goals of psychotherapists are limited. They hope that, at the end of therapy, their patients will 
be able to live their lives with other people in ways that are mutually enhancing. They hope they 
may suffer no more anxiety than any healthy person may should in a stressful culture, and that 
their sufferings should be the normal ones of changing relationships, of loss and other 
vicissitudes. They hope that the therapy has been effective in promoting the growth in their 
patients' personalities previously arrested or deformed by overwhelmingly negative experiences.
One way of describing the work of therapy is to say that patient and therapist have met and 
compared realities. Such meeting suggests a dialogical view of therapy that relies on Buber's 
notion of the I-Thou encounter. This was developed by Perls and his early colleagues and 
continues in the work of, for example, Yontef30. It is a view central to the theory and practice of 
gestalt therapy, although not confined to that school. The assertion that therapy entails meeting -
and meeting in such a way that the parties involved compare their realities - does not imply that 
the therapist is the one in touch with "real" reality while the patient is in touch with "unreal" 
reality. It is more accurate to state that the therapist is trained to register where the patient's reality 
does not accord with her own. There are many ways in which this might happen. An example will 
serve to make the point.
A patient, N., has had many appalling experiences throughout her childhood of being sexually 
57
molested and violated by men. So much has this been the case, that she has concluded (i.e. 
reached a position from which it is apparent) that all men are rapists. This conclusion is real to 
her. That is to say: she is being realistic in her assertion because it comes from a life made up of 
pain and fear. Her reality is not the only reality open to people, but it is inescapable for her. It
would be insulting, as well as useless, to argue with her that her conclusion is unrealistic (in the 
sense of being unreasonable or untrue). The object in the gestalt psychotherapeutic encounter is 
not to persuade N. by use of logic to think in some different way, although some cognitive 
approaches contain large elements of this. The dialogical approach requires first of all a meeting, 
and that meeting must be, insofar as it lies in the powers of the two parties, based on mutual 
respect, a meeting of an I and a Thou. This implicit acceptance of the reality of N. by the 
therapist, C., is not a technique. Indeed, were that to be the case, N. would feel patronised and the 
work would be unlikely to proceed. C. is a man, and at times feels uncomfortable because it was 
men in N’s family who violated her. It is important therefore that he is able to hold on to other 
realities besides that of N. For example, he should be aware of his own capacity for trespass 
against women and children, even if that has never amounted to what could be termed an abuse. 
He should equally be aware of his own development as a man who wishes women and children 
well, and who confronts not only gross violations but also lesser trespasses against other people -
whether they emanate from others or from himself. He needs sometimes to remind himself that 
he is not a rapist. And, at times, he notices and is gladdened by recognising other aspects of N.'s 
reality, e.g. that she is consulting him, and seeking at some level to meet him. This seeking may 
contain unaware masochistic impulses to repeat a bad experience, but, more likely when seen 
from a gestalt perspective, it represents N.'s attempt to put right the wrongs of the past. In other 
words, this may be N.'s latest attempt to prove that her reality is not the only reality, nor one to 
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which she wishes to cling. Over time, an atmosphere of trust, arising from shared safe 
experience, makes it possible for one or other party to focus their joint attention on the 
phenomena of their meetings. Any healing of the past hurts that make up N.'s reality can only 
happen as that reality is both taken seriously and also confronted dialectically by an alternative 
reality. That other reality is, in part, the reality held by C., but it is most of all a reality which N. 
and C. have created between them.
So far as the psychotherapeutic quest is concerned, N.'s reality was modified when she began to 
lose her fear, to express her anger at past injustices, to grieve for the loss of her childhood, to 
uncover and to heal the shame she had borne. C.'s reality also changed. In experiencing at close 
quarters the harm that boys and men can do, he had to revisit his own development, and was 
challenged afresh in his dealings with women in his life. He was also encouraged in his work 
with other men in his professional life and in his dealings with male friends and colleagues. 
These outcomes - for N. and for C. - are not separate events. They are aspects of a shared reality 
at which the two of them arrived over the course of eighteen months. That shared reality was 
characterised by their recognition of the personal, social and cultural factors in the rearing of men 
that require women to operate a practical hermeneutic of suspicion. It also entailed detecting 
where trust may be built and developing tools with which to do that. In the meeting of N. and C. 
there was often a playfulness and lightness which had been impossible at first but which enabled 
further therapeutic progress to be made, as when N. checked out with C. something that puzzled 
her about a man she was getting to know. She found that anything could be disclosed and 
discussed.
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The psychotherapeutic quest overlaps the philosophical and the scientific quests. It is concerned 
with the search for certainty and for fundamental understandings that underpin and give 
coherence to much else. It is also concerned with the scientific interest in answers to specific 
questions and it espouses some of the epistemological and methodological interests of science. 
Psychotherapy has, however, its own disciplines and methods that relate to the dyad of patient (or 
group of patients) and therapist in their search for a practical or liveable reality. It is important for 
patient and therapist that this reality is philosophically coherent and does not fly in the face of 
scientific knowledge and methods. A gestalt approach to therapy emphasises the 
phenomenological and dialogical nature of reality and it is this approach which will inform the 
later work of establishing and comparing practical-values.
2.5 Gestalt philosophy
The three quests examined above arise from three different types of discourse and have different 
frames of reference and aims. In the present context the focus of each quest is the examination of 
gestalt as a discipline. First, we shall pursue the philosophical quest. The story of gestalt 
philosophy began in 1890 with the publication in Vienna of a paper entitled "On 'Gestalt 
Qualities'"31 by Christian von Ehrenfels, a philosophy professor in the German University in 
Prague. Von Ehrenfels, like many of the early gestalt philosophers, was a keen musician. His 
paper was a response to one written by an influential contemporary philosopher of science32, 
Ernst Mach. Mach had, in accordance with his aims, attempted a definition of sensation 
(Empfindung) which was a key term in the whole of his work33. Von Ehrenfels found the 
definition logically contradictory, although useful in its turn as it pushed him towards a deductive 
60
understanding about sensations and the perception of entities (such as a spatial shape or a musical 
melody) which became fundamental to gestalt psychology34. Both papers triggered prolonged 
debate. The fundamental question at the centre of the debate was an ontological one about the 
nature of experience. Taking into account the concerns of Mach and von Ehrenfels, this 
fundamental question may be refined and restated in this manner: what are complex perceived 
formations such as spatial figures or (musical) melodies?
The fact that the question could be asked in this acute way owes much to von Ehrenfels' principal 
teacher, Franz Brentano, and also to another teacher and friend, Alexius Meinong. Brentano had a 
profound influence on contemporary ways of thinking. He was teaching at a time when atomistic 
thinking, perhaps best understood as a reductionist extension of the implicit and explicit 
analytical philosophies of the Age of Reason, had failed to give more than merely logical 
answers, i.e. answers wholly determined by the questions which they were framed to resolve. The 
direction of answers in such a positivistic, materialistic context always pointed further down the 
reductionist scale. In short, such answers could not satisfy what were, in the philosophical circles 
of the German University, then being seen as primarily ontological enquiries.
Brentano taught at a time when science, philosophy and psychology were not so discrete in the 
minds of educated people as they are today. The structures of university schools and departments 
reflected this integrated understanding. Brentano schooled his students in philosophical 
experimentation, in the use of subjective and objective observation of the phenomena of 
behaviour and of things, and in the differentiation of types of psychic phenomena. His overriding 
interest was in an ontology of mind, and that led him into the fields of intentionality and of 
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perception35, although it must be said that he repudiated the notions of "Gestalt quality" later 
associated with both Meinong and von Ehrenfels.
     
Von Ehrenfels had set out from a point of agreement with Brentano. His questions were 
Brentano-type ontological ones, seemingly disingenuous in their form. He was, for instance, 
interested in the nature of sensations (Empfindungen), the subject of Mach's book and of 
Brentano's then unpublished lectures (Deskriptive Psychologie) on the matter. Mach had used the 
example of a musical melody in some of his work and had sought to analyse the ontological 
status of what is signalled by the term "melody". Von Ehrenfels put the question thus: "Is a 
melody (i) a mere sum [Zusammenfassung] of elements, or (ii) something novel in relation to this 
sum, something that certainly goes hand in hand with, but is distinguishable from, the sum of 
elements?"36.
As a composition student with Anton Bruckner, von Ehrenfels was in his element with this 
enquiry. His answer to the melody question was firmly in favour of (ii). He saw that, from the 
atomistic-reductionist point of view, music is "a sum of tones....... brought to presentation", but it 
does not tell us what constitutes melody as such. He illustrated this point by reference to a folk 
tune which he quotes37: he points out that anyone, musician or not, can recognise a tune, no 
matter what its key (and in some keys, none of the notes in certain other keys would be 
employed). Nor is the recognition of melody simply a matter of rhythm, nor an assembly of the 
"right" notes in a different order, nor solely of the musical intervals. Rather what is perceived is a 
complex set of relationships on the analogy of spatial relationships. It was that set of relationships
- and not just the aural impact of certain tones - which constituted the particular Gestalt. One 
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could change all the tones in the "sum of tones" by a simple shift of key and yet the melody 
would still be recognisable: and, if it were played to one on a first occasion wrongly, one might 
have a strong suspicion that this was the case. He came to the conclusion that something else is 
"given" in the experience of melody which is over and above the mere "sum of tones", which he 
referred to as Gestaltqualität.
The word Gestalt has a long history in the German language and has accrued a range of 
meanings. It derives by metaphorical extension from the Old High German "stalla", meaning "a 
place to stand" (cognate with the English "stall"). By further extension it came to mean form or 
shape (as in Goethe's Gretchen am Spinnrade, "Sein hoher Gang, Sein' edle Gestalt" – “His 
stately gait, His noble figure”) and can be applied both to people and things. Figuratively, it can
mean something else, as in "sich in seiner wahren Gestalt zeigen" (to show oneself in one's true 
colours - literally, one's true shape). Thus it was that, in discussion of Mach's paper on the 
perception of spatial and musical figures (the latter a metaphorical extension of the former), the 
word Gestalt was available. Indeed, one might suggest that, for von Ehrenfels, the term Gestalt
was given in that process whereby the units of the overall experience of his thinking were 
brought to presentation.
Whether or not that is so, he believed that, in addition to the elements constituent of a visual 
presentation and their spatial or quasi-spatial determinants, there is concomitant with them a 
further quality or attribute. This occurs in such a way that we must say of our visual or 
quasi-visual experience that we do not experience a mere sum or complex of sensory elements 
but a unity. Further, von Ehrenfels’ syntax, in common with that of the school of Brentano, 
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suggests quite clearly that this is not simply a matter of our subjective perception, but that this 
experience is indeed "given" in (e.g. aural or visual) presentation. He states specifically that 
"Gestalt qualities are given in consciousness simultaneously with their foundations38, without any 
activity of mind specifically directed towards them". One could even ask if there exist Gestalt
qualities quite independently of observers, or one might enquire if these qualities exist in 
conjunction with the observer as another Gestalt.
If von Ehrenfels' writing and illustrations are complex when he deals with simple sensory data, 
the complexity increases as he attempts to show how the theory may be applied to abstract levels 
of activity and to multi-sensory experiences. One important insight emerging from these 
illustrations is that events which involve different aspects of reality39 are not correlates of 
different mental faculties, but are whole events or experiences that involve, potentially at least, 
the whole of us in one unified movement. Von Ehrenfels – without using the language of holistic 
perception or holistic experience - was defining a key aspect of what was later recognised as 
right-hemisphere (or, more accurately, sub-dominant hemisphere) brain function40. However, it 
took the work of his student, Wertheimer, and other members of the Berlin school of gestalt 
psychology, to offer satisfactory theories connecting brain function and gestalt perception. Even 
then, it was a further thirty years before more detailed physiological data would be available.
   
Von Ehrenfels was not, of course, working in a philosophical vacuum. His notion of gestalt 
qualities is paralleled, for example, by Husserl's notion of "species". Husserl, influenced as he 
was by his teacher Carl Stumpf (also an associate of Brentano), was working on an ontology 
which could illuminate the commonplace observation that persons tend to take in configuration 
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(Gestalt) at one glance, that we do not see one bird and another and another ......., but a flock of 
birds: we see "flock-ness" as a phenomenon. By giving the notion of "flock" an ontological 
status, Husserl extended von Ehrenfels' concept of a Gestalt quality in perception and added to 
subsequent debate about different orders of Gestalt - rather than, for instance, different levels of 
abstraction.
Von Ehrenfels' paper continued with a section on orders of Gestalt qualities in a way not 
paralleled by Husserl. He gave as his example a geometric pattern in which a great many shapes 
offered themselves (were indeed apparently present) but in which one overall pattern seemed to 
predominate. It was this predominance which fascinated him and led to his brief speculation 
about orders of Gestaltqualitäten. His last paper on the matter of Gestaltqualitäten was dictated 
to his wife shortly before his death in 193241. In it he takes further the matter of orders, 
approaching as he does so, a Platonic sense of Ideas, hinting perhaps at a progression of 
Gestalten toward some infinite or even absolute Qualität.
Although von Ehrenhfels was the first to write of Gestaltqualitäten, he used common 
terminology when he wrote of "foundations" or "fundamenta" (what we might today call "bits of 
data") and thus of "founded contents", a term which describes what he more elegantly called 
Gestalten. The language of fundamenta and founded contents provided the thinking tools for a 
number of disciplines of which psychology and linguistics are only two examples42.  Educated 
and enquiring minds responded readily to a philosophical approach that opened up scientific 
thinking and directed it to broad cosmological enquiries. Those enquiries led to and then built 
upon the theories of relativity, the uncertainty principle and quantum mechanics. It seems curious 
therefore that such a profound shift in philosophical basis as that of von Ehrenfels and his 
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colleagues should be so little known or taught today.
The penultimate section of von Ehrenfels' original paper concludes with a further complication: 
"the illusion-forming powers of imagination can however succeed  ..... in varying the foundations 
themselves, and thus also indirectly the corresponding Gestalt qualities"43. In this he anticipated 
the work of the Berlin school of Wertheimer and others.
2.6 Gestalt psychology
Von Ehrenfels' comment foreshadowed a more extreme view which came to be held by Max 
Wertheimer in which the latter claimed that, in his most quoted phrase, our perception is 
organised "von oben nach unten", that is, from the top downwards44. What this means in effect is 
that what is given in experience is Gestalten: the perceptual sensations or fundamenta we 
recognise are, in this view, derived from or are in some way secondary to the Gestalten. This  
view differs from that of, say, Stumpf who described how we may perceive (in whatever 
combination of modalities) either a complex (an aggregate of fundamenta) or a Gestalt
(something else given in the experience of the relations between the fundamenta). However, 
Stumpf asserts that Gestalten cannot be given in experience except in relation to some given 
content, suggesting that these contents are far from being secondary to their corresponding 
Gestalt.
     
In order to understand Wertheimer's departure from the general line of gestalt philosophy, we 
should consider a number of important facts outside the immediate field of philosophical enquiry. 
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Wertheimer explored the phenomena of experience through the academic disciplines of 
psychology and of neurology as well as philosophy. One of his major contributions was the work 
that led to his defining what he called "phenomenal motion" - as distinct from the absolute 
motion, or substantial transport, of a body from A to B45. The "moving lights" advertisements in 
Piccadilly Circus offer a convincing example of Wertheimer’s phenomenal motion. His famous 
experiment was subsequently abbreviated and translated into English by Shipley who comments 
that this paper is generally regarded as the launch of the new Gestalt psychology. Shipley is 
particularly interested in what he terms "the cosmic meeting grounds" of religion and ethics. He 
examines the contributions of Jung and Freud to these grounds and continues
All great philosophies must come to stand or fall upon them. A rapprochement, on 
these issues, between the two great movements in modern psychology, - Gestalt and 
Psychoanalysis, - is probably the most important challenge in the field today. There are 
elements in each, which ... should eventually blend into a more healthy and a more 
generous description of the human personality than we have yet been able to 
comprehend".46
Wertheimer engaged two of his students, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler in the phenomenal 
motion experiments and their follow-up. He showed them two lights that flashed alternately. 
Under certain conditions it appeared that there was a movement of light between two points. The 
conditions of the experiment, e.g. the distance apart of the lights, the duration of illumination, 
and the frequency of alternations, are of critical importance. The eidetic trick depends on the 
conditions. But the eidesis obviously resides in the observer, although it also became evident that 
individual observers may vary in what they see. In a series of experiments, Wertheimer and his 
team47 began to establish a series of what he called phi-phenomena48, i.e. purely phenomenal 
experiences. The phi-phenomenon referred to above he called "across" and suggested that we see, 
independently of the movement of bodies, "across" (although not, at this stage, a more abstract 
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order of, say, "across-ness").
Wertheimer's theorising about phi-phenomena was primarily in psychological and philosophical 
terms, but his students, Köhler and Koffka, focused sharply on cerebro-cortical events, and on the 
interface of neural endings with their environment. Their shift of language and change of 
conceptual framework represent the break from the development of gestalt philosophy as a 
theoretical enquiry founded on introspection and focused upon intellectual construction. The 
latter continued to occupy the contemporary philosopher Benussi and his 
philosophical-psychological colleagues of the Graz school49 of gestalt philosophy who promoted 
what they termed a "production theory" of Gestalten. One of the points of divergence between the 
schools came in a paper by Koffka50 as part of a reasoned criticism of Grazian notions about 
phenomenal motion51. The criticism turned on an understanding of the ambiguous nature of 
Gestalten. Such ambiguity, from a production theory viewpoint, suggests that Gestalten, far from 
being given in the sensory experience, are the outcomes of data processing, i.e. the building up of 
complex images by a process of agglomeration of "bits" of sensory information. The fundamental 
axiom of Benussi's position is that there is constancy in sensory information that privileges 
objective experience over subjective. Koffka, however, argued that what makes a stimulus out of 
sensory data cannot rest absolutely in the data themselves, but rather in the relation of the data to 
the subject.
   
This is the point at which the later gestalt therapy theories of gestalt formation and contact 
process (Perls et al, 1973) are incipient52. Koffka had undermined mechanistic notions of cause 
and effect and had, so to speak, founded a field theory53 in whose terms it may be said that 
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context determines meaning. It is this determination, so central to the Berlin school's formulation 
of gestalt theory, which forms one of the operating assumptions in therapeutic practice. Field 
theory and the associated understanding of top-down organisation of perception, are notions 
absent from Grazian understandings about meaning. In looking for the psychological roots of 
gestalt therapy, one must look, therefore, to the Berlin school, exemplified by Koffka and Köhler, 
rather than to Benussi and the Graz school. The early literature of gestalt therapy does not make 
this point explicitly, although there are acknowledgements of a debt to Wertheimer54.  Perls was 
perhaps most explicit about the link with Wertheimer when he criticised psychoanalysis for its 
reliance on "association psychology"55. He believed that association psychology would have 
disappeared but for being given a new lease of life by Freud. He considered that Freud's 
discoveries were made almost despite his reliance on association psychology, and that Freud 
discovered intuitively a number of Gestalten behind the associations on which he focused. In this 
Perls is nailing his colours firmly to the mast of gestalt psychology and specifically to the work of 
Köhler and Wertheimer56.
2.7 Links between gestalt therapy and gestalt philosophy and psychology
Another link between the Berlin school - especially Köhler - and the founders of gestalt therapy is 
found in the work and person of Kurt Goldstein. Goldstein worked with brain injured soldiers 
after the First World War in a clinic he had founded in Frankfurt. He was a physician and 
described himself thus, but he was also a philosophically minded person and had initially been 
undecided which discipline he most wished to pursue in his first degree. His work, both in 
clinical papers and in larger and more general works, shows a preoccupation with dimensions 
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beyond the immediate physical exigencies of his patients. He was familiar with the work of von 
Ehrenfels, Wertheimer, Koffka and Köhler57. His general approach to pathology and to normal 
functioning was an holistic one which viewed the events and processes of his patients' lives as 
aspects of wider wholes. A loss of function in part of the brain was an insult to the whole person 
or else a stimulus towards a different homeostatic resolution for a whole life. As will be seen in 
chapter 3, Goldstein's work was not only at the then cutting edge of neuroscience, but it was also 
radically different in its holistic approach to perception, learning and consequent re-educative 
possibilities for patients with acquired brain injury58. 
One of Goldstein's associates was a psychology graduate named Lore Posner. It was her clinical 
observations and theoretical grounding in gestalt psychology which prima facie represent the 
single strongest link between gestalt psychology and gestalt therapy. It seems that it was she, 
rather than her (eventual) husband Friedrich Perls, who had deep roots in gestalt59.  Perls met 
Posner at Goldstein's clinic, but it may be too simple to conclude that his stay of only a year in 
Frankfurt means that he had little grasp of gestalt psychology. In reconstructing the events of that 
time, one should not overlook the excitement which the gestalt school was generating nor its pre-
eminence as the principal approach to experimental psychology in Germany and thus the world. 
Just as it would be hard for a philosophically educated person there to avoid the existentialist 
influence of Tillich in Frankfurt and Buber in Berlin, so it is unlikely that a psychologically 
educated person would be unfamiliar with the gestaltists. For present-day practitioners of gestalt 
therapy, there is sometimes some heat in the debate about the relative contributions of Fritz and 
Laura Perls, and the foregoing is not intended in any way to detract from the undoubted genius of 
the latter. However, her collegial relationship with Goldstein – though it undoubtedly makes a 
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strong link between clinical applications of gestalt psychology and the development of gestalt 
therapy - should not be viewed as an apostolic succession. Goldstein's work was widely known 
and thought to be as exciting then as when it was "re-discovered" by Jonathan Miller and Oliver 
Sacks60. 
Interestingly, gestalt philosophy and psychology are not much acknowledged in current discourse, 
even though they are fundamental to sociological theory. In various forms they have an implicit 
role in social psychology, in the language of intrapsychic, interpersonal and group dynamics, field 
theories, systems theories and theories of perception61. Gestalt theory is also found in the
language of aesthetics - in music, visual arts and literature. It seems likely that the achievements 
of the gestalt philosophers are here to stay62. No doubt the development of gestalt therapy as a 
force in the field of therapeutic psychology, and its establishment throughout the Americas, 
Europe, South Africa and Australasia would have surprised Brentano and von Ehrenfels. There is 
nonetheless a coherent line from Brentano to Perls and beyond.
2.8 Some philosophical issues in gestalt
In the earliest days of gestalt thinking, during the era of Brentano and his students, the questions 
they were asking were ontological ones: they were questions about the nature of mental acts and 
the nature of the stimuli on which such acts were focused or which they reflected. These 
ontological questions gave rise in due course to epistemological ones about how we know, and 
how we think of that as true. As philosophical discourse developed, linguistic interrogation raised 
the matter of meaning, and the new question became: what does it mean when we say that we 
71
hear a melody or see a geometric shape63.
Brentano, von Ehrenfels and the rest were attempting to create an intellectual base upon which all 
human experience could be shown to rest. They did this by studying the activity of human 
perception64. At first sight this seemed to offer a surer epistemological basis than, say, Descartes' 
"cogito". The Cartesian position, of logical necessity, forces people to turn in on themselves. The 
beginning and end of that process is what philosophers recognise as solipsism, and what 
psychotherapists might construe as narcissism or even psychosis. Of course, Cartesians were not 
all mad or narcissistic. Like the early gestaltists and the phenomenologists, they checked their 
experiences against those of other people, and sought common realities. But their philosophical 
position was a weak one. To the epistemological question, how do you know what is true? (or 
even, how do you know what you know?) they could only answer, I know because it is what I 
think. The gestaltists, by contrast, could answer that they had carried out certain sensory 
experiments to arrive at their conclusions, and that these conclusions were commonly perceived 
and repeatable. They rested on a philosophical basis derived from empirical science.
And yet there is a paradox in this position that emerges if one presses the epistemological enquiry 
a little further. The enquiry is fundamentally a quest for certainty, and yet one of the chief fruits 
of the gestalt approach is to establish that Gestalten are characterised often by their ambiguity 
and shifting qualities!  Could it be that this “hard science” approach is actually "woolly science"? 
Wertheimer tried to answer this question and proposed that the fundamenta of our experience 
may, in reality, be abstractions from the Gestalten given in experience. This is a notion so close 
to Platonic Ideas that it is remarkable in a 1920s philosopher-psychologist65. However, more 
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important and more surprising than the apparent resort to philosophical history is the way that 
Wertheimer puts the perceiver, once more, at the centre of the knowable universe. He does not 
say this explicitly. But, by stating that Gestalten are given in experience, are primary, and that 
sensory fundamenta are or may be abstractions from them (i.e. are secondary), he makes the 
human brain the defining organ or fundamental reference point of all that is, or is knowable. In a 
curious way, he foreshadows the "anthropic principle" discussed by Hawking66. Hawking 
suggests as a definition for the principle "We see the universe the way it is because we exist". In 
its emphatic or "strong" form, the principle amounts to a question and answer. The question is 
"Why is the universe the way it is?" and the answer "…is then simple: if it had been different, we 
would not be here!"67
The shift from Brentano to Wertheimer and then Hawking indicates one of the problems 
attending any attempt to proceed in more than one discipline, and it highlights some of the 
problems involved in defining a philosophical basis for gestalt psychology.
2.9 Gestalt therapy and gestalt philosophy
Philosophy is as important in gestalt therapy as it is in gestalt psychology. However, although it is 
commonplace to assert that every counsellor and psychotherapist has an underlying philosophy, 
this is often the area in which, upon examination, psychotherapy and counselling students have 
greatest difficulty. Quite rightly, the emphasis in educational programmes68 for therapists rests 
firmly upon their ability to think, feel and act clearly and appropriately in the practical situation 
with a client. It may be inevitable in new professions that little attention is paid to the intellectual 
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infrastructure of the programmes or indeed to the breadth of the students' previous education, let 
alone their philosophical orientation. Some may argue that what matters is that the therapy is 
effective, whatever its psychological and philosophical basis. But there is a case for more 
educational energy to be expended on conceptual frameworks as well as practice.
The case turns on two main points. The first is indicated in the metaphor of foundations. If one 
has strong foundations, one may expect to put up a sound building which, provided the 
construction is carried out well, should stand and serve its purpose. If, on the other hand, the 
foundation is not properly constructed, then subsidence and structural faults will occur, no matter 
how good the rest of the construction. If, for example, a school of therapy were founded on the 
premise that all people are intrinsically kind and wish well to their neighbours, the practitioners 
might find that some people were helped, but most would not be. That is because the therapeutic 
philosophy does not take into account much of their experience of themselves and of others. The 
second point on which this case turns is as a device for measuring other philosophical approaches 
(to see, for example, how they match or conflict), and for exploring compatibility with other 
disciplines in which therapists may need to co-operate.
New ideas in one discourse often influence experience in others. For example, Freud's ideas 
about the unconscious have had considerable impact on plastic and graphic arts, on films, on 
theatre and literature, and on advertising and commerce. Or, to take another example, 
Schleiermacher’s emphasis on subjective experience and the corollary move away from 
neo-platonism is implicated in changes in theological and political thinking. From the perspective 
of the field theory that characterises the thinking of gestalt therapists, one cannot say strictly that 
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a particular shift in philosophy causes changes elsewhere, nor that changes in theology or politics 
make possible certain shifts in philosophical discourse. What is observable - and this is consistent 
with field theory - is simply that these events or changes seem to go hand in hand, or, as Jung put 
it, they are "synchronous"69. Whether an apparent cause or an apparent effect, it seems that 
changes in philosophy go hand in hand with other changes. Philosophy and not theology is "the 
queen of the sciences" in the sense that it underpins a priori or a posteriori other forms of 
discourse and knowing.
The underlying assumptions of a therapeutic approach lie in the province of philosophy. As has 
been noted above, there was a time less than a century ago when mathematicians, philosophers, 
physical scientists and psychologists worked together, without concern for the boundaries of their 
disciplines, on matters of common interest70. Whatever the historical or cultural reasons for this, 
they plainly recognised that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory"71.
The practical uses of gestalt philosophy in gestalt psychology and therapy are summarised and 
illustrated in the following three sections. First, the subject is part of the gestalt. The second 
heading is von oben nach unten, a consideration of the whole and the parts. The third is the 
breadth of the gestalt idea. This is followed by a brief account of Stumpf's (corroborative) view of
philosophy-psychology72.
2.10 The subject is part of the Gestalt
The clearest early statements from a gestalt source about the interdependence of observer and 
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observed come from Koffka73. Koffka himself marks a boundary between gestalt philosophy and 
gestalt psychology74 and is usually thought to be on the psychological side of that boundary. In 
his critique of Benussi and others over phenomenal motion, he took an important philosophical 
step when he challenged the notion of external stimuli as constant or absolute. He concluded that 
stimulus is not an absolute property of an object or process, but rests on its relation to the subject. 
This statement emphasises the Berlin view that the subject is active in the formation of the 
gestalt. Borrowing a term from Oswald Külpe75, he spoke of the subject's mind-set (Einstellung) 
as contributing to the Gestalt rather than the subject's mind being simply instrumental in the 
process of Gestalt formation. Von Ehrenfels had not addressed this problem directly although 
Wertheimer’s work, as we have seen above, supports such a position. In the debate on 
phenomenal motion, Wertheimer’s experiments and early conclusions made certain assumptions 
about cortical functioning. Grazian theories about cerebral "production"76 prompted his further 
thinking on the matter. In contradicting those theories Wertheimer made a radical break from 
allegedly objective scientific thinking. This kind of thinking, usually termed atomisitic, was 
characteristic of much natural science at the time77. Wertheimer's critique of atomism rested on 
his empirical work but must also be seen as a philosophical confrontation. Put in the most general 
terms, his position may be summarised thus: who we are and what we experience are inseparable. 
This is a fundamental statement, but it is in a weak form. A stronger version of the same 
statement might run thus: the universe that exists is - in part at least - the universe we make. In its 
provisional form ("in part at least"), that is certainly a fundamental assumption in the practice of 
gestalt therapy, and it is rooted in (one strand) of gestalt philosophy and psychology and it relates 
to feminist assumptions about the epistemological status of experience. 
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2.11 Von oben nach unten:  the whole and the parts
Wertheimer's view of human experience was that it is organised, in an eventually famous gestalt 
tag, von oben nach unten 78. In this, as we have seen, he opposed production theories. He justified 
his position empirically, citing evidence from his experimental work in perception. However, he 
was also arguing the philosophical principle that the whole is not simply the sum of the parts79. 
He was indicating that what is given in experience is not a series or mass of data, no matter how 
simple or how complex, but rather complexes of data. These complexes are wholes rather than 
bits, and the bits (which may not even be complete) are dependent on the whole. Thus one may 
say, with Smith80, that "a collection of data (or any other psychological formation) does not have
a Gestalt: it is a Gestalt, a whole whose parts are themselves determined as being such that they 
can exist only as parts of a whole of this given kind".  It is in this sense that the whole is more 
than the parts81, about which von Ehrenfels used the word Gestaltqualität. It is this "more than" 
which is represented in Wertheimer's von oben nach unten. The phrase asserts the primacy of the 
Gestalt in perceptual experience. It serves not only in the arguments of gestalt philosophy but in 
the day to day work of gestalt therapists. In opposing the Grazian approach, it warns against a 
simplistic use of computer analogies for human mental activity.
Von oben nach unten does not, of course, necessarily suggest that the bits of data given in 
experience are so secondary as to be irrelevant. On the contrary, it may be argued that they are of 
the essence of the Gestalt, contributing to a field that is the Gestalt. Wertheimer argued that the 
Gestalt is what we experience, and Koffka showed that the Gestalt is what we make in the act of 
perception - so much so that the Gestaltqualität can fill in missing data, demonstrating the power 
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of this function and its omnipresence in experience.
As a philosophical assumption, von oben nach unten says something about human beings. For 
example, it supports a view of people as creatures who operate from whole perceptions, complex 
understandings and interpretations, and it rejects the (potentially reductionist) notion that we are 
data processing, logical producers - without of course denying our capacity for such activity. It 
also sets the scene for gestalt therapists to approach the therapeutic encounter as a whole event 
involving both parties (and others), and as something which will reorganise (some aspects of) the 
lives of both participants. This inheritance from gestalt philosophy is thus of importance for 
therapy as well as for psychology. And it has wider implications. In political life, for example, 
people who seek to govern must decide whether it is the Gestalt, the overall vision of society, 
which organises the experience of the electorate, or whether improved services work von unten 
nach oben (from the bottom upwards) to create a sense of a good society.
2.12 The breadth of the gestalt idea
The illustration of two different political directions is suggestive of the breadth of the gestalt 
idea. Paradoxically, it is probably this breadth combined with its simplicity that has led some 
people to overlook its fundamental importance. Four aspects of that importance are considered 
here.
First, the work of the Berlin school, and indeed other gestalt schools, in psychological research 
drove and continues to drive research into perception, leading, for example, to the generation of 
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psychometric instruments and tests. The institute in which Wertheimer and his students worked is 
acknowledged as the first of its kind, and at the forefront of the development of scientific, i.e. 
experimental, psychology
Second, in a period when scientific writing for the general public enjoys prestige, gestalt 
philosophy can rightly claim to have begun as a philosophy of science82. Because their roots are 
in empirical observation and deductive logic, the ideas of the gestalt philosophers are important 
for modern science. For example, the notion of non-causal dependence about which both von 
Ehrenfels and Mach developed (differing) theories is integrated into modern physics.
Third, Lewin's field theory, deriving directly from the work of Stumpf and of the Berlin school, 
represents a psychological application of a physical theory regarding non-causal dependence. It 
finds echoes in, for example, catastrophe theory and chaos theory. Field theory is currently a 
fundamental idea in the development of (social) systems theory, family therapy, group dynamics 
theory and some management theories83.
Fourth, von Ehrenfels' original idea included the assertion that there are orders of Gestalten84. 
Wertheimer developed a notion of certain kinds of orders in perceptual experience and used the 
term Prägnanz to describe what he deduced. The word does not admit easily of an English 
equivalent, though it has overtones of the English "pregnancy" in the sense of fullness. However, 
it is used principally to describe the tendency of perceptual phenomena (and thus of the 
components of memory) to organise themselves or to be organised (the ambiguity is both in the 
idea and the experience) in the direction of equilibrium85. This idea has been developed not only 
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in gestalt philosophy and psychology, but also in gestalt therapy86 and, in modified form and by
other names, in other schools of therapy. Prägnanz concerns the internal ordering of the Gestalt; 
and that in turn indicates what order of Gestalt it is, i.e. what is its level on a scale of simplicity 
and complexity.
Gestalt theory is both simple and complex in its intellectual history and in its constructions. In 
chapter 7, in the examination of gestalt therapy and feminist theology for their compatibility, it is 
asserted that each has its world view (or more than one), and that each is a broad discipline 
resting upon firm philosophical foundations. It could be said of gestalt that it is an apparently 
simple idea, but one which has its own Prägnanz or self-optimising potential. 
2.13 Stumpf's view of philosophy and psychology
No account of the development of gestalt should omit some reference to an outstanding figure of 
the time, Carl Stumpf. Stumpf studied under Brentano87 in Prague88, and he supervised the 
doctoral studies, including the experimental work, of Köhler, Koffka and Lewin. Wertheimer also
studied under Stumpf. There are two principal reasons for including his name at this point in the 
thesis and they concern his influence on the development of the founders of the Berlin school. 
First is his principled adherence to the views of Brentano on experimental work, namely that 
philosophical or psychological theories should be based on empirical evidence and rational 
deduction. The second important area of influence is Stumpf's insistence that psychology and 
philosophy should not be split89.
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His is not an unqualified support for Wertheimer and his colleagues: Stumpf's position in the 
matter of Gestaltqualitäten represents a halfway house between them and Brentano. This can be 
seen in, for example, his insistence on contextualising mental acts as parts of or abstractions from 
some greater process of consciousness, something which later gestaltists characterised as seeing 
every Gestalt as part of a wider Gestalt leading outward ultimately to the cosmos. It can also be 
seen in Stumpf's deductions about the phenomena of mental fusing of sensory data, which is a 
precursor of von Ehrenfels' observation about seeing wholes rather than series of parts. In these 
matters he prefigured much of what his students discovered or formulated. But he was highly 
critical, on philosophical grounds, of gestaltist claims such as Wertheimer's nach oben zu unten. 
In particular he asserted that it is ontologically erroneous to suggest that Gestalten exert or could 
exert causal influences on fundamenta90. In his supervision and his criticisms, Stumpf played an 
important part in the development of the gestalt philosophy- psychology upon which gestalt 
therapy drew. His work and attitudes also lend support to Perls’ occasional claim that gestalt 
(therapy) is not just another psychotherapy, but a philosophy91. The "philosophy" to which Perls 
refers owes much to Stumpf in what he says about wholes and parts, and about the perception of 
Gestalten, their completion and their ambiguity.
2.14 Conclusion
The work of pastoral theology requires movement between disciplines. The movement 
considered here is between gestalt and feminist theology. The choice of disciplines in such work 
is of crucial importance if we are to avoid skewed choices and, thus, unreliable conclusions. 
Since gestalt is juxtaposed with feminist theology, it is imperative to demonstrate that these two 
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disciplines are of equivalent breadth and depth. Whilst, on its own, this is not a sufficient test of 
compatibility, it is a sine qua non before proceeding to more specific assessments.
However, even within the apparently single discipline of gestalt, it is evident that a number of 
discourses are involved. Therefore caution is required in moving from one discourse to another. 
The consideration of the roots of gestalt in this chapter takes place within three discourses or 
quests. Philosophical, scientific and psychotherapeutic quests have been considered. Gestalt 
philosophy and psychology represent a starting point in the history of gestalt therapy. Despite the 
occasional suggestions in gestalt literature to the contrary, there is an unbroken line stretching 
from Brentano to the Berlin school of gestalt psychology. This Berlin school, led by Wertheimer, 
influenced and continues to support the development of gestalt therapy. One of the implications 
of this is that gestalt therapy has its roots in a sound philosophy of science. This is not to propose 
infallibility either by descent or association, but it illustrates a solid infrastructure underlying a 
therapy that claimed international attention in the anti-intellectual days of hippies, flower power 
and the Esalen Institute92 whose invitation was to "lose your mind and come to your senses". The 
Esalen phenomenon was more than a new confidence in physicality and spirituality: it was also 
part of an intellectual revolt and refreshment. The big (if heavily edited93) workshops of those 
days were a prime way in which gestalt therapy became known both to the American Psychiatric 
Association, many of whose members participated in them, and also to a lay public. The edited 
transcripts make the link back to Wertheimer and beyond him to the gestalt philosophers. They 
also point to a number of other important influences. These include Freud and psychoanalysis, 
Smuts and holism, Friedlaender and his philosophy of "creative indifference" as well as the 
existential philosophers to whom passing reference has already been made. The next chapter 
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explores each of these in turn and gives an in-depth account of the development of gestalt therapy 
as a discipline that is well-founded, coherent, comprehensive and sufficiently robust to stand 
comparison with feminist theology.
                                               
1 The psycho- prefix is problematic. Some protagonists of gestalt therapy are insistent in their 
rejection of the prefix since, in their view, it supports a culturally widespread dichotomy of 
mind or spirit and body. All gestalt therapists would probably unite behind a standard that 
proclaimed an holistic understanding of persons and the essential unity of mind, body and 
(increasingly) spirit.
2 I am indebted to Dr. Rex Ambler for the distinctions made in these statements.
3 KOESTLER, A. The ghost in the machine. London: Hutchinson, 1967 and Arkana, 1989, 
gives a non-technical treatment of this phenomenon. The title of the book is a reference to 
his understanding of the Cartesian view of human functioning. More technical exposition of 
the mechanisms of awareness and reflection are found in GOMES,G "Self-awareness and 
the mind-brain problem" In  Philosophical Psychology 8 (2) 155-165, Jun 1995; MORIN, A 
"Characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information"  In
Imagination, cognition and personality 15 (1) 45-58, 1995-6;  -- "Self-talk and 
self-awareness: on the nature of the relation" In  Journal of mind and behaviour 14 (3) 
223-234, Sum. 1993; -- et al "Le dialogue intérieur comme mediateur cognitif de la 
conscience de soi privée: une mesure de l'activité consistant à se parler à soi-même à propos 
de soi et une étude correlationnelle"  In  Revue Quebecoise de Psychologie 14 (2) 3-19, 
1993;   LLOYD, D  "Consciousness: a connectionist manifesto"  In  Minds and machines 5 
(2) 161-185, May 1995;  GIBSON, K  "Toward an empirical basis for understanding 
consciousness and self-awareness" In  Consciousness and cognition: an international 
journal 1 (2) 163-168, Jun 1992; SIMONOV, "The bright spot of consciousness"  In  
Journal of Russian and East European psychology  30 (2) 5-12, Mar-Apr 1992;  MILLER, L 
"Brain and self: toward a neuropsychodynamic model of ego autonomy and personality"  In
Journal of the American Academy of psychoanalysis  19 (2) 213-234, Sum.1991. 
4 This assertion is a form of the "anthropic principle", illustrated by HAWKING, S. A brief 
history of Time. London: Bantam Press, 1988, pp. 124-126.
5 WHITEHEAD, A N and RUSSELL, B. Principia mathematica (2nd edition).  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1927. The first edition was published in 1907.
6 For example, the closing words of RUSSELL, B History of Western philosophy. London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1946."In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms, one of the few 
unifying forces is scientific truthfulness, by which I mean the habit of basing our beliefs 
upon observations and inferences as impersonal, and as much divested of local and 
temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings. To have insisted upon the introduction 
of this virtue into philosophy, and to have invented a powerful method by which it can be 
rendered fruitful, are the chief merits of the philosophical school of which I am a member. 
The habit of careful veracity acquired in the practice of this philosophical method can be 
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extended to the whole sphere of human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of 
fanaticism with an increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual understanding. In 
abandoning a part of its dogmatic pretensions, philosophy does not cease to suggest and 
inspire a way of life" (p.789). 
7 For example LACAN, J. Écrits: a selection. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977, 
reprinted London: Routledge, 1989, in particular chapter 3, "Function and field of speech 
and language"; and, in that context, p.83 for a worked through example of concern for 
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8 EAGLETON, T. Literary theory: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, chapter 5, 
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9 FREUD, S. “On narcissism: an introduction (1914)” in The Pelican Freud Library, Vol 11. 
London: Pelican Books, 1984, p.84.
10 Eagleton op cit p.165.
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about the phallus, for example, it is necessary to use the editor's "Classified index of major 
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never wholly successful attempt to reach the signified, to attain that unitive sense we once 
had. In our attempts, he says, the signified slides beneath the signifier - often because the 
signified is in fact repressed and thus inaccessible. Any sense we have of being ourselves, of 
knowing who we are and engaging with others is a practical convenience credible only to 
pre-Freudian persons. Such an illusion is the "imaginary" aspect of the ego. Eagleton 
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imaginary kind. The "subject of the enunciating", the actual speaking, writing human person, 
can never represent himself or herself fully in what is said: there is no sign which will, so to 
speak, sum up my entire being. I can only designate myself in language by a convenient 
pronoun. The pronoun "I" stands in for the ever-elusive subject, which will always slip 
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cannot "mean" and "be" simultaneously. To make this point, Lacan boldly rewrites 
Descartes's "I think, therefore I am" as: "I am not where I think, and I think where I am 
not."” (Eagleton op cit pp. 169-170).
13 KRISTEVA, J. La revolution du langage poetique. Paris: Seuil, 1974. This is her doctoral 
thesis, translated by M. Waller as Revolution in poetic language, New York: Columbia 
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reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. Her chapter 4 gives an example of the semiotic.
14 Moi, op cit pp 92-93.
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normality.
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as The age of reason, The reprieve (both trans. Sutton, E), and Iron in the soul (trans. 
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commitment. For one of the central characters, a philosophy teacher named Mathieu, the 
conclusion is to find within himself hatred and a willingness to kill which alone confers on 
him a sense of freedom (Sartre, 1963 p.225). The trilogy concludes, nonetheless, with a 
sense of alienation and emptiness (ibid. p.349). 
17 Fromm op cit.
18 ETZIONI, A. The spirit of community: rights, responsibilities and the communitarian 
agenda. London: HarperCollins, Fontana Press, 1995; HABERMAS, J. Communication and 
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Heinemann Educational, 1979.
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takes into account then novel ideas of individuality, subjectivity and reason as a basis for 
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Company, and polite Conversation... To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and 
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Mach was concerned to grapple with the ontological and epistemological implications of an 
emerging psychobiology.
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68 Courses for counsellors and psychotherapists are usually described as "training" rather than 
"education". The words are not synonymous and the difference signifies a more technical 
approach to practice, with less emphasis on formation and, therefore, upon philosophy.
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71 A remark attributed to Kurt Lewin in a number of sources but with no precise provenance.
72     Smith op cit pp.44 et seq.
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1920. (A thesis presented to the Department of History at Harvard as part of his PhD, 1982, 
p.338 (British Library, microfilm). Smith (1988) cites Ash, p.38 in this connection. Koffka's 
views, reflecting a Wertheimian or Berlin perspective, were opposed to the Grazian school 
exemplified by Benussi and so do not represent all strands of gestalt thinking at the time.
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80 op cit p.13.
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93 Shepard (1976) p.165.
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INFLUENCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GESTALT THERAPY
3. Introduction
Chapter 2 showed how the roots of gestalt therapy lie in the gestalt philosophy of von Ehrenfels 
and his colleagues in the German University of Prague in the late nineteenth century. Their work 
contributed directly to the development of experimental psychology and to the Berlin school of 
gestalt psychology. There are, however, many other influences in the development of gestalt 
therapy. In the comparison of the practical-values of gestalt with those of feminist theology in 
chapter 7, these other influences play an important part: for this reason they now are now 
identified and critically assessed. This assessment culminates, in the next chapter, in a resultant 
picture of the self in gestalt thought and practice and to the analysis of core ideas in gestalt.
As a prelude to the examination of other major influences, section 3.1 carries forward a 
discussion on language (developing some themes from section 2.1). The section discusses the 
nature of psychological language, with particular reference to Freud whose theories were 
especially important in Perls' work. The chapter then examines major influences in the 
development of gestalt therapy acknowledged by Fritz Perls, and some others not so overtly 
acknowledged but demonstrably formative1. Section 3.2 therefore focuses on Perls and Freud, 
examining Perls' reliance on and his critique of psychoanalysis. Whilst his criticisms are not the 
same as those of some feminist writers, there are some overlapping concerns about the ways in 
which they image the person.
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Section 3.3 discusses the influence of Reich. There is no evidence that Perls adopted all of 
Reich's ideas, but it is argued that, as a therapist and a teacher, Reich's influence on Perls was 
profound. This is most obviously the case in his view of the body as being far more than the 
container or even a key aspect of the self. We may therefore anticipate both convergence and 
divergence between gestalt and some feminist writers on these points.  Section 3.4 identifies the 
close links between Perls and Smuts in the matter of holism, something that figures large in the 
core ideas of both gestalt and feminist theology. Section 3.5 examines the claims made by Perls 
concerning the importance of the philosopher Friedlaender. This is particularly important since 
there is no written source that goes beyond a simple assertion of such connection: the work 
conducted here is thus essential for the intellectual integrity or coherence of gestalt (therapy) 
theory2.
Section 3.6 describes the significance of Goldstein for Perls. Again, Perls was generous in his 
admiring references to Goldstein's work but he never made clear how he relies on him. Since the 
"rediscovery" of Goldstein by Miller and Sacks, it has become possible to show clearly that this 
connection is more than an acknowledgement by Perls of his former chief. In section 3.7, there is 
an assessment of the contribution of the gestalt psychologists. To Perls, this was obvious, but 
since the connection with gestalt psychology is challenged by writers within and without the 
gestalt therapy camp, the argument must be clearly resolved.
The following section (3.8) discusses the significance of Lewin's work for gestalt therapy. The 
importance of this stage lies largely in Lewin's deployment of (physical) field theory in the 
psychological domain and, in particular, in his understanding of the importance of context and 
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need in determining perception. In breaking away from narrow understandings of causality in 
human behaviour, Lewin paved the way for a view of the person as a feature or focus in a 
network of relationships. Such a view subverted earlier individualistic views of human being that 
were also heavily criticised by, amongst others, feminist writers. The next section (3.9) examines 
the importance of the existentialists in the development of gestalt therapy. This philosophical 
standpoint, arising in the period following the First World War, challenged old certainties and 
sought a way forward in a world disillusioned by gods, empires and rulers. With its focus on 
"being" and on the "crisis" of the present moment and situation, it not only fitted precisely the 
crisis of the consulting room but also opened up the possibility of dialogue with other viewpoints 
that seek to deconstruct the intellectual structures of the modern (western) world.
The material of chapter 3 serves as a ground3 for explaining in chapter 4 the gestalt notion of 
contact and thence an understanding of the self and what it is to be a person. That in turn opens 
the way for an analysis of core ideas in gestalt.
3.1 The language of psychotherapeutic theory
All language is symbol, and the language of psychology is arguably more symbolic than many 
other languages. Let us consider, for example, the language of bricklaying. The words used in 
bricklaying, e.g. "joint", are not themselves things. The word “joint” refers to the planes at which 
bricks meet when set in a structure. The signifier "joint" is not the same as the signified. The 
signified is better understood as an event, albeit one which is continuous and apparently unaltered 
in time. To speak of a joint in brickwork is a process dissimilar to that of joining bricks with 
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mortar. The making of a "joint", of itself, has no material component. And yet it is a process 
intrinsic to the construction of buildings. To talk of joints is, however, in some sense to reify 
them; it is as though joints exist in themselves rather than as sensory (visual, tactile) experiences 
of the observer. To complete the present example, we may all agree as to what of our experiences 
constitutes the entity we refer to as a joint in brickwork. And we can point to the same co-
ordinates and substances on a wall in such a way as to bolster up our sense of a shared reality.
In this example, there is a gap between the signifier and the events or materials signified, but it is 
not so great as the corresponding gaps which can occur in other disciplines such as that of 
psychotherapy. The shared reality is more difficult to arrive at in the field of psychological and 
psychotherapeutic theory. Let us consider an example from psychotherapeutic discourse. 
However good a definition may be offered of the Freudian Ego, nobody can claim to have seen or 
touched an Ego, and all would have to agree that the term is a way of talking about certain kinds 
of phenomena in human experience. Of course, there might not be agreement about those 
phenomena. Observers might take a structuralist view of events and not seek explanations outside 
whatever meaning may be adduced in the events themselves. Such events would then be 
understood as paradigmatic of existence, as statements about what is. But even if all the 
observers expected to view events in a chronological or historical perspective, or as intentional or 
purposive, it would be more difficult, in the nature of the case, to agree the very phenomena than 
was the case in the example of joints in brickwork. It might prove impossible to agree the 
psychological equivalents of spatial co-ordinates or planes or even relationships of 
(psychological) proximity. Given these difficulties, agreements for practical purposes and a sense 
of shared reality can present grave difficulties. Nonetheless, over many centuries in a range of 
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human cultures, people have found and agreed ways of talking about their experience and that of 
others. These ways of talking become codified, disputed, adjusted, reformulated and re-
examined.
The problems of language in psychotherapy are not confined to the pragmatic ones concerning 
the gap between the signifier and the signified. When Freud began to speak of the Ego (das Ich) 
he meant to signify the everyday "I" of personal experience. However, the English translations of 
Freud's work use the Latin terminology familiar to readers of English - ego, id, superego. 
Although it is true that Freud authorised the Standard (English) Translation, it is evident that it 
did not accord with his own preference for German readers. Bettleheim4 quotes Freud's The 
question of lay analysis (1926) thus:
We base ourselves on common knowledge and recognize in man an organization of the 
soul which is interpolated between the stimulation of his senses and the perception of his 
bodily needs on the one hand, and his motor acts on the other, and which mediates 
between them for a particular purpose. We call this organization his I. Now there is 
nothing new in this, each of us makes this assumption without being a philosopher, and 
some although they are philosophers.5   
For Freud, Ego is a homely reference to that aspect of ourselves with which we feel most 
immediately in touch, which we can know fairly fully. It is not the whole of ourselves, nor even 
the whole Seele (soul) for he continues: 
But we don't believe that by recognizing this part of the apparatus of the soul we have 
exhausted the description. Besides the I we recognize also another region of the soul, 
more extensive, grander, and more obscure than the I, and this we call the it.6
Freud was sure that, in his definitions and explanations of psychoanalysis, he was outlining a 
scientific system of analysis, classification and therapeutic procedure that was grounded in 
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human biology. He seems nevertheless deliberately to have used imprecise terminology - at least 
in the areas of the present examples
Bettleheim also points out that the usual French translations of Freud’s terms are le moi, le ça / 
soi, le surmoi and that the same applies in Spanish. The thesis of his book is that Freud has been 
consistently mistranslated in English and cites as a key example the seemingly deliberate 
mistranslation of the German die Seele as the Mind rather than the soul.. Bettleheim offers this 
comment on the imprecise nature of Freud’s language regarding die Seele:
“I suspect that he chose the term because of its inexactitude. Its ambiguity speaks for the 
ambiguity of the psyche itself, which reflects many different, warring levels of 
consciousness simultaneously. To have attempted a clinical definition of such a term - a 
definition that Freud's English translators would no doubt have welcomed - would have 
robbed it of its value as an expression of Freud's thinking......By "soul" or "psyche" Freud 
means that which is most valuable in man while he is alive. Freud was a passionate man. 
For him, the soul is the seat both of the mind and of the passions, and we remain largely 
unconscious of the soul. In important respects, it is deeply hidden, hardly accessible even 
to careful investigation. It is intangible, but it nevertheless exercises a powerful influence 
on our lives. It is what makes us human; in fact, it is what is so essentially human about 
us that no other term could equally convey what Freud had in mind.”.7
Lacan also noted how Freud has been misunderstood and mistranslated8. In his own re-working 
of Freudian theory, his concern for language went far beyond a search for agreed meanings. He 
showed that the language of (psychoanalytic) psychotherapy is highly abstracted and a matter 
requiring the closest attention9. In fact, the instance of Lacan illustrates a frequent combination of 
factors regarding language used in psychotherapeutic discourse, i.e. philosophical complexity 
combined with translation from one culture and / or language to another. With these provisos in 
mind, attention is now given to the development of gestalt therapy.
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3.2 Perls and Freudian psychoanalysis
In defining the gestalt therapy which, with his wife Laura (Lore), he "rediscovered", Fritz Perls 
acknowledged his indebtedness to a number of sources. Most obvious of all is his debt to Freud 
and to psychoanalysis. In Ego, hunger and aggression10 he considered that much of gestalt is a 
"revision of psycho-analysis". This is hardly surprising when one recalls that Perls had been 
educated in psychoanalysis11. He had entered a personal analysis with Karen Horney in 1926, 
although only for a short time as, on Horney's advice, he moved from his native Berlin, choosing 
instead to live and work in Frankfurt. He had qualified in medicine in Berlin in 1920 and worked 
in both Berlin and New York City as a neuropsychiatrist.  The move in 1927 began a momentous 
time in Perls' life. He worked under Kurt Goldstein at his clinic for former soldiers with acquired 
brain injury.  Perls was a broadly educated man, greatly influenced by literary and theatrical 
developments of his time. He was aware of the presence in Frankfurt of Paul Tillich, then 
teaching existential philosophy at the university. Tillich and Martin Buber (who held a chair in 
philosophy in Berlin) were major influences on contemporary German philosophy. This 
philosophy formed the cultural basis of much of Europe's intellectual life at the time. Whilst in 
Frankfurt, Perls entered analysis with one of Horney's students, Clara Happel. After a year of 
treatment, Happel declared his analysis complete12 and recommended he begin control work, i.e. 
supervised practice of analysis. 
One member of Goldstein's staff was a psychology graduate who had studied gestalt, Lore (later 
Laura) Posner. After only a year in Frankfurt, Perls moved on to Vienna, leaving Goldstein but 
not Lore Posner whom he subsequently married. Perls moved to Vienna where he worked under 
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the supervision of Helene Deutsch and Edward Hitschmann. He was educated in analytic theory 
by, amongst others, Paul Federn, and was open to the many other influences offered by this 
cosmopolitan city. He took a clinical assistantship at a psychiatric hospital, but the job lasted only 
a year, and by the end of 1928 he was back in Berlin and in practice as a psychoanalyst. He 
continued in analysis himself, this time for eighteen months with Eugen Harnik. Given his 
immersion in the world of psychoanalysis, it is hardly surprising that his language - and the 
structure of his thinking - is close to that of his contemporary analysts.
He had discovered, however, that psychoanalysis was not a homogeneous discipline, nor were all 
its practitioners alike. When he spoke to Horney about his dissatisfaction with Harnik's approach, 
she recommended that he see Wilhelm Reich. He did so (probably in 1930), and remained in 
therapy with Reich until 1933 when the burning of the Reichstag prompted Reich, a noted 
communist, to seek temporary refuge in Norway.  Reich had caused a stir in the psychoanalytic 
community with his novel focus on "character analysis"13. Put briefly, he had concluded that 
Freudian libido was to be understood physiologically as the sexual or "orgone" energy within the 
body. Resistance to the natural flow of this energy would give rise to frozen musculature which, 
in time, would produce idiosyncratic habits of posture and movement that were not simply 
expressions of but actually the basis for character (i.e. fixed aspects of the personality). Analysis 
of a person need not therefore consist of purely verbal enquiries focused on the partially 
repressed past or on dreams through which the unconscious life might be glimpsed. Instead, 
careful attention to present behaviour (in its most observable and palpable modes) would yield 
the necessary information. Moreover, physical intervention in the life of the patient would bring 
about changes as resistances were worked through, frozen energy would be released and the 
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patient’s maximum "potency" realised14.
  
Perls admired Reich's vitality and the energising potential of his approach. Two things were 
particularly exciting. One was the focus on the present situation of the patient, and the other the 
necessity of physical contact. Both were prominent in Perls' eventual formulation of gestalt 
practice.
Perls' break with psychoanalysis came about through a series of personal and political upheavals, 
not least of which was the National Socialist persecution of Jewish people that drove him and his 
family out of Germany15. After an indirect journey, the Perls family arrived in South Africa 
where they lived from 1935 to 1947. During that time, Fritz and Lore built up their practices and 
together founded the South African Psychoanalytic Society.  Perls also attempted to contribute to 
the expanding theory of psychoanalysis. He offered a paper to the 1936 International 
Psychoanalytic Congress in Czechoslovakia on the subject of oral resistances. The paper was 
received coolly by the Congress, and Perls was virtually snubbed by Freud. He left for a brief tour 
of Europe, disillusioned by the failure of his attempt. But that rejection fed into creative critical 
activity. In 1947, Perls offered the psychological world a critique of psychoanalytic theory and 
practice in his Ego, hunger and aggression.
In South Africa, the two Perls developed the "concentration therapy" referred to in Fritz’s book16. 
Their approach marked a technical as well as theoretical departure from the orthodoxy of the 
International Congress. The theoretical changes that most concern this thesis are those which bear 
upon the notion of the self17. Chief among these is Perls’ argument that libido theory is shot 
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through with internal confusions, and that a structure founded upon libido theory will not stand 
up to practical examination18.
He supports Freud's understanding of neurosis as
....a disturbance of development and adjustment; the instincts and the Unconscious play 
an immeasurably greater part in man than was ever dreamt of. Neuroses are the outcome 
of a conflict between organism and environment. Our mentality is determined more by 
instincts and emotions than by reason.19
But he goes on to comment that
On the other side of the balance sheet we find that Freud over-estimated the causality, 
past, and sex instincts, and neglected the importance of purposiveness, present, and 
hunger instinct.20
His focus on hunger was based both on personal experience (he was then the father of two young 
children) and on his critical ability to move beyond adherence to the thoughts of his undoubtedly 
great and original teacher. His critique of libido21 led him to maintain that Freud's understanding 
of the interrelation of ego, id, personality and self (or self-function as he preferred to call it) were 
erroneous. His concluded that psychoanalytic self-theory "makes the self otiose", i.e., idle or 
tending to inertia22. In his later writing, Perls criticises Freud for his "faulty theory of repression" 
but reserves his main critical assaults for Anna Freud and Paul Federn23.
Other principal differences with Freud himself are those concerned with creativity and the id and 
thus with Freud's notions of the unconscious and of repression. Freud held that much id material 
(including some of the "deep" instincts - a notion he himself later criticised) was unconscious 
and, in the economy of the self, had to be so. There were two reasons for this consignment to or 
location in the unconscious. One was that some id material was forbidden by parents and society 
100
and thus repressed (Freud says in the same essay that "the repressed is a part of the 
unconscious"). The other reason is that one can observe that, in any psychical act, much else that 
might form part of another psychical act is not currently conscious. What has happened to it? 
Freud's answer is that it is part of the unconscious, and may become conscious again as required. 
He asserted that our unconscious becomes apparent in dreams and parapraxes (e.g. slips of the 
tongue, things or words forgotten or mistaken)24 in healthy people, as well as in our pathology. 
He was equally adamant that the unconscious was a necessary hypothesis to explain such 
commonplace phenomena as solving problems without the intervention of conscious rational 
process.
Perls had little patience with Freud's "faulty view of repression"25. He held that it is not necessary 
to posit an unconscious. He talked instead of fundamental notions in gestalt psychology, namely 
figure and ground. Everything is ground unless it is figure. Our creativity – function of ego - lies 
in the Gestalten we make out of the infinite possibilities in the ground that is our cosmos. Perls 
was profoundly influenced by psychoanalysis, but he transformed his inheritance in formulating 
gestalt therapy. One more example may serve to illustrate this point, that of reaction-formation. 
The differences in understanding and emphasis between Freud and Perls on this matter are 
characteristic. The definitions and arguments, though detailed, can be summarised with some 
precision. Freud understood reaction-formations to be mechanisms or even states which the ego 
acquires, "to begin with in making its repressions and later... when it rejects unwished-for 
instinctual impulses"26. Reaction-formations are created as one possible anxious response to 
forbidden or impossible impulses toward some gratification (Freud wrote in terms of cathexes 
and, in reaction, anti-cathexes). What is formed is a reaction against that impulse: there are thus 
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two parts or two energies, one toward the gratification of the impulse or desire and the other 
contrary to it27.  That reaction, in Freud's understanding, may become fixed as part of the 
structure of the ego and act therefore as part of a person's character. 
Perls takes a different line. He states that
Reaction-formation is the avoidance of the anxiety threatened by breakdown of the 
repression (through increase of the inhibited excitation or relaxation of the inhibition) by 
further attempts to annihilate the excitation or the temptations to it, and by strengthening 
the inhibition. The repression avoids the excitement; the reaction-formation avoids the 
anxiety of the throttled excitement - for this anxiety excitement seems even more 
dangerous than the original excitement was.28
That summary reveals three features of reaction formation29. First, Freud tends to see reaction-
formation as part of the defence system of the ego, whereas Perls characteristically sees it as 
aggression. Second, Freud sees it as a contributor to overall character, a more static view than 
Perls'. Perls emphasised not only the fixities of character (though he wrote in terms of personality 
which he regarded as normally adapting), but equally the reactions in the present moment that 
may be observed as they occur. Third, Perls' example where he explains his position, is typically 
one to do with eating30: it indicates his focus on hunger rather than libido as a psychological 
prime mover, although he does cite more fixed reaction formations such as that of sexual 
prudery.
Finally, it may be noted that the connections between Freudian psychoanalytic theory and gestalt 
therapy are such that the syllabi of courses in gestalt psychotherapy increasingly require or 
furnish a working knowledge of Freudian thought. This is not surprising when one reflects that 
early gestalt therapists, including those who argued that one should leave behind the (assumed) 
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limitations of psychoanalysis, were well grounded in it. The reaction against psychoanalytic 
theory has largely worked itself out, and one may now discern a more serious re-evaluation of 
it31.  Later in this thesis, we shall see how a number of feminist writers have criticised Freud -
though some wish to restructure and use psychoanalytic theory - on grounds that are very 
different to those of Perls.
3.3 Perls and Reich
Perls was generous in his acknowledgement of the debt which gestalt therapy owes to the work of 
Reich32, whom he had come to know as his analyst and as a teacher and seminar leader. His 
adoption of Reichian theory was, however, selective and critical. The Introduction to Perls et al
(1973) states that Reich's orgone theory "successfully extends ad absurdum the most doubtful 
part of Freud"s work, the libido theory". The same passage also puts forward a characteristic 
gestalt criticism concerning references by Reich and others to "defence" as part of personality. 
Gestaltists generally dispute the reactive or passive tone of “defence”, since it is evident that 
"defences" are active and aggressive, or even hostile. What is valuable (to gestalt) from Reich's 
work arises from his early discoveries and technical innovations concerning the armouring 
functions of musculature and posture and the connection between them and repression. The debt 
owed by gestalt to Reichian character analysis is most clear at two points.
.....[W]e are deeply indebted to Reich for having brought down to earth Freud's rather 
abstract notion of repression. Reich's idea of the motoric armour is doubtless the most 
important contribution to psychosomatic medicine since Freud.33
This is a reference primarily to Reich's The function of the orgasm34. In it, Reich describes how, 
in his work with the repressed aspects of his patients, he
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...collected the countless minor and major experiences which, taken together, pointed in 
one direction: it is the patient"s total "personality" or "character" that constitutes the 
difficulty of cure. "Character armor" is expressed in treatment as "character resistance".35
In Reich's discussions with Freud, it became clear that the two men were diverging in their 
understanding on a number of issues, most especially the nature of anxiety36 and the nature of 
repression37. Reich's position was that
The task of psychoanalytic therapy was to uncover and eliminate resistances. It was not 
supposed to interpret unconscious material directly. Hence, the analyst had to proceed 
from the psychic warding off of unconscious impulses by the moralistic ego. But there 
was not just one layer of ego defenses to break through, behind which lay the great realm 
of the unconscious. In reality, instinctual desires and defense functions of the ego are 
interlaced and permeate the entire psychic structure.38
He took this argument further. Citing the case of a man with whom he had worked, he showed 
how the work had been with a succession of resistances. As patient and therapist continued, 
Reich began to see that repression was not a single lid that could be lifted off the unconscious. He 
came to appreciate "the antithetical functional unity between what wards off and what is warded 
off" - the interlacing referred to above. Later, Reich states that
The "antithetical functional unity between instinct and defense" made it possible to 
comprehend contemporary and early childhood experiences simultaneously. There was no 
longer any dichotomy between historical and contemporary material. The entire world of 
past experience was embodied in the present in the form of character attitudes. A 
person's character is the functional sum total of all past experiences.39
There are three important components in these links between Perls and Reich. The first to be 
discussed is that Reich is sure he is describing psychic structures that are not merely 
psychological hypotheses, but biological structures. In his thinking, these arise from the thwarting 
of sexual desires whose therapy consists in working towards effective genital functioning. So 
much is this physical, sexual need the basis of his thinking - especially about the genesis of the 
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neuroses - that he calls his basic schema of human character “the sex-economy". All creative 
work and our love of others arise from our sexuality, and our sexuality is no vague psychological 
notion. He states that "The sex-economic conception of the psychic apparatus is not of a 
psychological but of a biological nature"40. By the same token, the inhibitions of those sexual 
needs are described in terms of instinct and defence, and in terms of muscular activity, so that the 
cases he cites are full of the physical details that constitute character41. In this way his writing is 
very like that of Perls42 in which all the modifications or interruptions of the contact process are 
spelled out with physical and physiological detail. The dissimilarity comes, once again, over the 
matter of the primacy of sex in the human economy. For Perls, the prime movers are hunger and 
aggression. That said, there are strong similarities in the way the two men understand 
aggression43, the principal difference being in their understanding of the place of sex and sexual 
expression44. So far as aggression is concerned, both Perls45 and Reich make it clear that they do 
not intend the word in a way which necessarily denotes hostility or sadism, although it may entail 
destruction (which term they are also careful to define and limit). So far as sex is concerned, 
Reich offers a third alternative, a move away from Freud's libido-based theories but not in the 
direction taken by Perls. Reich instead bases his therapeutic approach upon biological sexuality. 
In his chapter "Breakthrough into the biological", he concludes:
"Sexuality" could be nothing other than the biological function of expansion "out of the 
self" from the center toward the periphery. In turn, anxiety could be nothing but the 
reversed direction, i.e., from the periphery to the center, "back into the self." 46
In short, Reich reworked his understanding of psychoanalytic theory on the basis of his biological 
understanding of human sexuality, and in particular on his understanding of the centrality of 
orgasm in human sexuality. He viewed Freud's life and death instincts (ideas current in the 
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1920s) as misinterpretations of aspects of sexual energies, stating that "neuroses can be cured by 
eliminating their energy source, the sexual stasis"47.  He concluded that "the alleged death 
instinct.... is the unconscious longing for the orgastic resolution of tension"48.
The second comment to be made here is that Reich's assertion that "a person's character is the 
functional sum total of all past experience" is very close to Perls' later definition of personality. 
The definition of character also resonates with Perls' definition of the self as the system of present 
contacts49, but that similarity is to be treated with caution. Perls is talking of the whole organism 
in its environment, whilst Reich oscillates between viewing character as personality and character 
as equivalent to the self50. 
The third comment concerns "functional unity" referred to above. For Reich this is an almost 
Newtonian rule of thumb. It is striking how action and reaction abound in Perls' thinking too, and 
in a way whereby the existence of one (e.g. impulse or desire) seems to suggest or require the 
existence of its opposite (e.g. an inhibition)51. The examples that Reich uses and to which 
reference is made above are those of "instinct" (action) and "inhibition" (reaction). Reich 
developed his notions from his critique of Freudian self-structure. Perls may well have developed 
his ideas as much from Reich as from Freud, although his understanding of polarities (e.g. love 
and hate, which do seem each to presuppose the other) draws more obvious support from 
Friedlaender52.
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3.4 Smuts and holism
In Ego, hunger and aggression Perls acknowledges the importance to him of a number of his 
contemporaries and teachers outside the ranks of formal psychology53. One of the most important 
of these, from a philosophical and theoretical perspective, is his reliance on the work of Field-
Marshal Jan Smuts, President of the Union of South Africa during Perls' time in that country. It 
was from Smuts that he gained his understanding of holism54, a term putatively coined by 
Smuts55. His Holism and evolution was a work
.... neither of Science nor of Philosophy, but of some points of contact between the 
two..... Some border problems between the two are here considered in the light of recent 
advances in physical and biological science. And a re-examination of fundamental 
concepts in the light of these advances reveals the existence of a hitherto neglected factor 
or principle of a very important character. This factor, called Holism in the sequel, 
underlies the synthetic tendency in the universe, and is the principle which makes for the 
origin and progress of wholes in the universe. An attempt is made to show that this 
whole-making or holistic tendency is fundamental in nature, that it has a well-marked 
ascertainable character, and that Evolution is nothing but the gradual development and 
stratification of progressive series of wholes, stretching from the inorganic beginnings to 
the highest levels of spiritual creation.56
Later, Smuts indicates how the notion of holism offers a conceptual framework for the 
understanding of much - though not all - of the world we experience. In his summary of chapter 
VII he offers this paradigm:
The discussion..... has disclosed a grading-up of such structures as can in any way be 
called holistic; beginning with the physico-chemical structures, into which physical and 
chemical relations enter; passing on to bio-chemical structures or organisms, into which 
those relations plus something new, usually called life, enter; and culminating in psycho-
physical structures, in which all three relations enter, together with the new elements of 
mind and personality. In this grading-up the earlier structures are not destroyed but 
become the basis of later, more evolved synthetic holistic structures; the character of 
wholeness increases with the series and the elements of newness, variation and 
creativeness become more marked.57
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He does not suggest, however, that holism is the sole organising principle or structure of the 
universe. The section above continues with a definition of a complementary principle that he 
called Mechanism58.
Smuts argues that mind and personality are vitally connected to bodily life by holism. Later, he 
argues, in a chapter entitled "Mind as an organ of wholes", that Mind, the atom and the cell, 
together constitute the three fundamental structures of Holism. However, he does not regard 
Mind as itself a whole, but rather as an "holistic organ" which may be seen to have several 
aspects or parts, one of which is what he calls Personality. He views Mind firstly as an extension 
on a higher plane of the system of organic regulation which characterises holism in organisms, 
and which has its base in the brain and central nervous system. The second aspect of Mind he 
identifies is that which makes of an organism an individual - that which, in our species, is "the 
Self of the Personality"59. His understanding of Mind is that it is the vital link that supports the 
holistic understanding of the human being as a psychosomatic entity. Neither Smuts nor Perls 
was especially remarkable in seeing people as wholes. However, there can be little doubt that the 
relentless use of the word "mind" as the proper subject of psychological study in, for example, the 
Standard Edition of Freud both reflected a dualistic tendency and also fostered it. It was this 
dualism which Perls confronted, and it was in Smuts’ work that he found support for that 
confrontation. So strong is the connection between the writings of Perls and Smuts that each 
might have written a passage in the other's work60. As an example of this affinity, here is a 
passage from Smuts:
An organism, like a plant or animal, is a natural whole. It is self-acting and self-moving. 
Its principle of movement or action is not external to itself but internal. It is not actuated 
or moved by some external principle or force, like a machine or an artificial construction. 
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The source of its activity is internal and of a piece with itself, is indeed itself. It consists 
of parts, but its parts are not merely put together. Their togetherness is not mechanical, 
but rests on a different basis. The organism consists of parts, but it is more than the sum 
of its parts, and if these parts are taken to pieces the organism is destroyed and cannot be 
reconstituted by again putting together the severed parts. These parts are in active 
relations to each other, which vary with the parts and the organisms; but in no case is 
there anything inactive or inert about the relations of these parts to each other or to the 
whole organism. The organism further has the power of maintaining itself by taking in 
other parts, such as food, but again..... it does so not by mere mechanical addition, but by 
a complete transformation, assimilation and appropriation into its own peculiar system of 
the material so taken in. Moreover, the organism is creative in that it is capable, under 
certain conditions, of reproducing itself in closely similar wholes.61
This could be Perls stating that "The greatest value in the Gestalt approach perhaps lies in the 
insight that the whole determines the parts, which contrasts with the previous assumption that the 
whole is merely the total sum of its elements"62, or else the following passage:
Envisaging an animal freely roaming in a spacious and various environment, we see that 
the number and range of contact-functions must be vast, for fundamentally an organism 
lives in its environment by maintaining its difference and, more importantly, by 
assimilating the environment to its difference; and it is at the boundary that dangers are 
rejected, obstacles are overcome, and the assimilable is selected and appropriated. Now 
what is selected and assimilated is always novel; the organism persists by assimilating the 
novel by change and growth.63
3.5 Salomo Friedlaender
Perls owed a philosophical debt to Smuts for his development of the concept of holism. In the 
theory and practice of gestalt therapy, holism on its own is insufficient to account for the 
observable behaviour and deducible structures of persons. For this further dimension of holism, 
Perls looked to a contemporary Berliner, the philosopher Salomo Friedlaender64. In the opening 
chapter of Ego, hunger and aggression, Perls proposes three intentions in his "revision of 
psychoanalysis". The first was "to replace the psychological by an organismic concept; the 
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second "to replace association-psychology by gestalt-psychology"; and the third "to apply 
differential thinking, based upon S. Friedlaender's "Creative Indifference""65. Perls' approach 
throughout the book is driven by his three intentions, although his approach does not often 
involve quotations from the works of others. It is also the case that Friedlaender's book was not 
then and has not since been translated into English, which may account for the summary 
references to a writer on whom Perls relies for fundamental ideas.
There are three particularly important notions that Perls takes from Friedlaender. These are: 
opposites; zero-point or pre-difference; and degree of differentiation66. Friedlaender was sure that 
the human species, though frequently denying it, was made up not of simple, single features or 
attributes, but of pairs of opposites. Further he was sure that the very universe was constructed in 
the same way.
The world is a pair, causality a pair, direction, dimension; each series - of numbers, 
sounds, colours, smells, tastes, faces - all are in pairs, polar, round, tending to be 
spherical. Only humanity has tunnel vision.67
He spells out his arguments on this point in chapter 1, giving numerous examples and, at one 
point, sees in these opposites or polarities a type of equilibrium in the world that we experience.
Whatever can be in balance is measured. That overweeningly clever "Devil", who is 
balanced by God and who in every limb expresses this balanced relationship, is measured 
and centred. The God who falsely leaves out of account his own negation, and who 
claims to be immeasurably good, who claims to be loving to the exclusion of hatred, has 
put all measuredness out of joint. He has thereby, before he has become fully aware of it, 
inevitably become the Devil's servant - whom he cannot get rid of, but only compensate 
for. To claim the opposite of a position is never crazy. To think that reality is one-
dimensional is crazy: truth can only be recognised in polarity.68
This point is later developed to suggest a "zero point", a point of equilibrium which Friedlaender 
also thinks of as a state of pre-differentiation. This is the nub of his notion of creative 
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indifference. It is at this point of balance, the place between all the polarities of life, that one can 
be most creative. At such a zero point, one is most in touch with all the possibilities of the field, 
hiding from nothing, denying nothing, open to everything and yet poised and without a priori
commitments as to value or outcome. The Indifferenz that Friedlaender defines is not the 
indifference of modern English usage. Instead it connotes impartiality. It corresponds to (but is 
not equivalent to nor coterminous with) the concept of "the middle mode" put forward by Paul 
Goodman69. It has similarities to the attitude of scientific detachment enjoined in Freud, but again 
is not altogether equivalent. Friedlaender specifies something more thoroughgoing and more 
charged with possibility. He does not caution, for example, against over-attachment, but rather 
shows how any attachment may signify a rejection of a polar opposite with consequent loss and 
concomitant delusion.
The assumption that polar opposites are a fact of life has many implications. It provides, for 
example, a context for the proverbial wisdom that love and hate co-exist in human relationships, 
and it has implications for the splitting which marks political as much as interpersonal process. It 
is somewhat akin to the holism inherent in Eastern thought, especially in the Taoist 
understanding of the inseparability and mutual co-existence of yin and yang70. It undermines at a 
stroke the splitting of body / mind, either / or, or good / bad. Philosophically, it is a radical 
rejection of and alternative to the dualism of Western thought and anticipates the binary 
oppositions of Derrida.
It is arguable that, for all his radicalism and departure from accepted norms of thought and 
morality, Freud did not make the philosophical shift that Perls made with his reliance on 
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Friedlaender, Smuts and others. To be sure, Freud's introduction of the notion of the unconscious 
has proved to be one of those ideas which has altered intellectual, artistic and spiritual life for a 
large percentage of the western world's population. And yet the ideas of Friedlaender represent an 
arguably more profound challenge to Western intellectual infrastructure. In his reliance on 
Friedlaender, Perls believed he had found a "mental precision tool which is neither extremely 
difficult to grasp nor to handle". The precision lay in the means of indicating or measuring 
degrees of differentiation71.  Whilst the claims of precision are Perls' rather than Friedlaender's, 
the latter was clear in his belief that there are gradations of differentiation and that these 
gradations are important. He states, for instance, that
The distinction between plus and minus is not simply a matter of quantity and of 
gradation - that is, if one takes gradation and quantity as polar in nature. In fact it must be 
said that the most minute difference already indicates a polar division, by which I mean to 
say the eternally inseparable, the (out of enthusiasm) self-dividing total reality of the 
subject. Plus and minus are therefore homogeneous opposites, mirror images. Gradation 
is differentiation.72
Friedlaender, although a prolific writer, is not currently considered a major figure in European 
philosophy. Perls and his associates might have reached their novel view of the essential 
connectedness of apparent opposites by another route than the one that they actually took73. 
However, Friedlaender had done the philosophical groundwork and Perls came across his writing 
in Germany and indeed met him74. What he found was an original, sometimes whimsical, mind 
of great inventiveness. Schöpferische Indifferenz was thoroughly subsumed into the basic 
structures of gestalt therapy theory and its central notions are to be found in schools of therapy 
and elsewhere eighty years after Friedlaender published them. 
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3.6 Kurt Goldstein
Perls was generous in his acknowledgement that gestalt therapy owes much to the neuro-
psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein75. He was equally frank in acknowledging his initial reluctance to go 
along with Goldstein's approach, not because he was not drawn to it or was more persuaded of 
Freud's, but rather because psychoanalysis had become his spiritual home. If he went the 
Goldstein route, he put at risk his "spiritual support". He knew that the gestalt psychologists did 
not count him as one of their own so that he could not look to them for support76.
Goldstein was working in Frankfurt at what Shepard identifies as "his Institute for Brain 
Damaged Soldiers"77. The authors of Gestalt therapy assert that "the magnificent work of 
Goldstein in neuropsychiatry still has not found the place in modern science that it deserves". 
They knew, despite Shepard’s minimising of the connection, that Goldstein had developed 
clinical approaches derived from gestalt experimental psychology78. The work was therapeutic, 
although not primarily psychotherapeutic. Lore Posner worked directly under Goldstein and can 
hardly have failed to be influenced by his approach. When the Perls began to formulate their own 
approach, the use of the fundamental concepts of gestalt psychology were more than illustrative. 
As they began to describe the conceptual basis for their “concentration” process (later modified 
and redefined as contact process) they spoke of a sequence of figure/ground differentiations - the 
very heart of gestalt psychology. Shepard's dismissal of the connection can only make sense if it 
is understood as a remark biased toward the massive influence of Freud and of psychoanalysis. It
is, of course, conceivable that, without the influence of Goldstein and others, the Perls might 
have arrived at a new therapeutic approach deriving from psychoanalysis and from Reich's 
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psychosomatic understandings. But that approach would not look much like the gestalt therapy 
they founded.
Goldstein's influence included a strong emphasis on the perceptual aspects of gestalt psychology 
which form an explicit part of Perls' approach to contact theory79. Shepard ignores Goldstein’s 
own gestalt orientation that identifies him as one of the strongest theoretical and practical links 
between gestalt psychology and gestalt therapy. Two examples from Goldstein’s writing serve to 
illustrate those links. The first demonstrates his rebuttal of the atomistic tendency of analytic 
scientific approaches, aligning him with von Ehrenfels and his successors:
When a student of human nature bases his studies on the results of one special science, he 
has nothing but a starting point; he will never derive a correct answer to his questions 
from the material of a single realm alone....
If the organism were a sum of parts which we could study separately, there would be no 
difficulty in combining our knowledge about the parts to form a science of the whole....
If the organism is a whole and each section of it functions normally within that whole, 
then in the analytic experiment, which isolates the sections as it studies them, the 
properties and functions of any part must be modified by their isolation from the whole of 
the organism. Thus they cannot reveal the function of these parts in normal life.80
The second example illustrates how close Goldstein's therapeutic work, reported in 1934, comes 
to Perls' work published in 195181. The illustration concerns a man given to sexual exhibitionism, 
triggered when he accidentally saw a naked part of a woman's body. He was otherwise leading an 
ordinary life that included "a normal sex life". In conversation with Goldstein, the man 
remembered a childhood game involving boys and girls who used to strip naked and then play 
"milking cows" in which the girls pulled the boys' penises. The point of Goldstein's account is 
that the man had not repressed his memories: he did not resist their return to memory, nor resist 
disclosure. Goldstein asserts that the memories had merely become irrelevant when the games 
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stopped and the children had moved on to other interests82. The man's exhibitionist behaviour 
represented an "invasion" of anachronistic and unwanted impulses. He comments on the Freudian 
approach to such an issue and then adds:
If the required performance  [i.e. carrying out of an everyday task] is a conscious act, it 
will seem as if unconscious processes were invading consciousness. Actually, only 
disfigurements of the required total excitation Gestalt take place, and these 
disfigurements naturally find expression in the conscious aspect of that process. What 
appears just as remembrance, in a situation to which it belongs as an adequate after effect, 
will, in a situation in which it does not belong, be regarded as the invasion of an 
inadequate and therefore an "alien" event that disturbs the present activity.83
It may be inferred - correctly - from the above that Goldstein did not accept the Freudian notion 
of the unconscious. He had no need of it within his theoretical framework. Furthermore, he was 
critical of Freud's use of a notion which, he considered, seriously distorted understanding of 
conscious process84. The understanding of neurotic behaviour and the corresponding 
psychotherapeutic approach in the example above are so close to those of Perls that one must 
assume either that Perls learned them from Goldstein directly or from another student of 
Goldstein's - or that they shared a common "ancestor". Given the prevailing hegemony of 
psychoanalysis at the time and given Perls' stay in Frankfurt with Goldstein, the simpler 
explanation is the first. However, the precise nature of the connection between Goldstein's 
thought and that of Perls matters less than the fact of their compatibility and frequent unanimity.
It is safe to conclude that Goldstein was a gestaltist so far as his psychological understandings are 
concerned85, and that Perls and other gestalt therapists have drawn on his understandings in the 
formulation of their work. Moreover, Goldstein was no mere receiver of gestalt thinking. He 
differed from other gestalt psychologists in important respects and so broadened the gestalt 
approach.
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My guiding principle has been a different one [from those of gestalt psychologists], 
inasmuch as the "whole," the "Gestalt," has always meant to me the whole organism and 
not the phenomena in one field, or merely the "introspective experiences," which in 
Gestalt psychology play quite an important part.86
He devoted his chapter 8 to defining some of his differences from other gestalt psychologists. 
These include a biologically based critique of Wertheimer's ideas about what constitutes a 
Gestalt. His critique does not, however, undermine the gestaltists' position, but broadens its base 
and paves the way for a biologically based view somewhat different to Perls’. However, Perls et 
al use the term "the organism" frequently. Although no attribution is given, it seems probable that 
they preferred this to other possible terms (the individual, one, a person) because of the 
connotations derived from Goldstein's holistic gestalt approach.
3.7 The gestaltists
The influence of Wertheimer and Lewin, and of Wertheimer's students, Köhler and Koffka, on 
the development of gestalt psychology was discussed in chapter 2. What follows is a more 
detailed description of how the gestaltists influenced gestalt therapy and, in particular, Perls’ 
articulation of a theory of the self. For these purposes, it is sufficient to take two of these 
psychologists as examples. The first is Köhler who here represents gestalt psychology87 (as well 
as his teacher Wertheimer and Koffka), and the second is Lewin (section 3.8), chosen for his 
articulation of field theory.
In his seminal Gestalt psychology88, Köhler argues that much preceding psychology offered a 
view of nature, including human nature, that stemmed from a mechanistic view of the cosmos89. 
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He argued that such a view is not only at variance with the naïve and uncritical experience of 
most people, but that it does not stand up to scientific scrutiny. It is an inherited view that reflects 
the bias of atomistic thinking and neglects to take into account even the physiological (let alone 
psychological or emotional) sophistication of human beings. He advances a physical argument 
about the movement of a drop of water within a vessel and within a larger volume, gradually 
increasing the complexity of the scenario. He suggests that the non-physicist onlooker may 
conclude that the movement becomes random and unpredictable, but reminds his readers that this 
is merely a reflection of the observer's confusion. He argued that, within the apparent randomness 
is an overarching process that makes sense of the microscopic processes90.
This is precisely the theory of dynamic equilibrium or organismic homeostasis that became 
central to Perls' understanding of ego function. Perls saw all behaviour, neurotic or functional, as 
purposive and, more than that, purposive within a context usually much wider than the individual 
whose behaviour is under consideration. Each person may indeed be compared to a drop in a 
large ocean: the sheer complexity of that situation challenges human ingenuity, but it is 
characterised by processes that may be discerned within the overall field. Köhler further asserted 
in this connection, contrary to the view held by William James, that the kinds of categories and 
distinctions which psychologists and others attribute to the field of (particularly sensory) 
experience are not necessarily arbitrary or pragmatic. Rather,
"…notwithstanding the general dynamic interdependence throughout the field, there are 
boundaries in it at which dynamic factors operate toward a measure of segregation rather 
than uniform continuity. For this there are good examples in physics. Everything favors 
the assumption that the same happens in the nervous system."91
Köhler states that it is this apparent tendency toward spontaneous grouping in sensory fields that 
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Wertheimer noticed and which formed the basis for much of his research92.
Another important intellectual step which Köhler and the others took was their conclusion that 
the phenomenology they encountered was the phenomenology of the brain. This is a statement of 
fundamental importance. Psychology had been from the beginning a sub-discipline of 
philosophy, so that it is reasonable to speak of Aristotle's or Kant’s psychologies. What 
Aristotle’s and Kant’s psychologies have in common is that they are psychologies of mind. That 
indeed was where Brentano had started. But, as the process of phenomenological investigation 
gathered pace, and under the firm guidance of Stumpf regarding scientific method, personal 
observation and phenomenological exactitude, the new experimental psychology became focused 
on the activity of the brain. It was this that underlay Köhler's assertion that "it seems to be the 
natural fate of Gestalt Psychology to become Gestalt Biology"93. He was anticipating by forty 
years current trends in psychology as a cognitive science, and a discipline linked to molecular 
biology, genetic research and even the memetic debate94. In other words, Köhler gave empirically 
researched psychological undergirding to Smuts' poetic grasp of the holism and isomorphism of 
biology and psychology. That was something that Freud had believed but had not been able to 
show in any organised fashion95. 
Perls’ background in neuropsychiatristy predisposed him to see persons as biological and 
psychical entities in whom the two modes were so woven together that their separation in 
professional discourse would seem artificial. In Köhler and his colleagues, he found the same 
holism. But he found more which was to contribute to his understanding of the self and its 
structures. One of his chief criticisms of psychoanalysis was that its psychology was 
associational96 (he was referring principally to notions of cause and effect in psychic functioning 
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as well as to free association as an analytic technique). He wanted to put in its place a functional 
psychology, based upon and descriptive of the functions of the ego and other aspects of the self97.
Shepard’s assessment of  Köhler's Gestalt psychology was that it had little to offer a therapist 
such as Perls98. For example, much of Köhler's work was to do with phi-phenomena such as 
phenomenal or stroboscopic movement, and with behavioural observations of primates. But he 
was more than a laboratory psychologist. His early chapters show a philosophical sophistication 
regarding the epistemological problems of the work that demonstrates clearly his understanding 
of the gestalt philosophers99. But his most practical gift to gestalt therapy is in the carefully 
articulated understanding of gestalt formation and its status as a process. It is this that lies at the 
heart of Perls understanding of the self. In his work on isomorphism100, Köhler sets out to 
establish the relationship between interior or subjective experience and biology101, "i.e...the 
similarity between sensory experience and accompanying physiological processes"102. He quoted 
Goethe in a chapter heading in his paper on physical Gestalten. The quotation was: "Denn was 
innen, der ist aussen"103. He was aware that his attempt to resolve a long-standing dilemma in 
experimental psychology might lead to misunderstanding. The dilemma may be understood as the 
tension between associationism or atomism on the one hand and our perception of organised 
configurations on the other104. The important question in this tension, he argued, was not what we 
see but how we see it: we know that what we see is an organised whole, but how do we perceive 
it?  Is that organisation out there, given in the experience, or is it in here, the activity of the 
perceiver?105. Now Perls took Köhler to be on the side of the perceiver as organiser or maker of 
Gestalten. Wertheimer, on the other hand, and to an extent Köhler also, had held that these 
Gestalten exist in nature and, through the media of our senses, impress themselves upon us. This 
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uncertainty about and preoccupation with the mechanics of pure perception was, according to 
Wheeler106, a good example of how the presuppositions of the scientific enquirers may limit the 
experiment and skew the observations. Wheeler goes on to resolve that old tension in a way 
which, by appealing to Lewin's field theory, represents a mainstream position in gestalt thinking 
today and which echoes Köhler's own attempts at resolution107.
The resultant view might be summarised as a both / and resolution. A personal illustration may 
explicate this. In a Cornish field I observed an organised entity, a flock of sheep, in the 
environment. That commonplace and unsurprising percept was not the product of, say, my desire 
to eat mutton nor of any other subjective impulse. Then a new event took place. A more careful 
gaze indicated that two of the sheep had unusually long necks. They were, it transpired, not sheep 
but llamas put there to guard the sheep from predators. There was a moment's doubt about the 
sensory evidence, but the external data were irrefutable. What this illustrates is the activity of at 
least two processes. One is the perception of a complex Gestalt, i.e. a flock of sheep. It was the 
organised entity "flock-of-sheep" which was the sensory stimulus. There was also an atomistic or 
associationist process whereby the discrepant data, long necks, became figure in the ground (i.e. 
the perceptual field was reorganised around this stimulus) and the data checked in a scanning and 
matching process. Scanning built up the evidence (long necks, long ears, four legs etc), and 
matching entailed comparing the emergent picture with remembered images from another 
occasion. The example shows how both out-there and in-here can be important in what appears to 
be a single act of perception.
Perls was aware both of the ongoing scientific and philosophical conflict on this score and of the 
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importance of both these processes indicated in the example of the sheep and llamas. It was not 
his primary concern to address these issues in any detail although they are evident in his work on 
the self. For Perls, the self, as will be seen below, is not a fixed entity but a fluid process 
constituted out of all its experiences of contact, finished and unfinished. To put it in a more 
functional way, "the chief work of the self [is] gestalt-formation"108. That is what the self does 
and that, from Perls' point of view, is a more important statement than a less functional one 
answering the question, what is the self (for)?  Thus when Perls came to articulate his 
fundamental theoretical and technical notion for gestalt therapy, that of contact, he defined that 
process in terms of gestalt formation109. In that definition, one can see the self both as recipient 
and perceiver of the external reality and as the organiser and constructor of reality. That is a 
direct debt to Köhler and his associates110. The outworking of Köhler's gestalt psychology in 
terms of the structures of the self is considered in greater detail in chapter 4.
3.8 Lewin
Wheeler suggests that Perls may have been unaware of Lewin when he was working on his new 
approach to therapy and drawing on gestalt psychology111. This is a surprising suggestion, 
especially in the light of Perls' references to the notion of "field"112 and a specific reference to 
Lewin's work on testing memory113. Although these references do not add up to overwhelming 
proof that Perls was conversant with Lewin's work on field theory, it does constitute textual 
evidence. And, even if that conclusion were unreliable, it is still possible and, in the present 
context, important to assert that Lewin's ideas about field theory have exercised a significant 
influence on the theory and practice of gestalt therapy, and that they continue to influence its 
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development114.  It is not overstating the case to say that field theory is fundamental to gestalt 
therapy115.
Field theory began life as a concept in theoretical physics and can be understood as a move away 
from Newtonian mechanics in the understanding of forces. Subtle and sophisticated though 
Newton's work is116, it became necessary to elaborate ever further the interplay of forces as 
physical events of increasing complexity were analysed. An example of this may be found in the 
work of James Clerk Maxwell in the mid-nineteenth century. It was Maxwell who is credited 
with unifying (and thereby developing) existing theories of electricity and magnetism117. He did 
this by positing electromagnetic fields in which various forces might be detected as disturbances 
of the field (phenomena which gestaltists would recognise as figures in the ground). Early in the 
twentieth century, Einstein was working on what became known as his special theory of relativity 
and later on his general theory. This latter marked a breakthrough in the concept of field whereby 
all events thereafter would be regarded as occurring within four-dimensional space-time. 
Hawking's glossary of terms offers a thumbnail definition of field as "something which exists 
throughout space and time, as opposed to a particle that exists at only one point at a time"118. 
Now, as was pointed in section 3.1, all language is metaphorical, even the language of physics, 
although the degree of abstraction entailed is different to that which pertains when field theory is 
applied to psychology119. This is a point not easily expressed in a single formula. Thus Lewin can 
state
I am persuaded that it is possible to undertake experiments in sociology which have as 
much right to be called scientific experiments as those in physics and chemistry. I am 
persuaded that there exists a social space which has all the essential properties of a real 
empirical space and deserves as much attention by students of geometry and mathematics 
as the physical space, although it is not a physical one. The perception of social space and 
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the experimental and conceptual investigation of the dynamics and laws of the processes 
in social space are of fundamental theoretical and practical importance.120
The elegance and comprehensive scope of physical field theories exercise a compelling influence 
over people who seek to understand (and perhaps predict) group and individual attitudes and 
behaviour. Once field thinking had entered educated discourse, it would have been absurd not to 
attempt to apply it to important matters in other areas of life121.  Although the task is beyond the 
aim of this thesis, it can be argued that field theory had permeated other schools of psychology: 
however, nowhere is this more transparently so than in gestalt. Lewin's widow pointed out that 
her husband's lifelong preoccupation had been to relate theory to practical issues, to build 
bridges122. He was impatient with psychological observations that stopped in the laboratory: the 
experiments he wanted to conduct were in the real world, as in his "War Landscape"123. Wheeler 
points out that it was in the harsh conditions of the Western Front that Lewin formulated his 
notions of mental topology. He concluded that people make for themselves mental maps that 
indicate not so much the geographical definitions of a piece of ground as its features related to 
their current needs. The lines of the map are drawn by concerns such as safety, danger, resources 
or food124. He summarised this observation with his tag that "the need organises the field".
The notion of need was not new to psychology, of course. Freud had spelled out in his theories of 
instincts and drives the outworking of libidinal needs. Perls had started at another point: hunger. 
It is hunger and the need to satisfy it that configures the infant's field. Lewin’s ideas offered to an 
emerging gestalt therapy a phenomenological and empirical foundation. On such a basis, gestalt 
therapy could claim philosophical connections with "hard" science, as well as finding liberation 
from the chains of S(timulus) / R(esponse) causality. Such a scientific and philosophical footing 
served to strengthen Perls' conviction that the data of the psychotherapeutic encounter were 
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indicators of a complex field of events and processes. In the present thesis, field theory is 
important as a major plank in the theoretical structures of a discipline whose scope is at least as 
wide as is Lewin's vision.
3.9 The influence of the existentialists
Gestalt therapy is frequently referred to in books and articles as "existential" in its philosophical 
orientation. Such remarks are usually followed by one or two examples of what such a statement 
may mean. The term is used as a marker, a means of describing how gestalt therapists pay close 
attention to the phenomenology of their experience and to that of their patients. It is not the 
concern of most therapists to justify such statements through philosophical argument, nor to ask 
in what ways existentialism has influenced the development of gestalt therapy. But there are a 
few writers who spell out how such a question may be answered in terms of philosophical 
parentage and psychotherapeutic practice125.
Van De Riet et al cite Kierkegaard's Either / or (1944) in support of Perls' general approach. 
They describe the former as having
...shunned abstract approaches and rejected formulating a general theory of "being."  
Instead, he concerned himself with what a person does in a real situation. The 
confrontation between the person and his environmental situation distinguishes him. 
Kierkegaard saw this confrontation as primal, not separable from what the person is or 
who he is. The gestalt approach, similarly, maintains that it is the contact between the 
person and his environment that defines the person's identity..... That contact is 
constituted by awareness, which is at the core of gestalt therapy. In existentialism, 
awareness would be "knowing"...126
Wilson Van Dusen speaks of his patients and their "being-in-the-world"127, clearly referring to 
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Heidegger and Binswanger.   What is also apparent in Van Dusen's writing is his commitment 
both in theory and practice to the existential principle of here-and-now. This may be seen in an 
example he gives of encouraging his patient to say as an assertion and with more conviction 
something he had previously put as a question, viz. "Do you think therapy should go on 
indefinitely?"  The here-and-now version of the expression brings out the emotion, the concern 
and the projection of the patient. Van Dusen comments, "The projection was not interpreted as a 
defect in the patient. The affect underlying it was recovered and the patient was restored to 
power"128. A similar gestalt viewpoint may be seen, from an existentialist standpoint, in the same 
author's paper "Wu Wei, no-mind and the fertile void in psychotherapy"129. He takes the Chinese 
notion of Wu Wei and invokes associations it might arouse in the Western mind. Chaos, 
emptiness, even desolation, are in the fundamental meaning. These are the kinds of experiences 
we have in our most extreme states - including psychotic illness. And yet the void is a fertile 
void. Viewed from another angle, as an aspect of human existence, Wu Wei can be an occasion 
of creativity, a fertile void130.
Yontef gives a further account of the significance of existentialism in the development and 
practice of gestalt therapy. He points out three principal points of explicit influence. The first may 
be seen in his observation that
The existential view holds that people are endlessly remaking or discovering themselves. 
There is no essence of human nature to be discovered "once and for all". There are always 
new horizons, new problems and new opportunities.131
and,
Existentialism is based on the phenomenological method. Existential phenomenologists 
focus on people's existence, relations with each other, joys and suffering, etc., as directly 
experienced.132
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Another and fundamentally important influence of existentialism is found in the emphasis on 
dialogue in gestalt practice. Now dialogue goes back to a time before Socrates and is not peculiar 
to gestalt therapy. However, the features that were important to Perls owe much to Buber's notion 
of the I-Thou encounter and the dialogues that belong to such a relationship133. Yontef, perhaps 
most of all among current gestalt writers, promotes this dialogic approach to therapy and 
acknowledges its roots in existentialism.
The relationship between the therapist and the client is the most important aspect of 
psychotherapy. Existential dialogue is an essential part of Gestalt therapy's methodology 
and is a manifestation of the existential perspective on relationship.134
Yontef discerns a third influence of existentialism in the theory and practice of gestalt therapy. It 
is the notion of choice as perhaps the definitive human activity, the most significant sign of 
human consciousness. One of the most vivid depictions of choice in existentialist literature is in 
Sartre's trilogy of novels Roads to Freedom referred to in chapter 2. Choice, from a gestalt 
therapy perspective, is the foundation stone of the structures of the personality, and the sine qua 
non of responsibility. Yontef summarises these three elements in one sentence as 
"....acknowledgement of responsibility and choice in creating one's personal existence, the 
primacy of existence over essence, and the existential dialogue".135
One last point, again from Yontef, serves to show how important was existentialism for the 
development of gestalt therapy (including its development out of gestalt psychology). He makes 
the point that gestalt psychology is a "content" psychology in that it focuses on important aspects 
of persons such as their perception or cognition. By contrast, he maintains that gestalt therapy is 
both a "content" psychology and an "act" psychology. The grounds for the second half of this 
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claim lie in the way that gestalt therapy is an approach to the whole person as one who perceives 
and learns. This is, in effect, a shift from essence to existence in the Sartrian mode. It is a 
movement from the purely phenomenological approach associated with Husserl towards one 
which, whilst continuing to be phenomenological, widens its focus to encompass whole persons 
as they exist in their environment and in relation to others136. Such a view accorded closely with 
the views of the early gestalt therapists and supported their developing ideas about the nature of 
the self as organism-in-an-environment, as being-in-relation. Such a view would undoubtedly 
resonate positively with those feminist scholars who are concerned to deconstruct essentialist 
views of the human person, but might, by the same token, dismay those of a more liberal feminist 
approach who might feel undermined by such an approach to being and to relationship.
3.10 Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed major influences on the development of gestalt therapy and, in 
particular, on Perls and his co-workers as they articulated their approach to therapy and to wider 
matters such as cultural norms, education and individual evolution. Perls was heir to riches from 
a number of sources in many countries. He did not work alone, although it is his name that 
appears first in all the early works on gestalt therapy. There are many testimonies to his genius, as 
well as a reassuring number that focus on his personal foibles and his nastiness. What cannot be 
denied, however, is that his hunches about what to borrow and his ability to recognise a 
theoretical bargain when he saw one fed his integrative genius. That said, the articulation of 
gestalt therapy theory was not his alone and the work has accelerated rather than diminished since 
his death in 1970. The original integrations have stood the test of time and criticism to the point 
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where the conceptual structures of gestalt therapy are extending and elaborating, opening 
themselves to new influences and offering the prospect of new integrations. What is 
demonstrated in this chapter is the richness, complexity and the scope of gestalt therapy theory. 
This is important given the aim of this thesis aims to establish that gestalt is compatible with 
feminist theology. Gestalt must, at the least, demonstrate that it has a compatible range of 
interests, ideas and values.
The thesis continues, in the next chapter, to define the human self from a gestalt perspective and 
moves on to analyse the core ideas of gestalt. It is from this analysis that the practical-values of 
gestalt are derived and are, in their turn, compared with those of feminist theology.
                    
1      Lesser influences acknowledged by Perls in, for example, his workshop asides are not dealt 
with here. One such is Moreno whose psychological and theatrical genius in the 
development of psychodrama was important in the technical development of gestalt therapy, 
but whose theoretical significance is not as great as that of, say, Freud or Reich. The theory 
and practice of psychodrama is spelled out in MORENO, J L Psychodrama: volumes 1, 2 
and 3  New York: Beacon House, 1946, 1959, 1969; also GREENBERG, I A (ed).  
Psychodrama, theory and therapy. London: Souvenir Press, Condor Books, 1975 and  
HOLMES, P and KARP, M (eds.).  Psychodrama, inspiration and technique.  London: 
Routledge, 1991.
2      Later in his life, Perls referred less often to Smuts although holism continued to be central to 
his thinking, and he spoke more commonly of Taoism and other Eastern influences rather 
than Friedlaender's ideas about polarities and the zero point. It may be said both that fashions 
change and Eastern ideas enjoyed a certain cachet in the 1960s; and that the attempt to view 
Western ideas through Eastern lenses, whilst sometimes confusing, did offer a new context 
for familiar issues in Western cultures.
3    The word here may be taken both in its philosophical or logical sense and in its gestalt 
psychological sense as the context which gives meaning to the figure, in this case that of 
gestalt therapy.
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4      BETTLEHEIM, Bruno. Freud and man's soul.  London: Chatto & Windus, the Hogarth 
Press, 1983, ch. VIII.
5    The translation here is Bettleheim's own. It may usefully be compared with that of the 
Standard Edition (translated by James Strachey) which is reproduced in FREUD, S. Two 
short accounts of psycho-analysis. London: Pelican Books, 1962, p.104. 
6      Ibid pp.104-5.
7     Bettelheim, op cit pp.78-79.
8     The complexities and ambiguities of language at the heart of Lacan's work were discussed 
in section 2.2.
9      For example Lacan (1989), esp.ch.3, "Function and field of speech and language", and, in 
that context, p.83 for a worked-through example of Lacan's concern for language.
10     Perls (1969) p.13.
11     Much of the biographical detail in this and the following paragraphs is taken from Shepard 
(1976).
12     PERLS, F S. In and out the garbage pail. Originally published  Lafayette CA: Real People 
Press, 1969. Citations from re-issue, Highland, NY: Gestalt Journal Press, 1992, hereafter 
referred to as Perls (1992). The book has neither chapter divisions nor page numbers, 
rendering accurate references impossible. In the book Perls suggests that the analysis was a 
failure rather than complete, although it is hard to believe that Happel would have made her 
suggestion had she not taken the view that the analysis had gone as far as was necessary..
13     REICH, Wilhelm. Character analysis. English trans. New York: Orgone Institute, 1945.
14     For Reich and for Perls, the word "potency" has deliberate sexual connotations linked to 
Reich's notion of orgone energy. It can be seen as a beginning point for Perls' view that the 
resolution of a neurotic structure is often found in an explosive experience (Perls, 1971, 
p.60). But the term is broader than that. It can be understood as the forerunner of the word 
"potential" as it was used in the "human potential" movements of the 1970s and as the term 
is used in, for example, the education of children.
15     His mother and one of his sisters were murdered in Theresienstadt. 
16     Perls (1969), p.81.
17     In chapter X, Perls sets out the principal lines of his critique of Freud and offers the outlines 
of his own ideas
18     For example, he says that “My experiences as a psychiatrist in the South African Army 
reveal that only about 15 per cent of the neuroses show disturbances of sexual gratification, 
while only in 2 to 3 per cent could hysteria symptoms be traced to actual sex-frustration.” 
ibid.p.81.
19     Ibid.
20     Ibid.
21     Ibid pp.80 et seq. 
22     Perls et al (1973), pp.439, 446. It is evident from the context that Perls did not use the word 
“otiose” pejoratively, i.e. as equivalent to nugatory or worthless.
23     He criticises Anna Freud for asserting, for example, that "The ego, if it assents to the 
impulse [arising from the id], does not enter into the picture at all". This statement 
minimises the creativity of the ego that, for Perls, is vital. Freud and the analysts tend to 
attribute creativity primarily to the id: whereas Perls asserts that: “...the perceptions 
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[themselves functions of the ego] are not mere perceptions; they brighten and sharpen, and 
attract. Throughout the process there is discovery and invention, not looking on; for 
although the need of the organism is conservative, the gratification of the need can only 
come from the novelty in the environment: the id-function more and more becomes ego-
function up to the point of final contact and release, just the opposite of what Miss Freud 
asserts.” (Perls et al,1973, p.440). Perls' promise that, in a later chapter (chapter 13), he will 
show that Freud treats self-function more satisfactorily than his followers do is not 
adequately fulfilled, in that Perls did not there make explicit references to Freud's theories. 
However, it is clear from a reading of chapter 13 that it does owe much to Freud's teaching. 
The chapter concerns the latter two phases of the contact process - final contact and post-
contact. It is precisely at these stages that the ego is not much in evidence, for its work is 
over and the self fully engaged in the contact - or else quietly digesting after the contact is 
completed. In other words, any conflict with Freud's understanding of the self - a conflict 
which, following that with Freud's daughter, centred on differences over ego - is minimised.
24     FREUD, S. "The Unconscious" In  On metapsychology: the theory of psycho-analysis, Vol 
11 of The Pelican Freud Library. London: Penguin, 1984. See p.168.
25     Op cit part IV pp.183 et seq. Perls’ critique shows his impatience with what he sees as an 
unnecessarily complicated view involving cathexes, anticathexes, and systems of conscious, 
preconscious and unconscious psychical life.
26    FREUD, S. "Lecture 32: anxiety and instinctual life". In  New introductory lectures on 
psychoanalysis. Vol 2 of Pelican Freud Library, London: Penguin, 1973, p.123. Freud refers 
to the same subject in his papers "Instincts and their vicissitudes" and "Repression", both of 
which appear in Freud (1984) (op cit, pp.113 et seq and pp.145 et seq).
27     One sees in this notion the root of Freud's use of the term "ambivalence", a term eschewed 
by Perls as unnecessary and inaccurate.
28     Perls et al (1973) p.504.
29     Much more may be said on this subject than these three points. Two are of particular interest 
here. First, there is the matter of human biology. For Freud, the physical was important but 
often vague, as in his lecture on self-structure (Freud (1973) Lecture 31). The physical 
existence of the person is merely implied in the discussion of space and time and in the 
impulses, desires and cathected objects of the body and the physical world. Some of the 
gestalt psychotherapists who learned their craft from Perls himself tend to describe reaction 
formations in markedly physical terms, offering as diagnostic indicators such factors as 
sudden upper thoracic breathing followed by swallowing and a tipping downward of the 
head. The force of this is to underline Perls' frequent emphasis on reaction-formation as a 
thing of the moment just as much as it can also be a fixed character trait such as Freud 
describes in the extracts from On metapsychology referred to in note 26 above. This 
understanding is not at odds with Freud's, though the nature of Freud's language (and the 
philosophy of the times) suggests a degree of fixity rather than of transient process. Second, 
in writing about reaction-formation, Perls also makes it clear that, whereas Freud thought in 
terms of "defences" of the ego - in this case against excessive anxiety - Perls talks in terms of 
aggression. In this usage, he is not necessarily intending to speak of hostility, although the 
object in his example is the destruction of a perceived threat. Rather, in line with his critique 
of the Freudian self as otiose, he conceives of a self which aggresses in the strict sense of 
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that word (ad-gressum, Latin = move towards). 
30     Op cit p.504-505.
31    Yontef (1993) especially ch.9, pp.257 et seq, makes the point that gestaltists are re-
examining psychoanalysis as they encounter patients with severe personality disorders, 
something for which a more bare-bones gestalt therapy had not proved very effective 
(p.258). 
32     Perls et al (1973) p.17.
33     Ibid p. 17.
34     REICH, Wilhelm.  The function of the orgasm.  London: Souvenir Press, reprinted 1993. 
This book appears in an earlier translation as The discovery of the orgone, Vol 1: the 
function of the orgasm (1942, 1948) - a translation of its German title - copyrighted in 1968. 
Some of the internal references in Reich's writing suggest minor unacknowledged editing 
between editions.
35     Reich (1993) p.138.
36     Ibid pp. 133 et seq.
37     Ibid pp. 139 et seq.
38     Ibid pp. 138-9.
39     Ibid pp. 144-5.
40     Ibid p. 140.
41     E.g. that of the young American woman (ibid pp. 159 et seq). This patient presented with 
symptoms of severe bronchial asthma that she had suffered from childhood. She had asthma 
attacks whenever she became sexually excited. In addition she experienced acute and 
distressing spasms and unusual rhythms in her bowel, throat, vagina and other parts of her 
body. Reich spells out the symptoms and his understanding and treatment of them. His point 
is that her body is not separate from her character. Rather her character is quite literally 
embodied, including in the distressing ways which brought her into therapy. Her symptoms 
have an insistent logic, the same logic which, when understood sympathetically, led to her 
developing into a healthy and sexually active person. The change was indeed one of 
character.
42     Perls et al (1973), chapter 15.
43     Reich's understanding is shown in Reich op cit p.156.
44     Perls' stance regarding sexuality is the more remarkable when one considers his personal 
history and experiences. He had grown up with a rigid sexual morality and a morbid sense of 
being an unattractive failure. His ideas - about politics, the arts and literature - were those of 
a cultural radical, but his demeanour told another story. He had a stooping posture, was 
prematurely bald, sexually inhibited and sure that his memory had been damaged by much 
early (and forbidden) masturbation. His personal sexual liberation began with a tempestuous 
and orgiastic relationship with a cousin while he was working in New York City. A few 
years later, with Hitschmann, he was still concerned with a sense of sexual inadequacy. 
(Shepard op cit pp.31-35). 
45     Perls et al (1973) pp.100-101.
46     Reich op cit pp.266-267.
47     Ibid p.153.
48     Ibid p.155.
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49     Ibid p. 426. This matter will be treated at greater length in chapter 4.
50     E.g. Reich op cit p.148 "...his character was the person himself".
51    The obvious example of this is that of reaction-formations cited above, although it should be 
noted that Perls varies from the strictly Newtonian line in this instance. He does not see the 
reaction as being of the same order as the action, but rather as existing in a hierarchy of 
energies. Perls owes his non-dichotomous thinking to Friedlaender (section 3.5). Both men 
anticipate the work of Derrida in the matter of binary opposition.
52     This is explored in section 3.5.
53     Gestalt therapy derives its intellectual and philosophical structures from a number of sources 
that can themselves be investigated and criticised. The limited focus of the thesis excludes 
such an investigation of Smuts' work, although the widespread acceptance of holism 
suggests that research, largely lacking in this field, might lead to some fundamental 
reappraisal of this popular concept.
54     Ibid, pp. 28-29 et al. The book referred to is SMUTS, General The Right Hon. J C. Holism 
and evolution. London: Macmillan & Co, 1926.
55     This claim is made by Smuts and supported by The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
There may, however, be some evidence to suggest that the term was in use, at least in gestalt 
circles, before 1926.
56     Smuts, op cit p.5.
57     Ibid p. 145
58     Ibid p.145. “Mechanism is a type of structure where the working parts maintain their identity 
and produce their effects individually, so that the activity of the structure is, at least 
theoretically, the mathematical result of the individual activities of the parts. With the two 
concepts of Mechanism and Holism before us we can see how the natural wholes of the 
universe fall under both concepts. There is a measure of Mechanism everywhere, and there is 
a measure of Holism everywhere; but the Holism gains on the Mechanism in the course of 
Evolution. It becomes more and more as Mechanism becomes less and less with the 
advance. Holism is the more fundamental activity, and we may therefore say that Mechanism 
is an earlier, cruder form of Holism; the more Holism there is in structure, the less there is of 
the mechanistic character, until finally in Mind and Personality the mechanistic concept 
ceases to be of any practical use.”
59     Smuts op cit p.224.
60     It should be added that Perls was not uncritical of Smuts' concept of holism. He specifically 
indicates a "danger of deification in Smuts' concept, and I am not inclined to follow him in 
what I would call idealistic or even theological Holism". Perls (1969) p.29.
61     Smuts op cit p.101.
62     Perls et al (1973) p.19.
63     Ibid  p.276.
64   Perls (1969) pp.13-15. The book Perls cites is FRIEDLAENDER, S. Schöpferische 
Indifferenz.  München: Georg Müller, 1918; also München: E. Reinhardt, 1926.
65     Ibid pp.13-14.
66     Ibid p.16.
67     Friedlaender op cit p.87. "Die Welt ist ein Paar, die Kausalität ein Paar, die Richtung, die 
Dimension, jede Reihe, die her Zahlen, Töne, Farben, Gerüche, Geschmäcke, des Gesichts, 
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alle sind paarig, polar, rund, sphärisch veranlagt; und nur der Mensch, er hat den Star". I am 
grateful to the Revd. Dr. Paul Oestreicher for his assistance in this and the following 
translations of Friedlaender's text.
68    “Was balancieren kann, hat Mass. Der ausgepichte "Teufel", der von Gott balanciert wird 
und diese ebenmässige Beziehung in allen Gliedern verspürt, hat Mass und Mitte. Der Gott, 
welcher, die eigne Negation fälschlich ignorierend, masslos gütig sein will, nur Liebve ohne 
Hass, ist aus Mass und Mitte gerenkt und muss, ehe er sich's versieht, des Teufels werden, 
den er nie loswerden, nur kompensieren kann. Das Gegenteil der Position ist niemals Wahn. 
Dass Realität einartig sei, ist Unsinn, sobald man es nicht polar meint.” ibid  pp.19-20. 
69     Perls et al (1973) pp.430-431.
70     This is a connection made explicit in, e.g., Perls (1969) p.18.
71     Ibid pp.16-17.
72     "Der Unterschied zwischen plus und minus ist nicht mehr bloss "quantitativ gradual": wenn 
man Gradation und Quantität polarisch nimmt. Ueberhaupt bedeutet auch der allerleiseste 
Unterschied bereits eine polare Entzweiung - und zwar der ewig unteilbaren, aus 
Ueberschwang sich selbst entzweienden Vollqualität des Subjektes. Plus und minus sind 
also oppositiv (spiegelhaft) homogen. Gradation ist Differenzierung.”  Friedlaender op cit
p.20.
73     For example, he might have followed Jung who in turn followed Nicholas of Cusa (15th 
cent) who, in his De docta ignorantia characterised God as "coincidentia oppositorum", i.e. 
the being in whom all opposites meet LIVINGSTONE, E A (ed). The concise Oxford 
dictionary of the Christian Church 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. Also 
NICHOLAS OF CUSA (English trans. Hopkins, J) Complete theological and philosophical 
treatises Minneapolis: J A Banning Press, 2001.
74     Perls (1992).
75     Perls et al (1973) p. 13. Perls comments on Goldstein and holism in PERLS, F S. Gestalt 
therapy verbatim. Moab, Utah: Bantam Books (1971), p.6.
76     Perls (1992). This section occurs towards the end of the first quarter of the text.
77     Shepard op cit p.33.
78     Shepard is dismissive about this and asserts that “Gestalt psychology had little in common 
with what Fritz was later to call Gestalt Therapy. The Gestalt psychology that Lore studied 
and Fritz was marginally exposed to was of academic interest only. It described perception: 
how individuals saw things. It dealt with foreground / background and helped students to 
appreciate the concept of relativity ....... These Gestaltists had no idea of using their research 
in any psychotherapeutic way. Their interest was an experimental one, not one of helping 
people overcome emotional difficulties. Had Fritz not borrowed the term in 1951 for his 
therapeutic system, Gestalt would have faded to the dusty back bookshelves of graduate 
school libraries, a mere footnote in the history of academic psychology.” (ibid. p.34).
79    The same point arises later in this chapter, when consideration is given to the importance of 
Köhler, section 3.7.
80     GOLDSTEIN, Kurt. Human nature in the light of psychopathology. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1963, pp.9-10.
81     Perls et al (1973).
82     Goldstein argues even against the notion of repression. "We find not continual repression 
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but continual formation of new patterns. The factor, which actuates the so-called repressing, 
is formed neither through prohibitions from without, nor by a censor, nor by an ego, nor by a 
superego. Rather, through maturation, new patterns of the organism are formed, conforming 
to the human species in general and to the cultural pattern of that particular milieu in which 
the child grows up. Of course, one can call this development "ego formation," and of course, 
the prohibitions, just like other processes in the environment, are co-determining factors in 
this formation. Yet, the effects of former reactions have not been "forgotten" through 
repression. Rather, they cannot be remembered because they are no longer part of the 
attitudes of later life and therefore cannot become effective. We shall see that they can be 
revived or recalled if the individual is brought into a situation similar to that under which 
they originated - that is, psychosis or in the psychotherapeutic situation."  ibid. p.250
83     Goldstein (1995), pp.252-253.
84     Goldstein (1963) pp.167 et seq.
85     For example, Goldstein (1995) p.275.
86     Ibid. p.285.
87     Perls (1969), p.27 clearly locates his understanding of gestalt psychology in the work of 
Wertheimer and Köhler.
88     KÖHLER, W. Gestalt psychology: an introduction to new concepts in modern psychology. 
New York: Liveright, 1970 (first published,1947), chpater IV.
89     As was noted above, this was an argument which Goldstein also advanced and which lay 
behind the early work of Brentano and his students in Prague. 
90    ”.. all local changes must be such that, when considered in their totality, they bring the 
system nearer the balance of forces. The factor of inertia, it is true, may cause temporary 
deviations from this simple rule. But, then, in many systems inert velocities are at once 
destroyed by friction, so that the actual development exhibits the rule in pure form, and an 
orderly balance is soon reached. (It is important to know that this applies to the nervous 
system. There are no processes in this system which are influenced by inert velocities.)  The 
fact that the final result always constitutes an orderly distribution has been simply explained 
by Ernst Mach: In orderly distributions, the pattern of forces is just as regular as is the 
distribution of the material. But, clearly, in regular patterns forces are more thoroughly 
balanced than they are in irregular distributions. Hence, since undisturbed interaction 
operates in the direction of balance, it must operate toward orderly distribution both of 
forces and materials.
Dynamic self-distribution in this sense is the kind of function which Gestalt Psychology 
believes to be essential in neurological and psychological theory. More particularly, it is 
assumed that the order of facts in a visual field is to a high degree the outcome of such a 
self-distribution of processes. From this point of view, a stationary visual field corresponds 
to a balanced distribution of underlying processes. When conditions change, resulting 
developments will always be in the direction of balance.”  Köhler op cit  pp.132-133.
91     Ibid pp.136-137.
92     Ibid p.144. It should, however, be noted that, in the field of auditory sensation, von 
Ehrenfels had preceded Wertheimer in his Über Gestaltqualitäten.
93     Ibid p. 359.
94     For examples, DAWKINS, R. The selfish gene (2nd Edition). Oxford: Oxford University 
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Press, Oxford paperback, 1989, chapter 11, especially p.199; and (same author and 
publisher), The extended phenotype, 1983, chapter 6. A meme is "the unit of cultural 
heredity analogous to the gene" (PLOTKIN, H.  Darwin machines and the nature of 
knowledge.  London : Penguin Books, 1995, p.251. Also pp.212-227 on culture and its 
replication by memetic means). Dawkins explains cultural replication by means of units of 
memory which are an efficient means of transmission from one brain to another -
independently of genetic transmission. As Dawkins points out, by the time we see our 
second filial generation, the similarities are already fading: one's genes are halved with each 
generation soon to disappear into the gene pool. But memetic transmission is not subject to 
such vicissitudes and can be transmitted laterally as well as vertically: as such it is a 
profoundly important mechanism for human society and evolution. A view of memetic 
transmission contrasted with genetic transmission is set out in BONNER, J T. The evolution 
of culture in animals.  Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, Princeton Science Library 
edition, 1989, chapter 2.
95    This connection is not only one to the brain. Freud observed that musculature is intimately 
involved in psychological processes, e.g. his interest in the musculature of the anal sphincter 
which he linked to psychic development. Reich's work on character armour is probably the 
most complete psychoanalytic working out of the connections between psychology and 
muscles.
96    The point is made in Perls (1969) p.27, Perls et al (1973) pp.379-383 and other references 
under "association". There are references in the latter to Freud: the critique of Freud is 
extensive and on a number of fronts, all of which add up to a criticism of the type of 
psychology employed and developed by him, which is contrasted with a gestalt approach.
97    This is axiomatic to the approach in Perls (1969) and in Perls et al (1973). For example the 
closing words of his Introduction to Perls (1969, p.8) echo directly the approaches of Stumpf 
and Wertheimer.
98    This point was raised earlier in connection with Goldstein in section 3.6.
99   He cites von Ehrenfels in chaper 6 and elsewhere, and refers to other early figures. References 
to Ash (1982) in chapter 2 of his dissertation demonstrate the fundamental conviction of the 
experimental psychologists (mainly gestaltists) that their task was to answer philosophical 
questions by phenomenological means. The emergence of experimental psychology from 
faculties of philosophy was no historical accident, and the eventual schism between 
philosophy and experimental psychology arose from the growth of the newer discipline to 
the point where it ran into broadly political opposition (Ash (1982, pp.xxxi et seq)).
100   Köhler op cit pp.57-63. Isomorphism was not only a concern of gestaltists but a commonly 
held belief that, in some way, exterior events and interior experience reflected each other. 
Thus defined, its rather mechanical assumptions and shortcomings may be detected and 
Köhler's work offered a greatly modified view.
101   For a discussion of isomorphism in this connection,  ibid pp.150 et seq, also p. 301 and pp. 
344 et seq.
102   Ibid p.160 n.
103   This might be translated as: For whatever was interior is exterior.
104  KÖHLER, W. Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand. Eine 
naturphilosophische Untersuchung. Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1920. He records how he was 
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able to take Wertheimer's psychological models (models of psychic ontology) and extend 
them to the point where they may be applied in physical contexts. He takes as example 
inanimate matter that operates not simply in an atomistic or quasi- mechanical way, but in 
systemic ways with defined Gestalten of behaviour. This development is summarised by Ash 
(1982, pp.xxxix-xli), and in an abstract in the Bibliography of Smith (1988), p.348. 
105    Goldstein asked the same question in his critique of gestalt psychology cited above.
106    Wheeler (1991), chapter 1, especially pp.14-20.
107    Ash (1995), especially pp.176-181; Köhler op cit ch.VII and Wheeler op cit pp.23-26 et seq. 
108    Perls et al (1973) p.441.
109    Chapter 4 below and Perls et al (1973) chapters 12 & 13.
110   An exposition of aspects of this relationship may be found in Yontef (1993), chapter 8: 
"Gestalt therapy: its inheritance from gestalt psychology". The chief value in the present 
context of this chapter lies in the way the author draws parallels between the thinking and 
practice of gestalt psychologists and gestalt therapists.
111    Op cit p.5.
112    Perls (1969), pp.18, 26, 28 et al.
113    Ibid p.101.
114    For example, Houston  (1993)  pp.77 et seq, 99; and Yontef (1993), the subject index under 
Field, pp.543-544 which gives references to the many points at which field theory is central 
to Yontef's argument.
115   Thus Yontef (1993), p.293: "Field theory is the theory upon which Gestalt therapy theory is 
based..."
116   References to Newtonian science in gestalt literature can appear patronising, implying that 
his theories deal only with simple linear processes. Such comments fail to take into account 
the breadth of Newton's work (for example in optics with Herschel, as well as in 
mathematics, let alone in other spheres of activity, e.g. Parliament). They also overlook its 
sophistication, e.g. as when the demands of his own observations drove him towards the 
invention of the calculus (which he termed "the fluxions"), without which, it may be argued, 
it is hard to envisage the mathematical articulation of field theories.
117   MAXWELL, J C. A treatise on electricity and magnetism (3rd edition). Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998 (3rd edition first published by same publisher, 1892).
118   Hawking (1988) p.184.
119   Yontef op cit p.301 has it that "this usage derives literally (in physics) and by analogy (in 
psychology)". The critical word here is "derives". One of the points at which Lewin diverged 
from the Berlin school was in his understanding of isomorphism. Ash’s (1995, pp.268-275) 
and Yontef’s understandings correspond to that of Lewin rather than Köhler.
120   LEWIN, K. "Experiments in social space" (1939) In   LEWIN, G W (ed). Resolving social 
conflicts. London: Souvenir Press, 1973, p. 71. There is a parallel and somewhat similar 
model in Christopher Zeeman's Catastrophe Theory. This theory, in its origins, concerns the 
mathematical consideration of plane surfaces of metal sheets under particular conditions of 
stress. A cusp is reached in the interplay of forces beyond which there occurs a physical 
catastrophe (buckling etc). Zeeman developed his work into modelling (and predicting) the 
catastrophic behaviour of human groups under stress, some accounts of which are described 
in ZEEMAN, E C. Catastrophe theory, selected papers, 1972-1977. Reading, Mass.: 
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Addison Wesley, 1977.
121   The same may be said of Uncertainty, Chaos and other mathematical and scientific theories.
122   Ibid p.xvi.
123   LEWIN, K  "Krieglandschaft"  In  Zeitschrift Angewandter Psychologie  12: 440-447 (1917), 
cited in Wheeler op cit, pp.27-29.
124   Ash (1995) p.270.
125   Examples are found in VAN DE RIET, V. et al. Gestalt therapy: an introduction. New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1980, pp.22-24; and VAN DUSEN, W. "Existential analytic 
psychotherapy"  In PURSGLOVE, P D (ed.). Recognitions in Gestalt Therapy. New York: 
Funk & Wagnalls, 1968, pp.29-30. Van Dusen spells out what he understands by existential-
analytic psychotherapy and states that it has "roots in the work of Adler, Rank, Gestalt 
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THE SELF AND CORE IDEAS IN GESTALT THERAPY
4 Introduction
In pastoral theology, it is important to establish that the two (or more) disciplines in which one is 
working are suitable candidates for interdisciplinary work. Earlier chapters of the thesis, earlier 
chapters trace the unfolding of scientific thinking that guided the development of psychology. 
Chapter 2 shows how speculative thinking about the nature of mental acts led to the development 
of gestalt philosophy and, subsequently, gestalt psychology as a discrete discipline. Chapter 3 
shows how Perls, originally trained in psychoanalysis, integrated other ideas and perspectives 
into a new approach to psychotherapy. This approach proved to be of far wider application and 
was quickly seen to offer a novel understanding of what it is to be human and to be in 
relationship with others. These broad concerns are also part of the province of feminist theology 
and they offer points of possible convergence between the two disciplines.
However, it is from an articulated notion of the self and the self in relationship that the core ideas 
of gestalt can be analysed, i.e. loosed from their background. It is these core ideas from which 
practical-values are derived and, in chapter 7, compared with those of feminist theology.
In this chapter the gestalt approach to the self is stated in terms of contact process. Contact, from 
a gestalt perspective, is fundamental to life itself. It is the basis for defining the human self -
although this process may be seen in other life forms too. Contact is a process rather than an 
entity. It is intimately linked with the figure / ground differentiation (or gestalt formation), 
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implicitly recognised by the early gestalt philosophers and explicitly by the experimenters of the 
Berlin school. The publication of Perls (1973) - actually in 1951 - offered a developed 
articulation of contact theory and gestalt formation in the context of everyday human behaviour. 
Since that time, more has been written that elaborates those core understandings, but the early 
formulations remain fundamental to gestalt theory.
Section 4.1 opens with a description of the self (process) as Perls understood it. The thesis then 
moved on to an account of the contact process by which the self comes to be. This account brings 
together contact process and figure / ground differentiation. The theme of awareness, another 
important aspect of gestalt theory and practice, is discussed. Together, contact, gestalt formation 
and awareness provide the tools with which we may understand the gestalt theory of self.
Much of the revision and expansion of gestalt theory since the first published account of Perls et 
al1 has been in the area of contact process, and these revisions are indicated in section 4.2. 
References to ongoing theoretical work in gestalt therapy are included to demonstrate both the 
confirmation of the basic ideas and to point to developments in gestalt thinking.
Section 4.3 begins to draw on material from this and earlier chapters to analyse core ideas in 
gestalt. In chapter 7, these core ideas serve as a source for the derivation of gestalt practical-
values. The first of these core ideas concerns the primacy of experience in gestalt theory and 
practice. This is followed by section 4.4 which focuses on ideas of  body / mind / spirit (gestalt 
holism). Another type of holism is considered in section 4.5, viz. that of the personal / 
interpersonal / political and social.
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In section 4.6, attention is paid to some implications of the gestalt notions of self-regulation, 
homeostasis and Prägnanz, the German term used to convey what gestalt theorists see as an 
optimising tendency in the organism-in-an-environment. This is illustrated in terms of dealing 
with affronts to the organism and, in the following section (section 4.7) more broadly as a 
framework for understanding, from a gestalt perspective, individual and social evolution. In 
section 4.8, attention is focused on the core idea of gestalt's existentialist approach - the "Here 
and Now". Section 4.9 evaluates notions of response-ability as a way of viewing transcendence. 
Section 4.10 concludes by summarising Part One of the thesis and leads to Part Two.
4.1 The self in gestalt theory
Perls learned from Federn and other teachers a Freudian view of the structures of the self. This 
was not a single definition since Freud's own ideas and those of the International Psycho-Analytic 
Congress were in a state of continuous development, marked by occasional major changes2. Perls' 
critique of Freud, and in particular of the notion of the self, has already been explored3. The 
thesis now turns to an examination of what Perls proposed in place of those theories. The 
temptation in criticising received wisdom is to emphasise its negative points and so fail to do it 
justice. In putting forward his radical and dynamic understandings of the self, Perls tended to 
overlook some of the subtlety and dynamic nature of Freud's ideas4. It follows that, while Perls’ 
ideas differ from those of psychoanalytic orthodoxy, they also concur at times.
The contrast with Freud is starkest when Perls sounds most simple, for example, in one of his 
definitions of the self: "we consider the self as the function of contacting the actual transient 
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present..."5. There are a number of points to notice here. First is the word "function" which, like 
the phrase "transient present" points to the self as activity and engagement, rather than as an 
entity proper to the enquiry of philosophers6. The word "as" in this quotation is also important, 
for the author7 intends the meaning "may be understood as" or "is equivalent to". There is an 
avoidance of the verbal form "is" and of a substantive predicate to that verb. There is also a hint 
of parabolic speech. These are, quite probably, intentional forms designed to undermine any 
tendency in the reader to reify fluid processes. Reification tends to mystification and to the 
creation of approximations to reality that we mistake for the real experience. Like all substitutes, 
these objective approximate terms cannot be the reality.
Perls did not content himself with one definition of the self. Two further quotations amplify that 
above. First, "...the self is not the figure it creates but the creating of the figure: that is, self is the 
dynamic relation of ground and figure"8.  And, in describing the interaction of organism and 
environment in the contact process, "..the self (which is nothing but contact) comes to feel 
itself"9. Whilst these quotations serve to support the earlier one, their terminology raises 
questions.
First is the reference to figure and ground, and to the creation of figures10. The concept, now 
commonplace, has its origins in gestalt psychology. For Perls, as for Wertheimer, it was evident 
that (perception of) meaning stems from the relationship of figure to ground11. In the process of 
differentiation, part of the field becomes in some sense prominent or more focused with a 
corresponding decrease in the same qualities in the remainder of the field12. Some of the 
philosophical discussions of the early gestaltists concerned the nature of figure / ground 
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differentiation. The process reaches a point (typically a series of succeeding points) where a clear 
Gestalt is formed. The Gestalt or form is precisely that which is constructed or given as figure in 
the ground of all the possibilities that preceded the construction of the Gestalt. Once it has been 
formed and has been duly processed, it then dissolves into the ground and another figure may 
take its place in the view or interest of the subject. A simple example of this process is evident 
when one looks at a painting. One expects to see something (forms, shapes, patterns) and indeed 
does so, sometimes sooner, sometimes later. As one does so and then proceeds to examine that 
form (figure in the ground of the possibilities of the picture), it often gives way to other forms or 
possible figures in the same picture. In other words, and from another viewpoint, one's interest 
shifts to another aspect. The debates between the Berlin school and the “production” schools 
concerned the nature and origin of the Gestalten formed. Were they the products of the viewer's 
interest or were they given in the experience?  Why were some figure / ground differentiations 
apparently stronger or more insistent than others?  Why is it that the figure which one makes and 
its relation to the ground (and indeed the perceptible contents of the ground itself) vary with 
circumstance and from one person to another?  These questions are of such strong philosophical 
and scientific interest and value that there is ongoing debate between the two main viewpoints13. 
Perls followed Wertheimer (and thus von Ehrenfels) in his theory and assumed with him that 
perception is organised "von oben nach unten" (from the top downward). It was von Ehrenfels’s 
view that the Gestaltqualität is given in experience over and above sensory fundamenta ("bits" of 
experience). It is this quality that determines which fundamenta are taken into account, how they 
are processed, and which are put into the background. The Gestaltqualität works in the process of 
figure / ground differentiation and is fundamental in the activity of humans and other primates14.
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Second, it is important in considering Perls' definitions of the self, to return to the term 
"organism". In the context of gestalt theory, the word denotes part of a totality which is the 
organism / environment, i.e. a distinguishable entity (or, better, a moment) in a given field. The 
"organism" referred to could, for example, be the reader or writer of this paragraph. The word 
"self" is secondary to "organism" and refers to an aspect of the organism which, through its 
process of contacting, nourishes the organism by identifying and meeting its needs, primarily in 
relation to its environment.
The other words that are important in understanding Perls' view of the self refer to three "partial 
systems" of the self. These are termed id, ego and personality. Since psychologists, as well as 
people with no formal psychological education, use these words with a range of meanings, some 
definitions are offered here from a gestalt viewpoint. These definitions were constructed from 
two directions. One direction came from the observation of patients as therapist and patient 
thought new thoughts and developed new methods of working. This approach took as its primary 
criterion the (avowedly subjective) experience of the patient as opposed to the (equally 
subjective) experience of the therapist. The other direction was a critique of the methods taught 
in Freudian circles and the (related or corresponding) theories propounded15.
The most striking thing about the terms used of the partial systems is that all three, though 
employing pronouns and nouns, refer to activity or process. In this way, the authors seek to avoid 
the trap of ontological statements, and do not suggest entities or reifications. Taking the example 
of a simple spontaneous act, they state:
As aspects of the self.....Id, Ego, and Personality are the major stages of creative 
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adjustment [between organism and environment16]; the Id is the given background 
dissolving into its possibilities, including organic excitations and past unfinished 
situations becoming aware, and the environment vaguely perceived, and the inchoate 
feelings connecting organism and environment. The Ego is the progressive identification 
with and alienation of the possibilities, the limiting and heightening of the on-going 
contact, including motor behaviour, aggressing, orientation, and manipulation. The 
Personality is the created figure that the self becomes and assimilates to the organism, 
uniting it with the results of previous growth. Obviously all this is just the figure/ 
background process itself, and in such a simple case there is no need to dignify the stages 
with special names17.
4.2 Contact process and the self
The quotation above shows how Perls’ partial self-systems link with his understanding of figure / 
ground differentiation. This, in turn leads to his definition of the contact process. The 
terminology of self, partial systems, figure / ground differentiation and contact process together 
constitute the theoretical core of gestalt therapy. The quotation refers to a simple situation and to 
more complex ones in which a more elaborate definition is required. This more elaborate 
understanding is usually presented in terms of the stages of the contact process18. Contact process 
is defined in the fundamental language of gestalt psychology as a succession of figure / ground 
formations19 in which four stages are distinguished20:
  1. Fore contact: the body is the ground, the appetite or environmental stimulus is the 
figure. This is what is aware as the "given" or Id of the situation, dissolving into its 
possibilities.
  2. Contacting: (a) the excitement of appetite becomes the ground and some "object" or 
set of possibilities is the figure. The body diminishes. (Or contrariwise, in pain, the body 
becomes figure.)  There is an emotion.
  (b) there is choosing and rejecting of possibilities, aggression in approaching and in 
overcoming obstacles, and deliberate orientation and manipulation. These are the 
identifications and alienations of the Ego.
  3. Final Contact: against a background of unconcernful environment and body, the lively 
goal is the figure and is in touch. All deliberateness is relaxed and there is a spontaneous 
unitary action of perception, motion, and feeling. The awareness is at its brightest, in the 
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figure of the You.
  4. Post-contact: There is a flowing organism/environment interaction that is not a 
figure/background: the self diminishes.21
The sequence is simply illustrated in a meeting of two people. In fore-contact, an I-organism 
anticipates or approaches a meeting. My body is full of excitements - a little hungry, on the edge 
of some sexual excitement and a little nervous about meeting this person. What do I want from 
the meeting? from him? He enters the room, sees me, greets me (as I do him). I feel my 
excitement more clearly: he is as attractive as I remembered and hoped. My hunger disappears 
into the (back)ground of my body, as the stimulus from my environment triggers excitements 
from other, unfinished situations from my past.
The contact stage flows immediately from fore-contact. My excitement is now the ground from 
which a new figure emerges. Our greeting was not enough. I want more - what more I do not at 
first know. I feel my emotion. I feel a desire to touch and be touched. How can I do that? I do not 
want to launch myself at him or have him do that to me: that would be too much. I would feel 
embarrassed and ashamed. I could take his hand.
I reach out my hand, a conventional gesture, but not one I expected to use in this context. In 
response, he reaches for mine. Our hands hold, our eyes meet and we smile in recognition of our 
success in handling this new and exciting opportunity. I am no longer nervous - let alone hungry -
but content in this moment with this person (final contact).
Perhaps we stayed like that longer than either of us had expected. I was not counting the seconds: 
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it was what I had wanted and felt good. After a while, our meeting moved on. That first gestalt 
was complete, the contact finished, its fruits absorbed (post contact).
There are a few points to note in this illustration. One is that the initial contact is one Gestalt
within the wider Gestalt of the whole meeting which is itself one Gestalt within the wider Gestalt
of the life of the I-organism, which is ... ad infinitum. Using words like fore-contact and contact 
over something so ordinary and fleeting is to risk seeming ridiculous. The terms come into their 
own when applied to more complex Gestalten. However, even in this simple example, one 
further elaboration is required to complete the picture of this encounter. We have seen how the id 
may be understood as the I-organism's desire and / or the impact of the other person, or both. And 
we have seen how the ego is active after the excitement coalesces around a set of possible goals. 
What is not spelled out in this example (as it is not in the excerpt from Perls et al above22) is that 
the achievement of the ego function in the illustration represents an increment in the personality. 
In the gestalt understanding, personality is the term used for the sum of all one's ego 
achievements. It contains one's learned ways of dealing with life situations. These include, for 
example, one's personal, public and social roles and attitudes. The increment of personality in this 
illustration may be slight; and yet it is an achievement. The I-organism has found a way to deal 
with a situation that appears to have worked satisfactorily. It is henceforward available in similar 
situations, obviating the anxiety associated with first-time quick thinking. In summary, we may 
say that personality is the repertoire of our predictable behaviours by which the world knows us 
and by which we know ourselves. By contrast, we cannot know what we shall be or become in 
moments of creative spontaneity.
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In a gestalt understanding of the self, the structures of the self are moments in a temporal 
process23. Self-experience tells us, however, that there is continuity. Our bodies continue, 
although if our bodies were not also constantly changing, they would be dead. Our personalities 
continue. One cannot say that, were personality unchanging, the organism would be dead –
except in a metaphorical sense. It is intrinsic to personality that it grows and develops from 
infancy through many stages into adulthood. Moreover, it does not stop at an arbitrary point of 
maturity. People continue to grow and develop, sometimes prompted from within themselves and 
sometimes in response to external circumstances24. Some people grow unevenly and may appear 
to have areas of no growth. Consider, for example, the fifty-year old person whose religious ideas 
are almost identical to those of a five-year old. Such a person has not grown in that respect and, 
to that extent, must be considered undeveloped or immature in relation to his religious ideas. Or 
consider the person whose personality has what Perls called a "hole". Examples of people with 
holes in their personalities include those who are incapable of listening to others; or those who 
are socially disabled when encountering persons of the opposite sex. They have not achieved the 
necessary pieces of personality, and the corresponding holes are obvious to observers. To have a 
hole in one's personality is inconvenient or painful and the pain must be soothed or compensated. 
People who cannot listen usually ensure that they do not have to do so, and they often achieve 
this by themselves talking whenever they are with others. People who cannot bear to meet the 
opposite sex usually contrive to avoid them or else develop techniques such as bluster or 
withdrawal.
This model of the self points to the fundamental "moment" (rather than unit or entity) identifiable 
in therapy, management and education, as well as in broader processes of family and social life, 
147
political and economic activity. This is what gestaltists and other psychologists increasingly 
recognise as "spiritual" engagement.
Having arrived at a gestalt understanding of the self, it becomes possible to analyse, from 
material in this and earlier chapters, core ideas in gestalt. These core ideas serve as a source for 
the derivation of practical-values in gestalt and are discussed in chapter 7.
4.3 Core ideas in gestalt: the primacy of experience
The first of these core ideas concerns the primacy of experience in gestalt theory and practice. 
The fundamental importance of this notion reaches back to the seminars of Brentano who urged 
his students to consider, by observing and reflecting upon their own experience, what is the 
nature of a mental act. The early papers of von Ehrenfels, no less than the laboratory observations 
of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka, took as their starting point the validity of experience. One of 
the differences between the first of these and his successors was simply that of a generation, 
during which time thinking about the meaning of Gestalten had moved on. Another was the shift 
from what we would recognise as a philosophical enquiry to what is recognisably a psychological 
one. One of the factors in the elaboration of empirical psychological research was the recognition 
that experience is not an absolute. Even sensory perception is problematic and the move into 
experimental psychology represents a logical necessity encountered by gestaltists as they moved 
from hypothesis to empirical experiment, observation and scientific theorising. In philosophical 
terms, the gestaltists rested upon foundations laid by Descartes (the emphasis upon the cogitation 
of the subject) and upon the subject-centred approach of Schleiermacher. They were supported in 
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this by the phenomenological approach of Husserl and by the work, originally in Prague and then 
in various centres in post-war (post 1918) Europe which derived from the simultaneously 
introspective and empirical work of Brentano's students and associates.  For all the struggles to 
obtain objectivity, the gestaltists realised that we are limited in what we can know of the world 
"out there". Their focus was precisely upon the world "out there" plus the world "in here" and in 
the relations between these two spheres. We can know nothing of out there except via the 
perceiving subject in here: it was the "how" of that enquiry which fired their research and which 
inevitably put the experience of the experiencing subject at the core of the enquiry.
4.4 Core ideas in gestalt: holism
The emphasis on holism in gestalt therapy is usually attributed to Fritz Perls and his reading of 
Smuts' work. It is also true that the idea was one which reflected (one aspect of) the spirit of the 
time, in the sense that Smuts' work was widely accepted as an articulation of what others were 
thinking and feeling about their experience. What is arguably less evident, but nevertheless 
important, is that holism is a notion which expresses something of the spirit of gestalt philosophy 
and psychology. The studies of perception to which reference was made in earlier chapters do not 
always assume that the experiencing subject is a cognitive entity unconnected with a feeling 
organism. Rather, it was frequently evident to the experimenters that the ways in which people 
construed their physical environment was sometimes connected with the rest of their lives! It was 
the work of Lewin on field theory which finally made explicit what was only implicit in earlier 
gestalt psychology, namely his understanding of how need configures perception. With this 
established, the links of mind and body moved from intuitive perception and introspection into 
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empirical study.
That gestalt holism should also encompass the human spirit is, at first sight, less obvious. Much 
intellectual discourse of the twentieth century sought to relegate notions of spirit and spirituality 
to, at worst, the retreat of intellectual scoundrels or, at best, the realms of poetic discourse and 
rhetoric. The rediscovery by academic psychologists of the human spirit (still not a conclusive 
victory) points to a growing discomfort with that scientific reductionism which denies whatever 
cannot be studied empirically (= reductively). Gestaltists use the term "spirit" imprecisely and it 
seems unlikely that they will define it precisely. What is important about their usage - and its 
meaning - is its location in the body / mind / spirit trinity. It is a term that recognises the 
unnecessarily limiting aspects of empirical reductionism without feeling obliged to offer 
atomised definitions. Body / mind / spirit holism, where it is encountered in gestalt literature, is a 
term that seeks to include the whole of what it is to be human. It points to the whole person with 
her hopes and fears, her bodily existence and physical senses, her perception and cognition - in 
short, the whole experience. 
In promoting a holistic approach in gestalt therapy, the Perls were confronting what they saw as 
the over-cerebration of psychoanalysis (Fritz Perls' notorious "mind-fucking") and the 
corresponding reification of mental "parts" (ego, id etc). In positive terms, they put the whole 
person in place of a fragmented "subject" back at the centre of discourse about people and 
society.
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4.5 Core ideas in gestalt: personal / interpersonal / political
It is ironic that one of the early criticisms in Britain of gestalt was that its focus on the experience 
of people was unhealthy. The suggestion was that in using the word "I" a good deal, patients in 
therapy were being encouraged to be selfish in a negative and ultimately immoral way. 
Undoubtedly, the Gestalt Prayer25 and, indeed, some of Perls' own advocacy did much to fuel this 
perception: it is also likely that some British suspicion of American cultural imports added to it. 
It should be remembered that the 1970s in Britain, when gestalt became established as one of the 
humanistic psychologies, were years in which it became fashionable to use the language of "I" if 
one were a participant in the new counter-culture.
It was only as British and other European practitioners of gestalt developed their understanding of
the approach that its multi-dimensionality became clear. The publication in Britain of Gestalt 
therapy now26 showed that the approach had important implications for education, childcare, the 
penal system and everyday discourse between people. Only then did practitioners themselves 
begin to appreciate the scope of what they were developing. Moreover, experienced practitioners 
in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s were discovering that there was little point is helping their 
clients to change their individual lives if the relationships and networks around them remained 
unchanged. They had been taught that the individual is a (sometimes) convenient abstraction 
from a much larger process. Their work, if it was to be useful, had to focus with the client on the 
wider process and to resist the tendency of a hurt person to demand attention to themselves alone.
The personal and the interpersonal cannot be separated. By the same token, the interpersonal and 
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the political, social and economic are inter-related: these distinctions are for the sake of 
convenience and focus only. Gestalt holism is a viewpoint ultimately linking us all to each other 
and to the rest of the cosmos. It is a vision as poetic as that of Genesis or of the cosmologists who 
remind us we are made of stardust, and it is one grounded in empirical research and daily 
experience.
4.6 Core ideas in gestalt: self-regulation and Prägnanz.
One of the implications of this dynamic view of the self is that it can only be understood in its 
context. Perls viewed the self as an organism-in-an-environment, and paid particular attention to 
the regulation of self and environment. His fundamental understanding was that, in normal 
circumstances (i.e. principally ones not disturbed by neurotic formations) the organism tended to 
establish homeostasis. In practice, this means that healthy people will tend to make an optimal 
adjustment to their circumstances. From the point of view of human relationships, homeostasis 
suggests that we do not have a fixed identity in all circumstances, but vary how we are and even 
who we are to fit the situations in which we are - at home, at work, at ease or under threat. 
Moreover, following the theories of the gestalt psychologists, he was clear that each organism 
had its own Prägnanz, by which he meant that the organism has its own optimising tendency 
within its own boundaries. Between them, homeostasis and Prägnanz describe the How of self-
regulation and the primary means of growth and development.
We take what we need from our human, social and physical environment, experiencing and 
accepting that this is a mutual process in which others will take from us. Furthermore, we identify 
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whatever factors in our environment are not acceptable to us. These may be affronts (e.g. 
physical, psychological or political factors) and make the best adjustment we can to those. 
Sometimes, we avoid - at some cost - the conflict. At other times, we may take up the challenge -
again, at some cost - and confront the people, circumstances or parties that threaten our (or 
human) wellbeing. All these are examples of organism-environment homeostasis. It is our 
Prägnanz that prompts us to, say, join a gym for the sake of our personal fitness, and it is our 
Prägnanz that may also prompt us to take political action to promote more widespread human 
flourishing.
Perls was not afraid to call this, however controversially, "selfishness". Even what seems like 
being "taken from", e.g. in child-rearing, may contain large elements of mutuality which make the
experience rewarding in both directions. This was an important argument in the initial reception 
of gestalt in some quarters as the use of the term "selfishness" reinforced cultural unease about 
gestalt. It is now clearer that there is a proper attention to and care for the self which does not 
conflict with, for example, Christian morality about self-giving and taking up the cross. This 
argument is often captured in the pithy observation that to love one's neighbour as oneself is not 
much good to the neighbour if the Christian does not care at all for herself! In sum, self-
fulfilment is unlikely to follow from a selfish approach to life, i.e. one that does not take proper 
account of the social and physical environment.
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4.7 Core ideas in gestalt: evolution.
Prägnanz and homeostasis are the mechanisms whereby the organism regulates itself (and is 
regulated) in the environment. There is another perspective on these complex mechanisms, 
namely that of individual and social evolution. This expands the gestalt perspective offered so 
far. For Perls, as for many of his successors, the key metaphors here were nourishment (the whole 
process from the onset of hunger to absorption into the body) and learning (from first stimulus -
within or without the organism - to integration of what is learned into the personality). Again, in 
an ideal healthy situation, we are regularly taking in nourishment whether in the form of food and 
drink or, metaphorically, in terms of emotional building-up or useful and interesting learning 
about ourselves and our environment - including, of course, other people. We have a hunger to 
learn, practise and know (for future reference) just as much as we have physical needs. In this 
sense, we are evolving creatures. Perls did not use the word evolution to describe this, although it 
is useful to see how much his ideas tied with in those who did use the term in something other 
than its modern biological sense. One such person was Ouspensky27. The parallels between Perls 
and Ouspensky illustrate the spirit of the time (the late 1930s in this instance) and illustrate the 
interest in intellectual circles in what became known in the 1960s and 1970s as Personal Growth. 
Perls' writing and his practical work at Cowichan Creek and at Esalen demonstrate vividly his 
commitment to what Ouspensky called "personal evolution", i.e. change and growth in people. 
Again, it is necessary to suspend judgement about the narcissistic possibilities inherent in these 
phrases and to view them in the context of their users' broader concerns for the environment, for 
world peace and for more widespread fulfilment for humanity.  
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4.8 Core ideas in gestalt: Here and Now.
We have already seen how important was the contribution of existential thinking to the evolving 
gestalt project. This was evident in the early articulations of Concentration Therapy in the Perls' 
period in South Africa as they began to focus on the minutiae of their patients' behaviour in the 
therapeutic encounter and to pay less attention to analysis of past events. Their hunch and 
subsequent experience was that whatever was important from that past would in some manner 
present itself in the encounter. This was a crucially important development in therapeutic 
endeavour and no mere adoption of contemporary philosophical ideas for their own sake. One 
could speculate that such a move would not have been possible without their immersion in 
European existentialism in Berlin and Frankfurt. Whatever the truth of that, the gestalt focus on 
here and now in the therapeutic encounter remains central even though it can be argued that 
existentialism as a philosophical approach is no longer in vogue in the twenty-first century.
The present and specific focus of gestalt theory and practice is not confined to the consulting-
room. Wherever a gestalt approach is being employed, for example in management training or in 
education, that focus is evident. Its impact is found in its immediacy, in its vibrant sense that, 
whatever the past, we can only act - or decline to act - now. Moreover, we can only do that in the 
world as we experience it: there is no ideal or better world in which we might do differently.
Christian critics might see this as immanence taken to its extreme and enquire about the 
perspectives of eternity. Here and now do not, however, contradict notions of eternity in the sense 
of a transcendent dimension to our lives. From a gestalt perspective, the emphasis is different. 
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The gestalt question is, how does this eternal dimension affect the present situation? 
Paradoxically, in this way the gestaltist confronts at every turn what T. S. Eliot characterised as 
"the intersection of the timeless moment"28.  To live in the here and now is, from a Christian 
perspective, to live in crisis or under judgement in its non-condemnatory sense. Every choice has 
its consequences and each counts now and in the longer term. 
4.9 Core ideas in gestalt: implications of response-ability.
The notion of personal response-ability is crucial to a gestalt approach. Perls offered this spelling 
of the word to underline his positive view of human responsibility. He was concerned both to 
avoid laying burdens of guilt on people who sought his help as a psychiatrist and also to 
demonstrate the liberating possibilities inherent in assuming responsibility. Responsibility in this 
sense was a major part of what he saw as every individual's journey from high dependence in 
infancy to mature adulthood. We become, in a healthy situation, increasingly responsible for 
ourselves. We learn not to take responsibility for the actions of others for two reasons: one is that 
it is inaccurate and induces guilt in us, and the other is that it robs the other of her proper 
response-ability.
There are, however, other possibilities inherent in the notion of response-ability. Experience 
teaches us that we cannot be responsible for more than our share of life. We can only do what is 
possible for us and we have to leave the rest to others. Sometimes, there are no others to take 
responsibility, and sometimes there seems to be nothing that anyone can do. Let us consider a 
common, if tragic, example. The death of a child or other loved person through incurable illness 
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is a terrible loss. When we have done all that can be done, we are faced simply with that loss. Our 
response-ability leads us to grieve our loss: we rail against the loss and long for a world that does 
not exist in which these things do not happen. Eventually we respond by adjusting to our loss. 
For some, this is not enough. If response-ability is, as many gestaltists hold, part of the way the 
universe - or at least our humanity - is, then perhaps it does not stop with our grief, mourning and 
adjustment to loss. Perhaps there is some response-ability beyond our own immediate sense but 
which is simply unknowable. Not the world as it might be (impossible) but a world we do not 
fully understand and can only intuit as possible.
Such a viewpoint does not constitute a gestalt understanding of transcendence. It does not prove 
anything about the cosmos we inhabit. However, it does suggest that transcendence and gestalt 
are far from incompatible. There is nothing in a gestalt perspective that, of itself, refutes the 
possibility of a dimension to the cosmos beyond what is ordinarily open to our apprehension. 
More than that, transcendence of a type is implicit in the very notion of the growth of a person 
from dependence to mature interdependence. After all, that move from primary narcissism and 
dependence relies on the real identification of that which transcends us, i.e. parents, siblings and 
society. There is, in the embeddedness of response-ability in our human nature, something that 
feeds an intuition that the universe may respond to our need and our suffering beyond our 
comprehension. Gestalt, as scientific discourse, does not accommodate notions of divine 
revelation in ways comparable to those supported by some theologians. However, the open 
agnosticism of the gestalt position outlined here is akin to that of some theological writers such 
as Cupitt (referred to in chapter 1). And it opens the possibility that response-ability is a context 
in which Christian gestaltists might contemplate a reflexive God.
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4.10 Summary
This section concludes Part One of the thesis where work of Brentano and his students at the 
German University in Prague in the late nineteenth century is examined. This work led to a novel 
approach in philosophy. In turn, this gave rise to the discipline of gestalt psychology, directly 
influencing the establishment of modern psychology which emphasised empirical verification 
and scientific methodology. The experimental and theoretical work of the gestalt psychologists 
anticipated the findings of later neuroscientists, and demonstrated the processes of perception and 
learning executed in the brain. Of particular interest for this thesis was the crucial involvement of 
the perceiving subject in what is perceived. The gestaltists challenged the relationship of subject 
and object as then conceived, and undermined the notion of an objective perceiver / subject. 
Relations between subject and object came to be understood in a dialectical or reflexive manner, 
and the hitherto autonomous subject was re-configured as an organism in an environment, 
seeking its own optimal self-regulation through its interactions.
The emergence of gestalt therapy was due not only to the work of the gestalt philosophers and 
psychologists, but also to many other contributors whose ideas were current at a time when the 
originators of gestalt were engaged in their critique of psychoanalysis. The novel integration of 
all these ideas and practices by Perls and his colleagues led to the launching of gestalt therapy 
with its own theories about the self and how the self evolves in its world. This self has been 
described in the present chapter and the various threads of its construction have been interwoven, 
e.g. linking contact process with gestalt formation.
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Such a novel approach has many implications as well as applications. Central notions such as 
organismic homeostasis, Prägnanz and field theory show that these are theories of wide 
applicability. The Perls saw that gestalt was more than a new approach to psychotherapy. Its ideas 
and practices have reached far beyond the consulting-room and the training seminar. Its 
philosophical roots, drawing on the gestalt philosophers, on Friedlaender, on Smuts and on the 
existentialists contribute to its breadth as a discipline. It engages with other disciplines and in the
discourses of philosophy, science and psychotherapy. It owes as much to its critique of 
psychoanalysis as to its roots in gestalt psychology and has the same possibility of wider 
application as does psychoanalysis, opening up possibilities in the arts as well as sciences. It is 
holistic and refuses the common dichotomies of body, mind and spirit, or the personal, 
interpersonal and political.
Out of this complexity, it is nonetheless possible to analyse ideas that go to the heart of the 
gestalt approach. There is a distinctive perspective, even though some voices in the gestalt 
community would choose a different emphasis or express reservations at certain points.
In this present chapter, core ideas of gestalt have been analysed through an in-depth examination 
of the academic literature. These core ideas are compared (in chapter 7) with core ideas from 
feminist theology. It is to feminism and feminist theology that the thesis now moves in Part Two. 
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1       Perls et al (1973[1951]). 
2       The most obvious example is that of Das Ich und das Es (1923), translated into English as 
The ego and the id in 1927. The Standard Edition was much revised and produced in 1961. 
With slight editorial changes, the latter is published in the Pelican Freud Library, Vol. 11, 
pp.341 et seq. Although much of the material is prefigured elsewhere in Freud's writing, 
these papers represent a gathering together and novel presentation of his ideas at a 
particular Congress (1922) on the subject of the structure of the self. All Freud's later work 
on the subject is predicated upon this collection. These are therefore the ideas that the 
young Perls would have learned through his analysts and in seminars from 1928 onwards.
3       In the first half of section 3.2.
4        Freud op cit, Paper II, posits a dynamic relationship between Id and Ego and the whole has 
an overall dynamic tone. Psychic material is described as "latent", "transitory" and 
processes are described in verbal terms such as "change", "discharge" or "lowering energic 
cathexis". To be sure, Freud's concepts are avowedly speculative, whereas Perls claimed 
that his are descriptive or derived from observation of what is (in fact, Freud makes the 
same claim for his ideas also) and are thus, presumably, empirically verifiable. Perls' 
succumbing to the temptation to caricature Freud's work may be seen at its most extreme 
when, in the context of workshops, he refers to the experience of psychoanalysis (and 
therefore, by association, its conceptual structures) as "mind-fucking" (see also Perls, 
1969a). Perls' sense of personal hurt is reflected in Garbage Pail, but his more considered 
writing (e.g. Perls et al, 1973) often shows admiration and respect for a healer and thinker 
of stature.
5        Perls et al (1973) p 425.
6      This is a distinction that Tillich, Laura Perls' one-time academic supervisor, might have 
defined as "ontic" rather than "ontological". (Tillich, 1962, p.50).
7      Almost certainly Goodman if style, intellectual density and precision are to be taken as 
indicators of authorship.
8        Perls op cit p. 470.
9        ibid p 475.
10       This matter has been touched on in section 3.6 regarding Goldstein's work.
11       This distinction had become fundamental in the work of the Berlin school and has since 
passed into common language. It denotes the perceived Gestalt (figure) as differentiated (a 
central feature of the activity of perception) from all other fundamenta available to 
perception.
12      There is a correspondence here with the psychoanalytic idea of cathexis, whereby one or 
more objects or aspects of internal or external experience take on, as it were, a psychic 
charge. This cathecting process implies a differentiation from other objects or aspects.
13       Some of this discussion is continued in consciousness studies, for example, VARELA F J 
et al. The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. London: MIT Press, 
1991. Chapter 1 relies heavily on MERLEAU-PONTY,  Phenomenology of perception. 
London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1962 and The structure of experience. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1963. Varela et al (chapter 2) make clear the direct line they, as cognitive scientists, 
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trace from themselves through Merleau-Ponty to Husserl and thus back to Brentano at the 
German University in Prague. They cite particularly Brentano's work on intentionality 
which formed part of the matrix in which von Ehrenfels did his creative work on 
Gestaltqualitäten.
14     The other view (von unten nach oben) (Wertheimer (1922) p.57) is currently found in the 
neo-gestalt school of cognitive psychology. Henle (1989) has a detailed discussion of this 
point. KEANE, M. "Modelling problem solving in gestalt 'insight' problems" In  Irish 
Journal of psychology, 10(2): 201-215, 1989 gives an example of how the distinction of 
Berlin and Graz theories may be blurred in some practical research, although the avowed 
theory is a production one. Production theories failed to satisfy von Ehrenfels and, later, 
Goldstein (1995, esp. ch II) who specifically refutes their implicit atomism as a scientific 
approach suitable for the study of humans.
15      An illustration of these two directions is given in Perls et al (1973), pp. 432-438 
16      Present author's note in square brackets.
17      Op cit p.433.
18      The stages are, unlike the contact process itself, somewhat arbitrary. They are contrived 
notions that enable us to consider aspects of a unity.
19      For example, Köhler (1970) pp. 202 et seq. A gestalt therapy understanding of the terms Id 
and Ego is found in Perls et al (1973) ch.10.
20      It is also possible to discern a stage of pre-contact in the process, making five stages in all. 
See HINKSMAN, B. "Gestalt group therapy"  In  AVELINE, M and DRYDEN, W. Group 
therapy in Britain. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988. O'Leary (1992), pp.30-36 
gives examples of contact.
21       Perls et al, op cit p.460. Other formulations of this pattern are summarised in Clarkson 
(1989b), pp. 27-40. These formulations differ in their shape and their emphases, but each 
retains something of the naturalness and the rhythmicity of the original, marking out 
particular stages or points of interest.
22      This point is, however, made in the excerpt from Perls et al (1973) at the end of section 4.1.
23      For example, the comment in Perls et al (1973) on the Id: "The self [in aware relaxation] 
seems scattered, and it is indeed disintegrating and vanishing into mere potentiality, for it 
exists, is actualized, by contacting" (p.436).
24       Perls' notions of creative adjustment and movement towards homeostasis (in e.g. Perls, 
1969 and Perls et al, 1973), may be understood as similar in their underlying thinking as 
well as in their practical application to the self-actualization theories of Carl Rogers and of 
Will Schutz and the encounter theorists in ROGERS, C.  "Learning to be free"  In  
ROGERS, C & STEVENS, B. Person to person: the problem of being human. London: 
Souvenir Press, 1973, pp.47-66; and SCHUTZ, W. Profound simplicity. London: Joy Press, 
1979, pp.98-110.
25       I do my thing, and you do your thing. /  I am not in this world to live up to your expec-
tations / And you are not in this world to live up to mine. /  You are you and I am I, / And if 
by chance we find each other, it's beautiful. /  If not, it can't be helped. (Perls, 1971, p.4).
26       FAGAN, J.& SHEPHERD, I..L (eds). Gestalt therapy now: theory, techniques, 
applications. London: Penguin Books, 1972. 
27       OUSPENSKY, P.D. The psychology of Man's possible evolution  London: Arkana, 
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1991
28       ELIOT, T.S.  The complete poems and plays of T,S. Eliot. London: Faber & Faber, 
1969. The Four Quartets: Little Gidding I, p.192.
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FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES AND FEMINIST THEOLOGY
5 Introduction
Part Two of this thesis examines feminism and feminist theology. The aim is first to identify the
diverse voices within second-wave feminism and proceeding to examine feminist theological
contributions. Defining a canon of writing as "feminist theology" is suggestive of a discrete
discipline with its own contents, methodologies and values. There are advantages to this
distinctive status in that it draws attention to what is feminist about its methods and its contents.
There are also disadvantages to any such separation, principally that it might encourage its critics
to sideline rather than respond to its critiques of theological methodology and content. The
position adopted in this thesis is that, by identifying feminist theology as a discrete discipline,
there is an acknowledgement of identifiable feminist perspectives in theology, as in much else.
Whatever one's point of view, there is no single feminist viewpoint, since feminist theology
speaks with many voices, sometimes united and sometimes conflicting.
Any examination of feminist theology, no matter how tightly focused, has to make choices, to
take a standpoint. The activity of analysing core ideas from a large corpus of work representing
feminist theology and interrogating them for practical-values is one involving choices. These
choices cannot be objective or absolute. Most feminist - and other - critics today acknowledge
that they inhabit a world influenced by deconstructionism and postmodernism. From such a
perspective, the notion of an objective standpoint or “a view from nowhere”1 is problematic.
Critical decisions are involved in each stage of what follows.
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The first such decision is to focus primarily on feminist (Christian) theology in the West, that is
to say, the Catholic, Reformed and Protestant traditions of Europe and North America. Where
occasional references to other contexts are necessary, these are highlighted.
Throughout this chapter, attention is paid to both the methodology and the content of feminist
theology: they are, for most writers, inextricably linked, demonstrating a more general principle
that hermeneutics and content are necessarily related, even if the links are not acknowledged.
Feminist theology is a term that embraces a wide range of views and ideas. Whatever differences
of personality, experience or religious belief feminist theologians may have, their differences can
be understood as differences in philosophical assumptions. In this they have much in common
with feminists in other discourses. The next section of this chapter therefore engages in an
analysis of feminist perspectives using a philosophical typology (section 5.1). In a critical
discussion of Judith Evans’ review2, feminism is described in terms of “schools” along an axis
whose poles are equality and difference. The purpose of this typology is to demonstrate the broad
spectrum of critiques that pass under the banner of feminist perspective. It might be possible,
from this typology, to map a range of feminist theological stances. However, for the purposes of
this thesis, i.e. the derivation of practical-values from an analysis of core ideas in feminist
theology, this is unnecessary and outside the scope of the present work. Nevertheless, references
are made, in the sections that follow, to Evan's typology since it is useful in identifying the
philosophical provenance or context of a writer and aspects, at least, of their practical-values.
Section 5.2 introduces feminist perspectives in the church and in theology. This leads on to
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sections examining in more depth the work of feminist scholars in the fields of Old and New
Testament studies (with particular reference to methodology) (5.3), pastoral theology (5.4),
christology (5.5) and spirituality (5.6). This last shows how feminist spiritual writers tend to
integrate what have traditionally be seen - in the West, though not in the Orthodox East - as
discrete discourses, namely spirituality, theology and politics.
5.1 Feminism and philosophy
Philosophy is in urgent need of a feminist perspective. For centuries the practice of
philosophy has been overwhelmingly the prerogative of men but it is only recently that
feminist analysis has made it possible to see the distorting effect of this historical fact.3
This opening statement by Griffiths and Whitford draws attention to two phenomena that operate
together. The first is that feminism is intrinsically philosophical. There are feminist ideas that
frequently lead to engagement and action, and there are also feminist ideas arising out of action
and experience: experience and thinking are necessarily interrelated. The second, and in many
ways distinctive, thing about feminist ideas is that they are closely linked to women's historical
experience and to emotions4. The purpose of this section is to indicate how feminist ideas "are
interrelated with philosophical ideas"5 and thus have changed the infrastructure of discourse in
many disciplines.
However, "[f]eminism is not monolithic and feminists do not speak with one voice"6. Attempts to
categorise feminist ideas run the risk of arbitrariness, but there is some consensus about their
history, direction and compatibility.
[F]eminism means that we seek for women the same opportunities and privileges the
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society gives to men, or ... that we assert the distinctive value of womanhood against
patriarchal denigration. While these positions need not be mutually exclusive, there is a
strong tendency ... to make them so.7
In drawing a distinction between a demand for equality ("the same opportunities") and a
requirement that difference be acknowledged ("the distinctive value"), Evans posits an "axis"
along which is ranged several "schools" of feminism. Her typology is chosen here because it
offers a more extended list of types than the three more frequently encountered, i.e. liberal,
socialist and radical. Evans' axis is not itself a classification of types of feminism, although the
terms "equality" and "difference" have been used by others to suggest differences between, for
example, North American and French feminism. The schools Evans identifies are "liberal, 'early
radical', 'strong cultural' (or 'cultural radical'), 'weak cultural', socialist, and postmodernist”. Even
these categories are not, as will become evident, hard and fast distinctions. They are elaborations
of the three categories (liberal, socialist and radical) referred to above and, as such, offer a more
nuanced picture of the range of voices in feminist criticism8: her elaboration of these schools
demonstrates the links and gradations between them.
As illustration of how Evans' axis works, we may consider the way it functions in the case of
liberal feminism. Liberal feminism is directly linked to first-wave feminism epitomised by the
speech of Julia Anna Cooper9. Cooper believed that all oppressions are oppressions of the human
spirit. One species of oppression is not overthrown until all oppressions are overthrown and
replaced by a new consciousness and new social order. Her agenda for radical thought and action
represent a vision for an ever-extending future, since oppression in some form is endemic to
human existence.
166
Liberal feminism of the second-wave was and is concerned primarily with the quest for equality,
e.g. equal employment opportunities and pay for women and men, and may thus be thought to fit
into a category of equality-feminism. However, some of its protagonists recognised that equality
was, on a number of counts, a goal of dubious worth and, in some senses, incapable of
achievement. Evans locates Betty Friedan's The feminine mystique10 in this liberal feminist
category because Friedan criticises the secondary status accorded to women relative to men and
argues that women are equal to men and should be accorded equality. At the same time, Friedan
traces how such a state of affairs has come about and points to the development and imposition of
an ideology. This ideology creates in women a false consciousness centred on their being "special
and different"11 - but special and different in the direction of sexual passivity, subordination to
men and a life of home making and child rearing. In this way, Evans' first and leading exponent
of liberal feminism defies categorisation as an equality-feminist and shows how both equality and
difference are factors to be taken into account. Equality and difference are both entailed in a
feminist quest and are therefore best regarded as poles of an axis along which the various schools
are ranged and move relative to each other.
Friedan's The feminine mystique, serves to undermine confidence about the feasibility of equality.
Evans points out that the kind of equality demanded by her was, in essence, equality with men on
the part of white, middle-class, educated women. Such equality denies another equality, that with
women who do not conform to those criteria. An example of this awareness of difference comes
from Susan Thistlethwaite, a white feminist writer:
The white feminists' emphasis on the ontological identity of women and men did not
allow them to explore either their own differences or those that existed between the
situation of white and black women. Difference is assumed to be the result of rational
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choice. White feminist liberals, therefore, do not include analyses of existential difference
a priori in their analyses.12
Early radical feminism may also be regarded as an equality-feminism but one more overtly
addressing difference. Evans refers to Shulamith Firestone's The dialectic of sex13 to demonstrate
a radical development in ideas about equality:
.... the end goal of feminist revolution must be ... not just the elimination of male
privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings
would no longer matter culturally .... The tyranny of the biological family would be
broken. And with it the psychology of power.14
Firestone offers a critique arising from her experience in the American New Left and shows that
the oppression of women was integral to the structure of society and more fundamental than other
oppressive distinctions e.g. of class and race. To work for women's liberation is to strive for the
freedom and equality of all humankind - women, children and men.
Although Evans' account draws mainly on feminist writers in the USA, she refers at length to the
British Marxist Juliet Mitchell15. Mitchell's analysis of women's place in society starts from her
observation that, for many socialists, the liberation of women would be an outcome of the
revolution: revolutionary theory was not founded on a view of women's oppression per se. In
other words, for many on the Left, women and women's liberation were not fundamental.
Mitchell's own analysis began with the ways in which "woman" is constructed, for "woman" is
something determined by the structures of society. In particular, the determinants are "production,
reproduction, sex and the socialization of children"16. The force of these structures is such that
women are marginalised in the sphere of paid work (production), while reproduction and the
rearing of children are held to be part of an unexamined entity called “family” in whose name
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women's interests are submerged.
The term "cultural feminism" applies to those writers who take a positive view of the
characteristics of women and who hold a different view of the characteristics of men. Inherent in
such a position is feminist separatism, which may take the form of physical and environmental
separation or may be a matter of function, for example, participation in political activity only
with women. Such separatism arises in part from negative experience of not being separate from
men. It is based also upon a view that there is no point in participating with men (culturally or
politically) since men do not have the characteristics that make such participation possible.
Among those who have written from a cultural feminist position are Mary Daly and Adrienne
Rich.
For Daly, writing as a theologian,
The becoming of women may be not only the doorway to deliverance which secular
humanism has passionately fought for - but also a doorway to something, that is, a new
phase in the human spirit's quest for God.
Using Tillich’s ontological language, (even though he "does not betray any awareness of the
relevance of this to women's confrontation with the structured evil of patriarchy") she suggests
that “at this point in history women are in a unique sense called to be the bearers of existential
courage in society”17.
The core of Daly's critique of male culture is contained in a chapter subtitled "The end of phallic
morality". Although she begins by writing of "radical feminism" it is evident that her goal is a
critique of male culture, and that she is indeed a cultural feminist. She criticises explicitly
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equality-feminism as "neither possible nor desirable" because such a project would be conducted
in "patriarchal space". For the women's movement to make any real progress it is patriarchy
which must be exposed and confronted.
Intrinsic to the re-creative potential of the women's movement, then, is a new naming of
values as these have been incarnated in society's laws, customs, and arrangements. This
means that there will be a renaming of morality which has been false because
phallocentric, denying half the species the possibility not only of naming but even of
hearing our own experience with our own ears.18
One of Daly's methods in her cultural critique and in indicating woman-culture is a novel use of
language. Most characteristic is her reclaiming of terms of abuse (employed by men against
women) to use them as terms of pride. She writes of Crones and their wisdom, of Witches and
their Craft, and of Hags. Such uses are playful and they are serious political acts in their
simultaneous confrontation of male oppression and their proclamation of woman-culture.
Rich's work is in many ways congruent with Daly's, although her approach has a quite different
feel. It is more poetic and discursive, and also transparently earthed in her personal experience.
Thus in her work on motherhood19 she arrives at a definition of woman-culture out of her bi-
polar (but never in practice separable) sense of motherhood as both an experience which is hers
and also as an institution - set up and maintained by a patriarchal system. Her critique of
patriarchy leads to one of marriage and of heterosexuality. It follows naturally from that critique
as well as from her study of the mother-daughter relationship that she confronts the institution of
compulsory heterosexuality. In designating a different woman-culture, she hesitates to use the
term "lesbian" in an unqualified way but is at a loss to offer a more useful term.
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Evans' scheme for understanding the various schools of second-wave feminism continues with a
"weaker" version of cultural-feminism. In a critique of Carol Gilligan's In a different voice20 she
finds this "weaker" form in her distinction between the meanings of "woman" and "womanhood"
compared with the meaning of "womanly". A focus on “woman and womanhood” signals a
thoroughgoing critique of patriarchy whereby women create a separate culture based upon their
understanding of what it is to be "woman". The concept “womanly” on the other hand simply
requires the recovery or creation of "womanly" characteristics that oppose patriarchal values.
Gilligan is ultimately writing about difference rather than equality, although there is evidence in
her work of both poles of the equality-difference axis.
The same mixture may also be seen in socialist-feminism. In the early days of socialist-feminism,
as references above to Mitchell show, the struggle was for women's rights to be recognised as
having any place except as a struggle for the rights of members of an oppressed class that should
look to the revolutionary movement for its liberation. Specific hopes or claims of women would
have to wait until that liberating goal was achieved. As is noted above, more radical socialist-
feminists subverted this proposed order of things by positing that the fundamental oppression was
that of women (and children) and that all other oppressions were secondary to it. By placing
patriarchy above capitalism in the list of oppressive forces, socialist-feminists such as Firestone
moved the socialist project from being one of a radical egalitarianism to a politics of difference.
In her analysis of socialist-feminism, Evans cites the work of Iris Young. In particular, she shows
how Young moved from socialism with feminist overtones to radical gynocentrism. This is a
species of cultural-feminism at once politically radical and also consciousness-raising and
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empowering of women. Empowerment takes the form of concrete social action based upon
analysis of the political situation of various groups within society including racial groups and
sexual minorities. The analysis does not, however, construe women as a group, for Young
distinguishes between groups of women with different interests. The women who belong to these
groups belong also to other groups, not all of whose members are women. Women may also
belong to groups opposed to each other within a political process. The socialist struggles for
justice and for access to the democratic process are still there but the means of those struggles are
some way from Marxist class-based theories. Young's gynocentrism nevertheless does not posit
women's oppression as primary. Her political concern is for the empowerment and advantaging
of all oppressed or disadvantaged groups21.
Evans' last school of feminism is postmodernist. She examines how the subversion of all grand
narratives has, from this perspective, exploded whatever validity might have attached to liberal,
cultural or socialist feminisms. She examines the implications of the postmodernist assumption
that the "subject" is dead and finds in it both good news and bad news for the cause of feminism.
None of the grand narratives, even those of liberal-feminism and socialist-feminism, has
privileged women. Since these narratives are undermined by postmodernist critiques, the
continued disadvantaging of women (whether it was incidental or central to them) can no longer
be supported. However, and by the same token, claims made by women cannot be based upon,
for example, an appeal to justice or truth if these notions are implicated in one of the grand
narratives, notably those of socialism and liberalism.
So far as the death of the subject is concerned, Evans argues that feminists may be relieved at the
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abdication of the white male subject that had posed as the "neutral" observer of history, politics
and social policy. From a feminist perspective, it is better to engage from a standpoint of the
interaction of women and men rather than from a viewpoint that does not exist. However, from a
postmodernist perspective, the interaction of women and men is itself problematic since it is a
case of différance22. Women-men is a "binary opposition" and the implication of "women" with
"men" suggests an interdependence that is nevertheless intrinsically hierarchical. Such a view
comes close to psychological notions of co-dependence with a dominant partner. The deployment
of Derrida’s term différance suggests difference in the ordinary sense of the word, but also opens
up the possibility that both terms of the binary opposition may be no more than terms. From a
Derridean perspective they do not refer to a subject or essence called "women" or "woman", nor
to "men" or "man". In this way, the philosophical underpinning of the women-men binary notion
may be subverted and reduced to word-play.
Such a subversion may expose and undermine the claims of patriarchal structures, but it
simultaneously removes from feminists any ground upon which to base their own claims or
statements. This is a problem faced by the British feminist Kate Soper. She argues that
postmodernism is in danger of becoming self-stultifying in its relativising attacks on value
statements and truth claims. Deconstructive critiques end in the assertion that value statements or
truth claims made in a discourse can have no extra-discursive weight.
Soper, as a feminist, finds deconstructive methodology useful in exposing and confronting the
claims of patriarchal systems, but sees that her opponents could claim that her denial of extra-
discursive force should apply equally to her own values as a feminist. Does this mean that
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feminists are obliged to fall back upon liberal metaphysics to support their values? Soper's
answer is negative. She retains her intellectual coherence by pointing out that the very relativising
approach of post-modernism contains its own "latent metaphysical tendencies", its own values
that, whilst they may belong to a meta-discourse, are nonetheless a species of transcendent
value23. One obvious example of this is the appeal to justice. However problematic in specific
applications, the notion of justice is integral to feminism. Few people would want to claim that an
appeal to justice in some form had no force outside the limits of a particular discourse called
justice or law or morality, but rather has a more universal and trans-discursive validity.
5.2 Feminist perspectives in theology: some fundamental problems
There are a number of fundamental problems that arise when feminists consider theology24. The
first is that theology has often supplied the wherewithal for the sacralisation of patriarchy. "Much
of Christian culture has been and is deeply sexist. There is no doubt about that"25. Feminists have
seen and experienced in the life and language of the church the signs of patriarchy. The
leadership was ordained and, until recently, only men were ordained (as is still the case in some
churches), whilst the majority of members were - and are - women. The written languages of
liturgy and scripture were cast in the male-as-norm mould. The organisational structures and
management practices were not only masculine in style but also often anti-feminine. These
factors have constituted the norms of the church as an organisation, and they shape the thinking
and feeling lives of members. Feminists can therefore point to the church not only as one more
feature of a patriarchal society, but, more seriously for the church, as an organisation offering
transcendent sanctions to the sexist structures of other organisations26.
174
The second fundamental problem is that these criticisms apply to the structures and customs of
the church as an organisation, and to its theologies. They are linked. Theological discourse has a
reciprocal relationship with the church in that it both shapes that organisation and is shaped by it.
There would probably be no Christian theology were it not for the church, and such an
organisation necessarily generates assumptions and ideologies that become formalised. It is in the
nature of such formalisations (a comparison with a relatively simple text such as a company's
mission statement illustrates this point) that they take on a quasi-independent position in relation
to the organisation. From that position a critique of the organisation may be made and resources
offered for its direction, self-representation, motivation and encouragement. It follows that, if the
organisation is one shaped by and in turn promoting sexism, then its assumptions and ideologies -
formalised into theological discourse - are inevitably sexist and tend to reinforce sexism.
Such, certainly, is the position of Daphne Hampson. She sees Christian theology as
disadvantageous to women from a number of points of view. She examines the ways in which
Christians are tied to the past, for example in the ways that they seek support for their views in
biblical texts. This constitutes our third fundamental problem. It is most evident when Christians
try to make changes (such as taking on board feminist critiques).
Christians seem to believe themselves to be under a pressure to find texts in the bible
which directly support their case. Those arguing for the ordination of women clutch at
verses, or at historical evidence from the past, which seem to support 'their' side. The fact
that this is so indicates well that scripture is considered to be sacred literature.
(Something that arises out of the fact that Christianity is a historical religion in which
there is a belief in revelation, so that the literature, which tells of this revelation, is a
literature apart.) Christians must have difficulty in using the bible to speak to
contemporary issues so long as this belief persists.27
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Hampson’s second main theme (and the fourth fundamental problem) is that Christianity is tied
irrevocably to a male saviour and to a male God, which makes both figures and Christianity
irremediably unacceptable to her and to women who share her view. Now, it may be argued that
Hampson’s view of theology is invalid. It could be argued, for instance, that theology flows
principally from divine self-revelation. Thus, although one would have to admit the possibility of
human distortions, these would probably be corrigible errors that the divine self-revelation could
in some way override. Hampson calls this the "golden thread" approach. It asserts that, despite
the distortions, there is a thread of good news in the traditions for women and other oppressed
people. That is how she views, in part at least, the approach of Ruether28 when the latter gives
preferential status to some passages over other obviously patriarchal or misogynist ones. Ruether,
on this view, resists the possibility that the self-revelation of God could be sexist.
Here lies one aspect at least of the fifth and perhaps the greatest fundamental problem. It is an
ultimate question about Christianity and women. Is what feminists consider discriminatory and
oppressive behaviour rooted in the nature of God and accurately reflected in God's self-revelation
in scripture? Or is what feminists consider discriminatory and oppressive behaviour within a
patriarchal structure simply what they think it is, i.e. a system of injustice and oppression that
cannot arise from a God of justice and righteousness? There is a third possibility, adopted by a
number of post-Christian writers, namely that God is just and righteous: however, the claimed
revelations enshrined in the structures and theology of the churches are so contrary to God, that
God is obscured rather than revealed in them. There is therefore a need to focus on new
revelation or else to let go one's hope of such revelation and to abandon Christianity or the church
or both.
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Hampson puts the matter thus:
Many a woman - in a way in which this has not on the whole been true of men - has had
to turn her back upon the religion within which she grew up. It simply became
impossible. For any woman apprised of what the history of women has been, the question
of theodicy raised by the previous conception of God has made that conception of God
unthinkable. That God, moreover, was most clearly not made in her image, and became
superfluous as she came to herself and acquired a feminist consciousness. In this situation
there is, among those women who wish to find a way to be in some sense religious, a
desire to find a way forward. What would seem to be crucial is the question as to
whether we can learn to perceive, and to find new ways to conceive the presence of God
in our world.29
Hampson is arguing for a theology based upon experience and looks to Schleiermacher for
philosophical support, but she is not persuaded by what she sees of feminist theology.
What strikes me about much modern theology - and this not least true of feminist
theology - is how profoundly secular it is. It is as though theology has lost its moorings.
In the case of feminist theology, what seems to have replaced talk of God is largely talk
of women's experience. It is not even women's experience of God: it is simply women's
experience.30
These five fundamental problems are intended as an introduction to a more detailed consideration
of feminist perspectives in theology. The list is compiled for the purposes of this thesis: other
writers might demonstrate other priorities in their assessment of the problems. However, what
does emerge from this approach is that the problems, from a feminist perspective, go to the root
of Christian faith (in the sense both of belief and of trust) and practice. Unless they are addressed
satisfactorily, it is hard to see how Christianity and theology have much to offer women that does
not tend to reduce and conform them to patriarchal norms, with, of course, corresponding damage
also to men in whose apparent interest those norms have existed.
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5.3 Feminist perspectives in OT and NT studies: methodological considerations
It would not be reasonable to quiz the Bible on its views about second wave feminism, and yet, as
Hampson points out, Christians continue to look to the Bible (and other traditional sources) for
guidelines in regulating their personal, social, economic and political lives. Such people soon
discover that, the NT epistles and the Torah apart, much of the Bible is in the form of stories,
with the consequence that a large part of what can be understood about, for example, the relations
of women and men is implicit. The underlying views and social assumptions of the Old
Testament writers were largely those shared with their initial hearers or readers so that it was not
necessary to spell them out. Even where there is some specific teaching offered in order to correct
or regulate behaviour or attitudes, as in some prophetic writing, we have to remember that our
interests and concerns (including feminist perspectives) are not necessarily those of the original
readers. Ancient cultural forms and ideas are inferred from texts and may be supported by
evidence from archaeological reconstruction, histories, contemporary parallels, and
anthropological and religious studies. Even so, we cannot be certain what these matters meant to
those people in their societies in their time.
It may be argued that our information is probably more reliable if it is more recent. When
compared with Old Testament cultures, we can see that those of the New Testament are rich in
parallel written material. But that richness presents its own problems. There is a considerable
difference, for example, between the peasant Christians of the Syriac tradition and the
sophisticated city dwellers of Ephesus or Carthage - and between the residents of those two cities
- despite the common hegemony of Rome31. We should therefore expect to find, even in the
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gospels, a variety of emphases reflecting different world-views according to their provenance. If,
despite all this variety, we then arrive at a degree of certainty about teaching, context and
meaning, what emerges may take the form of a custom, command or prohibition that jars with
our own culture and could even be morally or ethically repugnant.
This uncertainty is compounded when we recall that we cannot expect our enquiry to lead to a
neutral “view from nowhere”. The approaches of feminist theology lead us to interrogate, from a
perspective unknown to early Christians, their traditions regarding their use of biblical material.
For example, when the creation accounts are cited, we have to ask if the NT writers privilege
aspects of Genesis that could be taken as divine authentication of male dominance, whilst
ignoring texts or perspectives with more egalitarian possibilities.
This approach implies two stages of extrapolation. Let us take, as an example, the material about
divorce. First, the texts themselves are to be taken seriously. This entails locating them, so far as
is possible, within the cultural setting that gave them meaning at the time. Second, although we
must acknowledge that feminist interests were not central to biblical writers' interests, we might
suggest that some kind of gender politics forms the occluded or unconscious sub-text or an
unspoken binary opposition buried in the text32. What is more certain is that we can find by our
interpretation only the writers’ interpretations. There can be no value-free interpretative
standpoint, nor way of knowing what they thought and felt which is untrammelled by the motives
and presuppositions of our enquiry. This is not, however, a new situation brought about by
feminist criticism. The Bible has always spoken with more than one voice and has represented
many traditions and points of view33.
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Feminist critiques of Christian theology vary in their scope. Following Evans’ scheme, we could
define the limited goals of a liberal feminism, e.g. the admission of women to all areas of church
life on equal terms with men, and the governance of the church in inclusive ways34. Cultural
feminists, by contrast, would probably challenge the very notion of priesthood as an order that is
intrinsically patriarchal35.
The ongoing arguments about women's ordination to priesthood in the Church of England offer
practical demonstrations of the gendered nature of biblical hermeneutics. Broadly speaking there
are three approaches to biblical texts that have been employed by feminists and that have enabled
previously occluded evidence to emerge from the text. One such derives from the approach of the
French historian Michel Foucault. It is often referred to as "postmodern" even though Foucault
himself showed how that label was inaccurate. McNay states that, whilst Foucault
…goes along with the postmodern rejection of metanarratives, ..... his work cannot be
categorized as postmodern. Against the postmodern dissolution of the subject, Foucault
retains a notion of the self and affirms autonomy as a worthwhile goal of emancipatory
politics.36
Foucault himself, whilst recognising the difficulty inherent in recovering events from history,
believes that history is more than (mere) discourse. Discussing the Enlightenment, modernity and
postmodernity, he describes his own critical approach:
[C]riticism is no longer to be practised in the search for formal structures with universal
value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute
ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.
In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a
metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method.
Archaeological - and not transcendental - in the sense that it will not seek to identify the
universal structure of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat
the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical
events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the
form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate
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out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer
being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a
metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far
and wise as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.37
Critics who share this more politically and historically conscious standpoint are concerned to
locate texts in their cultural and historical settings as part of a Derridean “double reading”38. In
doing this, they are able to identify the values overtly or covertly at play within the text and to
identify whose ends are thereby served. An extended example of this approach is Fiorenza
(1983). The early chapters show her construction of a critical apparatus that rejects the "view
from nowhere" and creates a feminist vantage point.
The inconsistencies in our New Testament sources indicate that the early Christian
traditioning and redactional processes followed certain androcentric interests and
perspectives. Therefore, the androcentric selection and transmission of early Christian
traditions have manufactured the historical marginality of women, but they are not a
reflection of the historical reality of women's leadership and participation in the early
Christian movement. It is important to note that the redaction of the Gospels and of Acts
happened at a time when the patriarchalization process of the early Church was well
underway.39
And, as the argument proceeds:
The dominant sociological model for the reconstruction of early Christian beginnings
explains the process of gradual ecclesial patriarchalization which entails the historically
necessary development from charism to office, from Paulinism to early Catholicism, from
a millenarist radical ethos to a privileged Christian establishment, from the radical Jesus
movement within Judaism to an integrative love patriarchalism within the Hellenistic
urban communities, from the egalitarian charismatic structures of the beginning to the
hierarchical order of the Constantinian church. Unlike the orthodoxy-heresy model, this
interpretative framework does not justify the patriarchalization process of the early
church on theological grounds but argues for it in terms of sociological and political
factors.40
Phyllis Trible develops a second possible feminist approach to texts. She was a pupil of the
rhetorical critic James Muilenburg whose method is explained in Walter Bruggemann's Foreword
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to Trible (1984). He points out that she aims to "get the interpreter/expositor out of the way so
that the unhindered text and the listening community can directly face each other"41. Trible's use
of rhetorical-critical method does not give much attention to anything except what lies within the
text. This sounds dangerously like an "objective" viewpoint and Bruggemann seems conscious of
that danger when he asserts that
…..the regnant methods [of criticism], for all their claims of "objectivity", have indeed
served the theological ends of "the ruling class". What now surfaces is the history,
consciousness, and cry of the victim, who in each case is shown to be a character of
worth and dignity in the narrative. Heretofore, each has been regarded as simply an
incidental prop for a drama about other matters. So Trible's "close reading" helps us
notice. The presumed prop turns out to be a character of genuine interest, warranting our
attention. And we are left to ask why our methods have reduced such characters, so that
they have been lost to the story.42
There is, then, a perspective. It is that of the person usually and traditionally overlooked, and that
person is usually a woman.
A third line of criticism employed by a number of feminist writers is that of the psychoanalytic
school. Part One of this thesis has already identified that psychoanalytic theory can be
problematic for feminists, although Mitchell counters by stating that "psychoanalysis is not a
recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are interested in
understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we cannot afford to neglect it."43 The
outcome of her and other scholars' reworking is a psychoanalytic theory different to that
articulated in the 1920s and 1930s. It has become a method - both of therapy and of hermeneutics
- appropriate for women (and men) in a culture shaped or challenged by feminism.
Psychoanalytic perspectives are important in much feminist theological writing, and
psychoanalytic theory has contributed to theological reflection44. Psychoanalytic insights are,
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however, more likely to be found in works on religion (as distinct from Christian hermeneutics)45
as well as in commentary about texts used in preaching. Of the three types of criticism identified
in this section, the psychoanalytic appears to be least used in both OT and NT studies.
In concluding this section what can be said is that there are characteristically feminist approaches
in OT and NT studies. These approaches address some of the fundamental problems defined in
section 5.2 in that they offer ways of using the Bible that do not tie us to a putatively definitive
past. They undermine the normalising structures of patriarchy. Feminist scholars also create a
vantage point from which to encounter their texts. This methodological work is intrinsic to a
feminist approach and contrasts with those biblical scholars who are apparently content with
what they presumably regard as an objective analysis of revelatory narrative.
5.4 Feminist perspectives in pastoral theology
A theological discipline much influenced by feminist critiques is pastoral theology. In theological
education, it has been regarded as that most practical of subjects, dealing with the mediation of
God's love through the church and directed towards church members and the wider community.
Pastoral theology leads to pastoral care, and in turn it feeds on the experience of pastoral carers in
a cycle of reflection and fresh inspiration. This reflexive relationship does, however, raise at least
as many questions as it resolves. The most obvious of these is the very nature of pastoral
theology46.
Although there have been prophetic exceptions, the early models of pastoral theology and
184
pastoral care were what one can now identify as paternalistic. By current standards, they were
frequently marginal in their impact, marginalising in their effects, misdirected and even political
in a suspect cause. The advent of a Christian socialist movement represented a crack in that
mould. Changes in theory and practice were further promoted by the liberation theologians of
Central and South America and the Black Consciousness movements in the USA and South
Africa, and by post-missionary theologians in Asia and Africa. In this context, feminist thinking
could be seen as another aspect of liberation theology, taking as its reference point God's option
for women, in parallel to the discourse about God's option for the poor of the earth. Indeed that is
one way of understanding the separatist, cultural feminist line associated with Mary Daly.
However, just as some South African liberation theologians have always held that liberation in
South Africa must be liberation for black, mixed race and white people, so many feminist
theologians insist that their hope is for the liberation of whole societies from the curse of
patriarchy and its attendant sexism.
Arguments for the renewal of pastoral theology and practice have come from a number of
sources. Kenneth Leech47 has demanded that the church address the political dimensions of
people's lives. Leech does not equate pastoral care with political activity48, nor does he deny the
need for individual attention that may be crucial to a person's development. Pattison makes the
point as follows:
Healing, sustaining, guiding, reconciling and nurturing, the core elements of pastoral
care, have been directed mainly at individuals and small groups. For many people,
pastoral care is synonymous with personal counselling and a therapeutic role.
I will argue here that, while giving care and respect to individuals is certainly an
important part of the pastoral task, this is too limited. Pastoral care has fallen into the trap
of thinking too narrowly about how people's welfare might be sought and their potential
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developed. In so doing, it may actually inadvertently work against its intentions to
promote well-being; it may also collude with some of the social and political forces
which create and maintain human suffering.49
Pattison takes feminist critiques seriously when he addresses the issue of "pastoral care with
women" and he examines "how the principles of socio-politically aware and informed pastoral
care can point ways forward for this activity"50. Peter Selby addresses another angle of the same
issue:
Feminism has offered a huge pastoral challenge. It has not so much raised doubts about
men's pastoral gifts or their monopoly of them; more importantly, feminism challenges us
to look again at what it is to be a pastor.51
Pastoral care from a feminist perspective is explored by Graham and Halsey who look at women
as carers and as receivers.
Attention to the novelty of women as agents and recipients of pastoral care is a matter
which goes far beyond the mere process of "adding in" a new constituency of pastoral
ministers and clients to conventional models. Instead, it requires the Church to consider
the nature of the core values at the heart of pastoral practice, and the implicit truth-claims
of the Christian community as enacted and embodied in diverse patterns of pastoral
ministry.52
Common to all these writers is an examination of what Graham refers to as "the implicit truth-
claims of the Christian community". She goes on to say that:
Embodied in the apparently straightforward and uncontroversially benign acts of healing,
guiding, reconciling, and sustaining - are assumptions concerning the nature of Christian
faith and human destiny, patterns of authority in the Church, and the very character of
God at work in the world.
Attention to the politics of pastoral care, therefore, begins with the realization that
pastoral relationships cannot be isolated from their broader social and cultural setting....53
The main argument of Graham's chapter concerns issues of power and empowerment. She sees
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that power relations inevitably inform any helping relationship and that power gradients play an
important part in relations between women and men individually and socio-politically. Even in
the most apparently apolitical encounter, there are inevitable communications from each side as
to what constitutes the healthy, the normal, or the good. It is an important task of pastoral
theology to reflect critically on the implications for pastoral practice of this fact54.
Sexual politics must therefore be high among the agenda of pastoral carers and pastoral
theologians, and they inform both content and process in pastoral praxis: here, as elsewhere, the
medium is the message55. It follows that a thoroughgoing feminist critique in the area of pastoral
theology will focus on both the methodology (of pastoral theology) and on praxis. Pastoral
theologians can point a way forward for theologians, pastoral practitioners and Christian
communities. New models of pastoral care put "the client" first whether the client is an
individual, a group or half the population. Older models of pastoral care have obscured or denied
this broad understanding of the client, just as they have obscured the pastoral work done daily in
unrecognised ways by millions of people, most of whom are women. These publicly praised (but
actually undervalued or ignored) caring functions of women are not usually dignified as pastoral
care because they are occluded in patriarchal cultures as unexceptional features of women's
biological destiny. It is for this reason that the concerns of many women - for themselves, their
sisters and the children for whom they are usually the primary carers - have not been given their
due weight in pastoral theological circles. The same must be said about the methodology of
pastoral theological reflection in the church. An example of this was the debate about abortion
conducted through the synods of the Church of England during the 1980s. The issues touched on
themes central to women’s lives, yet the tone of the debate was masculine, its language was that
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of a patriarchal institution, and the process was arguably masculine.
Whatever the nature of pastoral practice and pastoral theology, it reflects, explicitly or otherwise,
an understanding of God. This is as true of older models of pastoral care as it is of models
advocated by feminist theologians. Certainly, Graham points out that pastoral care enacts a
pastoral theology that is in turn "a reflection of the nature of God"56. Implicit in her position is a
belief that the nature of God is in some way reflexive, that is, in this context, client-centred and
empowering. It contains within it the striking possibility that, in our need, we come to know
something of the nature of God57. Monika Hellwig develops the notion of reflexivity in which the
nature of God and the key themes of a pastoral theology are intimately connected. She writes of
the theologian as mythmaker, and offers a myth of her own:
God creates human persons in the divine image by awakening them into freedom, self-
determination, and creativity, in which they discover that they are essentially relational
and that their humanity is realized in the ways they shape the earth, themselves, one
another, and their societies; in this they are fulfilling and realizing the creativity of God;
when they shape communities which offer liberation, happiness and fulfilling
relationships to all, they fulfil the purpose of creation; then all creation is drawn into a
great harmony and returns to the Creator in peace, and God is glorified.58
Hellwig’s myth is striking as a piece of Christian theology in that it does not feature, for example,
God as father, lawgiver or judge. As a feminist pastoral theologian she is concerned with justice,
but justice in terms of relationships within families, and relationships in communities and wider
social groups.
One of McFague's models of God supports this point. Speaking of the commandment to love
others as ourselves, she notes the impossibility of its fulfilment, but affirms the direction it gives
to human lives.
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The direction suggested by the present interpretation is toward bedrock justice: the
establishment of the conditions of a just order in which the necessities of existence are
shared. God as mother-judge condemns those who selfishly refuse to share. When
judgment is connected to the mother-creator, it is different from when it is connected to
the king-redeemer. In the picture of the king-redeemer, individuals are condemned who
rebel against the power and the glory of the monarch, assigning to themselves the status
that only the king deserves.... In the picture of the mother-creator, however, the goal is
neither the condemnation nor the rescue of the guilty but the just ordering of the cosmic
household in a fashion beneficial to all.59
Pastoral practice can address most sharply one of the fundamental problems referred to in section
5.2, for it is in the life of Christian communities that patriarchal practice is reiterated and
reflexively reinforces theological assumptions. But pastoral theology is more than daily praxis: as
much as OT and NT studies, it is a site of deconstruction and reconstruction of Christian
theology.
5.5 Feminist perspectives in christology
The changes in theology in the past thirty years are reflected strongly in christology. To illustrate
this fact and to analyse those changes, we will consider three books published during that period.
These very different but important examples are Oscar Cullmann's The christology of the New
Testament (1959), Jon Sobrino's Christology at the crossroads (1978) and Rita Nakashima
Brock's Journeys by heart: a christology of erotic power (1991). Cullmann's book is and remains,
despite his wish expressed in the Preface, a book of reference. It is a book of exegesis. Taking the
christological titles of Jesus for his structure, Cullmann examines the historical and textual
evidence about how early Christians viewed Jesus, what claims they believed Jesus made and
what claims they themselves made for him as Christ. Cullmann tries to confine himself to a
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thoroughgoing, historical and would-be objective examination and exposition. He asks of his
critics that they marshal their evidence as he has marshalled his if they wish to take issue with his
exposition and conclusions60.
Sobrino writes as a Jesuit theologian working in San Salvador. He is aware of the tensions in his
political and ecclesial situation. He cannot ignore the conciliar and papal magisterium that
enshrines and enjoins dogmatic christology. He believes that the framework of his christology
must be ecclesial, historical and trinitarian. By ecclesial he refers to the living experience of
Christians in South America: only secondarily does he mean the magisterium, although he has
also to bear in mind the significance that church members and church authorities give to it. He is
clear that "historical" in this context is not meant simply in the Marxist sense, i.e. that christology
should be "worked out on the basis of present-day history"61. He takes seriously present-day
history, but is also dedicated to discovering a christology that proclaims the historical Jesus. He
reminds his readers that Jesus did not come to proclaim himself or an idea, but the rule of God’s
justice. His book shows that the proclamation of Jesus is good news to those who hunger and
thirst for justice and right dealing. In his view, christology tells poor and oppressed people
something about their worth, and about the world as God would have it be62. Nonetheless it is a
work of what he calls theo-logy because it debates who Jesus was and is only in relation to God
the Father and God's kingdom, in relation to the Christ as God's anointed and in relation to the
Spirit of God63, i.e. a trinitarian theo-logy.
Rita Nakashima Brock's christology, on the other hand, whilst taking seriously the historicity of
Jesus and the history of christological thinking, takes a different stance with regard to history.
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She writes from her perspective as an Asian American feminist theologian whose personal
history is marked by oppression on the dual grounds of race and of gender. The starting point of
her christology is a theology "grounded in a feminist view of love as the basis of all power in
human life"64. As a feminist she discerns two major problems in christology. One is the fact that
Jesus was male.
In fact it is Jesus' maleness, and no other of his particular human characteristics, like race,
age, class, or ethnicity, that has kept women, an entire category of persons, out of full
participation in the Christian community.65
The second problem lies in the traditional doctrines of the Christ’s atonement that emphasise the
death of the son of God and themes of separation, disconnection and punishment (including
punishment in the absence of wrongdoing). She finds these unacceptable and incompatible with
the intimate love that she takes to be the nature of God (God/dess in her usage). Of such
traditional Christian teachings she writes:
The past and its traditions must liberate and make whole the present. All use of the past to
hurt and to oppress is illegitimate, and those who are hurt by traditions have the right to
decide what makes us whole. I seek to reveal here what, in christology, can lead us
toward a whole-making life.66
Brock's feminist christology rests primarily on her experience and that of other women and men
who have wrestled with the forces of patriarchy. She distinguishes her views of patriarchy from
those of some more radical feminists by asserting that, at the core of patriarchy, there is what she
terms "broken-heartedness". In short, she sees it as a pathological condition, socially prevalent,
and resulting from pain and damage inflicted, experienced and internalised in the family. She
does not seek to fight men and wrest from them their illegitimate power, but rather to bring
healing to people who are, in the first instance, themselves damaged and, in consequence,
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destructive of themselves, their families and, by extension, society and the world.
It is unsurprising then to find that Brock's central christological metaphor is not that of an
individual but of a community that she calls Christa/Community67. This community is
characterised by its manifestations of "erotic power", that is, the power of intimate love in the
context of relatedness. Jesus neither confers this on the community nor controls it, but himself
participates in it as a given of God. Because erotic power can only exist in relatedness, it could
not reside in an individual, not even Jesus.
Brock is relying here on an understanding of Eros that has evolved in feminist thinking,
particularly in the work of Haunani-Kay Trask. She quotes part of Trask's definition of Eros.
The feminist Eros encompasses the "life force", the unique energy which springs from the
desire for existence with meaning, for a consciousness informed by feeling, for
experience that integrates the sensual and the rational, the spiritual and the political. In
the feminist vision, Eros is both love and power.68
Brock contrasts the use of Logos in contradistinction to Eros, and draws out the way in which
Eros feeds and sustains the hearts of human beings in their relationships. The notion of "heart" is
central to her work both in relation to people and to God/dess, and it is in our hearts that we are
variously hurt or healed, deprived or nourished. Eros is the stream that brings us this nourishment
and is the medium in which we are created and through which we relate. Eros has characteristics
both of the spirit of God in the Old Testament and of the divine Logos69.
In expanding the feminist concept of erotic power to include its sacred dimensions, I am
developing its theological implications as the incarnation of divine love. The presence
and revelation of erotic power is the divine dimension of human existence.........
In the beginning is the divine Eros, embodied in all being. As the incarnate, life-giving
power of the universe, divine erotic power is the Heart of the Universe.70
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All three of the books reviewed above were conscientious in their attempts to be true to past
wisdom on one hand and, on the other, true to the needs of the world in which the writers found
themselves. The world changed radically between 1956 when Cullmann surrendered his
manuscript to his German publishers, and the time in 1991 when Brock ended a decade of
struggle to write hers. Brock's work arose in a context of new christological and theological
thinking. Chopp and Taylor identify five "discursive shifts" which influenced North American
theology in that period71 and it is arguable that these same shifts are true for Western theology
generally. They are: the deconstruction of older theologies with their WASP-male-as-norm; the
identification of social and political crisis as the locus for doing theology; postmodernist
ambiguity; a new sensibility of post-colonialism; and the perspective of world religions. In such
a context, it became important to review Christian symbolic systems (doctrines), including that of
the Christ, and to develop an appropriate communal praxis. For both Sobrino (his “ecclesial”
criterion) and Brock, the communal focus is particularly significant. Imagery based upon the
Suffering Servant may have implied a communal dimension for christology, but it was first
liberation theology and then feminist theology which brought to the fore a dimension largely
missing from earlier thinking.
Francine Cardman72 traces the development of feminist christologies from Daly's critique of
"christolatry" and Ruether's challenging women's alleged need of a male saviour to the
reconstructive work of Fiorenza envisaging a community marked by a discipleship of equals and
a praxis of inclusive wholeness. It was Grant73 who saw that these feminist christologies required
further critique in that they were based upon white racist assumptions: to embrace them would be
to perpetuate that oppression. Grant’s project of a womanist christology confronts the triple
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oppression of black women74 (race, sex and class) and identifies the Christ in the community of
black women75. What feminist christologies have achieved is to dethrone the white, male hero
and, in his place, to point to an inclusive community whose praxis is to seek justice and
wholeness.
At the conclusion of this section, it is evident that there is no one feminist christology. As we saw
earlier in this chapter (fundamental problems), some feminist difficulties with Christianity are
precisely with the Christ. Feminist scholars have found a number of ways to address this problem
(e.g. the Christa/community, Eros) and we should not - need not - look to find a single answer to
those problems. These writers have articulated understandings of christological function that are
independent of maleness and inclusive in their effects. In addressing these problems, they
confront Hampson's complaint that much feminist theology is (from her perspective) apparently
secular and they challenge previously accepted understandings as, at the least, compromised by
patriarchal values.
5.6 Feminist spirituality and sexual politics
Cullmann's book was not intended as a work of spirituality whereas Brock's is one both of
spirituality and of theology and is political in its implications. Since the rise of academic theology
as a discrete discipline, the task of theological reflection has often been divorced from the
workaday concerns and struggles of people and of communities of belief. The masculine habit of
classification and division has, undoubtedly, its uses, but it has supported a split between
theology and spirituality that is a feature of patriarchal religion. Leech points out that patriarchy,
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as a dominant cultural norm, rules by splitting or dividing76. For Leech, the spirit of the Christian
person is to be nourished by and to be active in society. In The eye of the storm, he quotes the
maxim (which he claims antedates modern feminism) that "the personal is political"77. Clearly,
small groups with exclusively personal agenda are likely to stay fragmented and be easily
marginalised. However, Leech contends that
. .... in the recovery of the personal dimension in politics, there has come to the surface a
feature of liberation struggle which is vital and yet is all too easily forgotten in much
fashionable militancy: the value and dignity of every human being, however degraded and
broken. Feminist politics arises from very basic and painful experiences of oppression,
and it is this rootedness, this solidarity in pain, and the organised response to it, which
makes the commitment to the least powerful so passionate and so persistent.78
Feminist voices have challenged people to confront the splits, ignorances and gaps in their
spirituality. A spirituality that is properly theological and political is one that finds its place and
fulfilment in God's desire for the world.
... liberation does not occur at the level of ideas and feelings, but at the level of actual
people, and of concrete institutions and structures. At the core of contemporary feminism
is a profound commitment to people combined with a critique of existing institutions
which oppress and damage people.79
Feminist spirituality takes seriously human experience and, in particular, the experience of
oppressed people, including women. Lavinia Byrne does not identify herself as a feminist but
writes nonetheless
….as a Christian, as a woman, as a person who is grateful to the feminists for opening my
eyes to certain issues and problems. More significantly, I write as a Roman Catholic and
as an apostolic religious sister; as a member of a Church and religious Order that have a
particular heritage and style.80
In her chapter "On being a praying woman" she describes her spiritual journey from being a small
child to the time of writing. Much of the detail of her childhood prayer seems like that of many
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young girls - and boys too. Growing up, she realised that prayer is not primarily a matter of words
and rituals or of formulae offered by the church. She saw that emotions and thoughts, e.g. about
injustice and suffering, are natural, given, and thus a part of prayer, but that they might not be
evenly distributed as between women and men.
Traditional Christian spirituality has not always been particularly helpful to women
because all too often it has proposed that most sophisticated of virtues, humility, to those
who are not yet ready to deal with it. Women approach all power, all strength, all
authority from a position of weakness. Not because we are weak and feeble people but
because we have been treated as such for centuries. The first Christian task is to come to
full, adult stature as people whom God has made and whom God finds good. In this way
we come to glory.81
In a study of the raising of Jairus' daughter and of the woman with the haemorrhage, Byrne
begins to sketch a new imaging of God and a new imaging of women in the messianic
community. The new image of God is of father, mother and life-giver.
Women have too easily in the past been asked to sacrifice themselves upon the altar of a
God misread, a God imaged as tyrant rather than a God imaged as life-giver and nurturer,
as parent and as friend. Behind the sacrifices asked of us in the name of religion lay too
much social convention and conditioning; woman the queen of shining floors has man the
king of the universe walk all over her far too easily. When any of us makes the Christian
gesture of offering ourselves in love to diminishment and weakness, we can do so only at
the request of God. For God alone can give the treasures of darkness, God alone can call
us beyond these into eternal life. Other calls to diminishment are the work of that Satan
who asked Jesus to throw himself off the side of the Temple, to make a heroic gesture in
the name of religion, isolate himself and, thereby, to test God.82
Much of what is so refreshing in Byrne's writing is in fact very old. It is as though there were a
stream of feminist consciousness that has run underground in the life of the Christian theology-
making community. At various points in the life of the church that stream has surfaced. Each
surfacing is different in detail, but the similarities are more striking. Nowhere was this more
evident than in the medieval flowering of female religious life. Caroline Walker Bynum has
shown how this coincided with a concentration of feminine imaging of God and especially of the
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person of Jesus83. Working from primary sources, she criticises those who have written off
feminine imagery of Jesus as the "puerile"84 imaginings of sexually frustrated women - if only
because much of it comes from men!85 Bynum examines (1) the rise in popularity of the
religious life for women in northern Europe; (2) the feminisation of religious imagery (among
women and men) during the period; and (3) the unprecedented production of documents of
religious experience by women compared with men in the same period. She challenges earlier
conclusions that these were due to a sudden demographic change or special deprivation on the
part of women86, and identifies one principal reason for this mass movement. It was a reaction to
the increasing clericalisation of the church evidenced in the great production of canon law in the
period. A further consequence was the elevation of the priesthood to the point where God became
effectively inaccessible to the laity87. In an essay on the nuns of Helfta, Bynum describes the
kinds of women who joined that and similar communities. They were educated, literate and, in
our terms, in search of "a positive sense of self".
Such women were more likely to see themselves as functioning with a full range of male
and female, governing and comforting roles, paralleling the full range of the operations of
God.88
Caught up in the religious fervour of the time, they could not become priests, although some of
their devotional imagery suggests they saw themselves in that light. Nor could they become
friars. But they could become nuns, and take on the role of vicarious worship that had been the
lot of (lay) monks. They could be and were religious and social counsellors and community
resource people. They could, with the direct authority of Christ mediated through their imaging of
Jesus, become mediators of the divine89. And they had access to the "apostolate of the pen"90:
The thought forms of those times do not always speak to our own religious sensibilities. What
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emerges, however, is the authority of women who knew God, spoke to God and spoke of God to
others. That authority is at least as powerful, though different from, the writings of their male
contemporaries and of the ordained priesthood91.
In returning to current feminist spirituality, the focus here is on its theology, and on the recent
work of feminist scholars in that field. There has been an increase in the number of overtly
feminist books of prayers and liturgies, but more important for the purposes of this thesis, an
increase in work showing a forging of spirituality with theology or theological spirituality. This
has been represented by the work of Byrne, who does not call herself a feminist, but whose work
resonates strongly with the theological / spiritual re-imaging of McFague in section 5.4. It is also
represented in the work of Brock and of Fiorenza, referred to in section 5.5 on christology,
offering further evidence of what one may regard as feminist theological spirituality.
5.7 Conclusion
There is no single set of ideas and practices that constitutes feminism. Evans' scheme of an
equality-difference axis provides a basis for a typology of schools of feminism that also shows
how they relate to each other, principally at the level of their philosophical assumptions. Feminist
critiques have influenced profoundly many areas of discourse including philosophy and theology
to the extent that it is usual to use the term "feminist theology" as shorthand for a large body of
work. Section 5.2 shows that feminists encountered in Christian theology a number of
fundamental problems and these are discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Feminist
critiques in the fields of Old and New Testament studies are notable for their hermeneutic
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approaches. Methodological considerations are central to a feminist approach to these ancient
texts, exposing patriarchal assumptions and editing that otherwise occlude important aspects of
ancient and more recent tradition. There are debates within feminist circles, as is seen in the
section 6.1 about the propriety - or even effectiveness - of some of this critical work.
The present chapter also examines the impact on pastoral theology of feminist critiques. Pastoral
theology is particularly important in the sense that it is in pastoral practice that people are most
obviously supported or impeded by theology in their lives. Feminist analyses of models of
pastoral care and of the imaging of God in practice have begun to change what is taught and
practised. More significant for present purposes, however, is the centrality of pastoral theology as
sign and agent of Christian belief and behaviour and an indicator of practical-values.
Feminist perspectives on christology are also important in this regard. So far as Christian
theology is concerned, christology is a central component of its structures. It is argued that earlier
christologies were, from a feminist viewpoint, more or less deficient and sometimes downright
oppressive. The work of discerning what is properly christological, as distinct from a study of
Jesus, may be said to date back to the gospels. Feminist critics such as Brock have brought new
elements into christology as well as deconstructing old patriarchal elements brought to the
subject many centuries previously. In doing this, they have begun a process that has the capacity
radically to re-model Christianity.
The same may be said of feminist spirituality. The argument advanced is that, in all the
undoubted diversity of feminist writing, feminist theologians have broadened a strand in western
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Christian spirituality that was in danger of being lost, namely its connection with theology. The
perspective of that theology is, of course, feminist and thus not to be subsumed into similar
endeavours from other quarters, e.g. Orthodox spirituality. It is shown in later chapters that this
constitutes an important aspect of holism.
The next chapter moves the argument forward by analysing the core ideas found in feminist
theology with a view to identifying the practical-values inherent in them.
1 JANTZEN, G.M. Becoming divine: towards a feminist philosophy of religion. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1998 uses Thomas Nagel’s phrase “a view from nowhere” in
her assertion that ultimate objectivity is not possible – or even desirable. She shows that this
is not an “anything goes” standpoint where any view is as good as another, but rather
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(pp.205 et seq).
2 EVANS, J. Feminist theory today: an introduction to second-wave feminism. London:
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HERNDL, D P (eds). Feminisms: an anthology of literary theory and criticism (revised
edition). Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, pp. ix-xii.
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Macmillan, 1988, p.1.
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of Scruton (cited), seek to empty it of any intrinsic significance relative to thinking.
Elsewhere Griffiths comments: "Feminism is not monolithic and feminists do not speak with
one voice. It is all the more striking then that the different concerns expressed in feminist
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5 Ibid p.1.
6 Ibid p.134.
7 YOUNG, I. "Humanism, gynocentrism and feminist politics" In Throwing like a girl and
other essays in feminist philosophy and social theory. Cited in Evans op cit, p.2. A number
of writers, like Evans, concur in the usage of "second wave" to describe feminists of the
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8 Evans op cit p.8. Writers who distinguish the three main groupings already referred to
(liberal, socialist and radical) include LOADES, A (ed). Feminist theology: a reader.
London: SPCK, 1990, p.1; Graham (1995), p.26; RUETHER, R.R. Sexism and god-talk:
towards a feminist theology. London: SCM, 1983, pp.216 et seq.
9 “We take our stand on the solidarity of humanity, the oneness of life, and the unnaturalness
and injustice of all special favoritisms, whether of sex, race, country, or condition.... The
colored woman feels that women's cause is one and universal; and not till the image of God,
whether in parian or ebony, is sacred and inviolable; not till race, color, sex, and condition
are seen as the accidents and not as the substance of life, not until the universal title of
humanity to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is conceded to be inalienable to all; not
till then is woman's lesson taught and woman's cause won - not the white woman's nor the
black woman's, nor the red woman's....The acquirements of her rights will mean the final
triumph of all right over might, the supremacy of the moral forces of reason, and justice, and
love in the government of the nations of the earth.” Extract from the speech of Anna Julia
Cooper to the 1893 Congress of Representative Women, quoted in FIORENZA, E.S.
Searching the scriptures. Volume one: a feminist introduction. London: SCM, 1994, flyleaf.
10 FRIEDAN, Betty. The feminine mystique. New York: Norton, 1963. The survey of the history
of feminism [DOYLE, J.A. & PALUDI, M.A. Sex and gender: the human experience.
Dubuque, IA: Brown & Benchmark, 1991, pp. 303-322 puts Friedan's book in its list of three
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11 Friedan op cit in Evans (1995) p.33.
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most evident in Mitchell (1975) pp.347-349, where the author portrays Firestone as confident
that "social reality [is] all" and that mental life is not a reality. Such a criticism challenges the
reliability of Firestone's analysis and approach.
16 Evans op cit p.73.
17 DALY, M. Beyond God the Father: towards a philosophy of women's liberation. London:
The Women's Press, 1986, p.23 and a reference to Tillich (1962).
18 Ibid p.100.
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21 Evans op cit p.120.
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47 LEECH, K. The social God. London: Sheldon Press, 1981. Also by same author Politics and
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53 Ibid, p.211.
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appropriate virtues to be fostered and wrongs to be righted, it is important to recognize that
such choices are not neutral, but have been influenced by already existing value systems.”
Ibid, p.216.
55 McLUHAN, M. Understanding media: the extensions of man. London: Ark, 1987, pt.1,
chapter 1 (originally published London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
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69 Despite this reliance on John's gospel, Brock turns to Mark for much of the biblically related
content of her book, devoting two chapters to studies of that gospel.
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womanist response. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, American Academy of Religion Academy
Series, 1989. WELCH, S D. "Human beings, white supremacy and racial justice" In Chopp
& Taylor op cit pp.170 et seq demonstrates how white theologians have been limited by
their racism.
74 Grant, op cit p.209.
75 Ibid Précis.
76 LEECH, K. The eye of the storm: spiritual resources for the pursuit of justice. London: DLT,
1992, especially pp.92 et seq.
77 Ibid p.82.
78 Ibid p.83.
79 Ibid p.83.
80 BYRNE, L. Women before God. London: SPCK, 1988, p.xi. The book was written before
Dr. Byrne felt obliged to leave her order (though not the church) after a series of attempts to
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81 Ibid p.79.
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Berkeley, LA & London: University of California Press, 1982.
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One of the differences which is of significance for this study concerns the ways in which
Jesus as mother was linked to Abbot as mother in the mind of some male writers. Mother in
this context was a symbol of (pastoral) authority, one in which governance was tempered by
nurture. Women's writing on Jesus as mother was more ecstatic, although the feminine
imagery of both women and men was at some points strikingly similar.
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CORE IDEAS IN FEMINIST THEOLOGY
6. Introduction
In the previous chapter, feminism is discussed in terms of a number of schools. Each 
school has its own philosophical basis or emphasis along an axis whose poles are equality 
and difference. This is a prelude to examining in depth the underlying concepts that 
inform feminist theology. It is evident that feminist theology contains a range of 
theological (sub)-disciplines with a variety of voices and emphases. Chapter 5 
demonstrates that in theology, as in other feminist disciplines, content and methodology 
are intimately linked. The need to pay attention to both content and methodology is a 
feature of much feminist scholarship. In this chapter, the focus moves to an analysis of 
core ideas in feminist theology as a means of deriving its practical-values. Such values 
arise from both the content and the methodology of that theology. These values are then 
compared in chapter 7 with the practical-values derived from a gestalt perspective and 
their compatibility discussed and assessed.
This chapter analyses core ideas in feminist theology. Analysis is a process whereby 
concepts and ideas are loosed from their original context. The word "analysis" derives 
from Greek roots meaning to loose from… The root meanings carry with them the 
possibility that, in such loosing, ideas could be taken out of context and their meaning 
altered. Since there are no agreed objective means to guard against this possibility, the 
writer must adopt rigorous academic standards of intellectual awareness and integrity.
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The overall aim remains to establish that gestalt is compatible with feminist theology. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the core ideas of feminist theology from which 
practical-values may safely be deduced.
The first core idea is that of experience as an epistemological basis in feminist theology. 
This is a position with a long philosophical ancestry. Consideration is given to other 
possible bases in the present philosophical and religious climate and to the question of 
whose experience is accorded that position. Some voices in feminist theory point to 
negative aspects of this epistemological stance, and these are discussed. Section 6.2 
focuses on the place of the body in feminist theology and its role as the site of our 
experience. Over the past thirty years, feminist theorists have taken a number of 
conflicting views of the status of the body. Their ideas, though not mapped precisely onto 
schools of feminist theologians, inevitably problematise attempts to take a single view of 
the body in feminist theology. A further core idea is examined, in section 6.3, by focusing 
on gender issues in feminist thinking. The precise relationship of sex and gender 
continues to be debated in feminist circles, and no single voice commands universal 
assent. What is incontrovertible is that the phenomenon of gender permeates our 
experience of religious practice and theology.
In section 6.4, the focus moves to the relationship of the personal, the political and the 
theological. It is argued in this section that this is a species of holism that is important to 
many feminist writers and to feminists in the church, though not commanding universal 
support. Section 6.5 analyses ideas about patriarchy and the importance of confronting it. 
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That leads into a related section (6.6) on commitment to change as a core idea in feminist 
theology.
In section 6.7, the focus moves again to an examination of the place of Jesus and the 
messianic community in feminist theology. It is argued that, although some writers are 
able to redeem Jesus and his immediate followers from the distortions of patriarchy, 
others have gone further by developing the notion of the salvific or saved community. 
The next section (6.8) follows in which ideas of God / Goddess are examined and found 
to occupy a key position in most feminist theological thinking and writing. Section 6.9 
concludes this chapter by summing up the work on core ideas. It also looks forward to 
Part Three of the thesis in which practical-values are proposed for gestalt and for feminist 
theology on the basis of their core ideas. These practical-values are then compared and 
discussed as a basis for the compatibility of the two disciplines.
6.1 Core ideas: the place of experience
One of the main ideas evident in the origins of feminist theology is that human 
experience provides an important basis for epistemology. This idea can be traced back 
through the philosophy of Schleiermacher to Descartes. It can be thought of as a logical 
or even necessary extension of a project much older than present-day feminism. 
However, it is not an idea that had noticeably transformed theological discourse until the 
respective advents of liberation theology and feminist theology. In placing such emphasis 
upon experience, feminist writers (like those of the communidades de base - base 
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communities - of the liberation theology movement) do not claim that experience is all 
that there is. That would constitute an excessive relativising of theology. In according 
epistemological status to experience, feminist theologians recognise and assert that, 
whether or not we acknowledge it, we all start from "somewhere" in doing theology. 
Given that we cannot start from "nowhere", we will inevitably accord to something or 
someone status as a point of reference. Even so, there are some feminist voices that sound 
a cautionary note. Perhaps the starkest of these is that of Hampson, cited in the previous 
chapter1. She is concerned that the "experience" which plays such an important role in 
theology is not women's experience of God, but simply women's experience, so that talk 
of God is, in her view, replaced by talk of women's experience. There may be situations 
where this is the case, although such idolatry is something for all theologians to be wary 
of rather than a possibility unique to feminist theologians.
If we do not follow those writers who accord epistemological status to human experience, 
then we will surely adopt some other epistemological scheme, for example that of the 
proof texts offered by some biblical literalists. However, this approach is arguably more 
dangerously subjective for its being (putatively) objective and allegedly free from the 
influence of personal and communal experience.  A further and major implication of this 
epistemological stance is discussed later in this chapter when we consider the notion of 
the reflexivity of God.
Although most feminist theologians would have little difficulty with the epistemological 
position outlined above, problems arise when we focus on the question of whose 
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experience counts. As chapter 5 showed, it is not enough for feminist theologians to 
answer "women's experience" because the question immediately arises as to who are the 
women whose experience is to have such a defining status. Sometimes it is the 
experience of women as reported, or even as occluded, in biblical traditions. Theologians 
attempt to reconstruct these suppressed or largely vanished traditions2, and in this 
frequently difficult task, they can claim some successes. They have confronted the 
theological positions, statements and stories that represent the dominant cultural norms of 
societies whose religious views were and are inimical to a feminist reading. By doing this 
they have established the outlines of other positions, statements and stories, and thus have 
gone some way to recovering the experience of the occluded others, usually women3.
Another aspect of experience opened up by feminist hermeneutics involves the 
highlighting of texts that look to women as models. Examples include the accounts of 
Ruth, Esther and Judith4. It may be argued that the experience of such women offers 
questionable role models to women today. A patriarchal (but superficial) view of Ruth, 
for example, might suggest that her claim to fame was to become David's great-
grandmother, and that was only achieved by following her mother-in-law's advice to 
seduce a rich male relative. But such a view misses the inclusivist and principal point of 
the story, namely that Ruth was a foreign woman tellingly imbued with important values. 
A Moabitess, she could shame the most virtuous Israelite with her strong sense of family, 
of loyalty and of industry. Hers is also the story of a relationship between an older and a 
younger woman, marked by solidarity, mutual support and commitment. It is a story of 
209
survival. These are the factors that emerge as primary in a feminist reading and which 
provide powerful role models.
Ruether sees the difficulties inherent in criticising biblical texts from outside and seeks to 
establish a means whereby texts can be criticised from within. She explains this in 
relation to what she calls the "prophetic principles" in the Bible that she takes as 
normative both for the Bible and for feminist critics. She says that:
Feminist readings of the Bible can discern a norm within Biblical faith by which 
the Biblical texts themselves can be criticized. To the extent to which Biblical 
texts reflect this normative principle, they are regarded as authoritative. On this 
basis many aspects of the Bible are to be frankly set aside and rejected.5
This kind of criticism challenges previously unexamined and familiar meanings and 
appears to overturn what was previously "agreed". Ruether wants us to accept that many 
of the prophetic utterances can be understood as speaking for oppressed groups in general 
and consequently for women in their oppression. This is because, despite the (oppressed) 
writers being male Hebrews living in an ancient rural culture, they knew what it was to 
feel threatened and disparaged - in their case by the sophisticated town dwellers of 
surrounding civilisations6. In this example, the city dwellers may be seen as standing for 
women's principal oppressors, i.e. men. Such a view, taken by their wives and daughters, 
would have been unthinkable for the original writers, but the force of their utterances in 
the modern context is potent. Ruether refers to this phenomenon of changed meaning 
thus:
This expansion of the Biblical message to include the unincluded rests on the 
assumption that the point of reference for Biblical faith is not past texts, with their 
sociological limitations, but rather the liberated future. .....In applying the 
prophetic principle to the critique of sexism and the liberation of women, we 
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deepen our understanding of social sin and its religious justifications and expand 
the vision of messianic expectation.7
Such a stance does not command universal accord among feminist theologians. Fiorenza  
points out that Ruether "is forced to concede that this critical prophetic tradition did not 
explicitly apply itself to the women's question either in the history of Israel or in 
Christianity. Nevertheless, she argues that women today can apply it to the feminist 
quest". Fiorenza's criticism is that Ruether overlooks "the oppressive androcentric 
elements" of the biblical traditions8. Fiorenza's specific point appears to be based firmly 
in history. The prophets did not promote a feminist cause: indeed the articulation of the 
concept announces its impossibility since feminism is itself a social construction of recent 
times rather than one of biblical societies and their times. However, Fiorenza's criticism 
need not be taken as invalidating Ruether's approach. Whether or not Ruether overlooks 
"oppressive androcentric elements" within the Bible, there seems to be no logically 
compelling cause precluding her from using prophetic insights and utterances in a 
situation for which they were not originally committed to writing.
Specific words spoken or written in specific situations, whenever they are cited in 
succeeding generations, are inevitably being used in contexts for which they were not 
originally intended. What matters is the adequacy or otherwise of the match between the 
original situation, insofar as it is knowable, and the current one. This is the case with the 
proof texts of first-generation Christians. They did not hesitate to use Ps.110, originally a 
royal psalm concerned with David and the sanctuary at Jerusalem, to refer to the risen 
and ascended Jesus. And whilst such a use of biblical text is not in vogue in most current 
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critical circles, it has always formed a part of Christian liturgy. What matters is not what 
the psalmist had in mind at the time of writing, but the usefulness of the text to the early 
Christians and their successors. The test question we might ask ourselves is: can we 
meaningfully9 use such a text about Jesus? By the same token, Ruether can take the 
prophets' demand that one nation should not subdue and exploit another and apply it to 
the socio-political interaction of men and women. The test question is: can we 
meaningfully use such a text about sexual politics? An affirmative answer does not mean 
that one believes that this usage was in the mind of the prophets and their followers, 
because the tradition which is being exposed is not so much about women as about 
minorities, the dispossessed, the disadvantaged and the poor of the earth.
Whereas much of the evidence of a more or less hidden tradition may be deduced from 
canonical texts, other evidence of marginalised traditions regarding women and the 
feminine comes from the study of contemporary extra-canonical texts. While the 
conclusions of such enquiries may be tentative, this may be simply because they do not 
have as much written material behind them as the successfully dominant texts. It is, 
however, also the case that such a heuristic approach may seem offbeat, unlikely or even 
presumptuous - depending on the cultural assumptions of the hearer or reader. Discussion 
of the relationship between Paul and Thecla10, for example, or between Jesus and Mary of 
Magdala11 contradicts most "received" understandings about the celibacy or otherwise of 
the two men concerned. These may then be rejected automatically simply because they 
are unfamiliar, rather than on evidential grounds.
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The criticisms of Fiorenza are by no means the most radical that are offered to this 
feminist reading of the Bible. There are others who gave up the attempt to reconstruct or 
recover women's voices that had been occluded by centuries of patriarchal definition, re-
writing and editing of traditions. They came to the conclusion that the Bible is 
irretrievably patriarchal and inimical to any feminist reading12.
Finally, it is important to recognise that experience itself can be two sided. Of course, 
there is the as-it-were-natural recognition that what we have lived through must be the 
basis for what we know to be true. But some feminist scholarship, e.g. the work of Joan 
W. Scott, points out that an uncritical reliance on experience and history can reproduce 
suppressions of difference (the examples she gives are of sexual and gender difference) 
akin to those that prompted this feminist epistemology in the first instance13. While this 
criticism need not undermine the importance of the main point here, it is a powerful 
reminder that it is unsafe to accept ostensibly liberating ideas uncritically.
6.2 Core ideas: the body in feminist theology
Christianity has a mixed history with regard to human embodiment and the physical 
world generally. Whilst affirming that the physical world is God's creation and that God 
called it "good", theologians and preachers have a long tradition of focusing on the fallen 
nature of the cosmos. Prominent in that fallen nature is the human body. So much is this 
the case, that popular belief still affirms that the "sin" of Adam and Eve was to do with 
their "discovery" of sex as well as of their nakedness. It is evident from the work of 
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Brown and others (e.g. Nelson) that Christian dualism with regard to our spiritual and 
bodily selves was widespread in the cultural environment of early Christianity. Voices 
can be heard both affirming and warning against our bodily nature. The early Christian 
history of sexual renunciation (a phenomenon also found outside Christian circles) 
suggests a widespread attitude of negativity towards the body as it is distinguished from 
the rest of the self. Nelson begins his account of this phenomenon in the present day but 
links it firmly to the earliest strata of Christian thinking and feeling.
Suppose on Sunday, the minister were to announce as the day's text Romans 12:1, 
"I appeal to you therefore .... to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and 
acceptable to God ..."  Would "bodies" be interpreted by most hearers as the entire 
self (as Paul intended)? Probably not. Would the mood conveyed by that text be 
the prospect of wholeness, joy, ecstasy? No, more likely it would be heard as the 
injunction addressed to the mind or the spirit to engage in the dreary duty of 
disciplining and controlling one's body, imposing upon it from outside an alien 
willpower.14
Nelson sees this alienation of the body as evidence not of dualism but of a "triadic" 
separation. That is because such alienation does not confine itself to the self and her / his 
body, but extends to our neighbours and ultimately to God. Further "what we reject in 
ourselves becomes projected outwards"15 and Nelson sees these projections of the 
unwanted body and its supposed evils as the root of medieval demonology. The thesis of 
his work is that Christian theology is nonetheless and necessarily body theology and that 
the body language of Paul and others is no mere coincidence, for all Paul's ambivalence 
about sexuality.
Nelson traces Christian mistrust of the body, relying on the exegeses of Bultmann and 
Robinson, to the hellenistic dualism evident in Paul's discussion of soma16. He also traces 
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some negative attitudes toward sexuality - particularly that of women - to post-exilic 
sources17, although the bulk of the written evidence is found in the Church Fathers. 
Nelson refers briefly to Tertullian, Jerome and Augustine in their mistrust of human 
sexuality. A concern with sex is only one aspect, however important, of body theology18, 
and Nelson points to other equally important factors. Chief amongst these was the 
continuing influence of Plato. Plato elevated the mental and spiritual above the physical, 
and that thinking influenced the more or less explicit Stoic philosophy found in the major 
centres of Roman civilisation. Stoicism places high value on an ethical state characterised 
by an absence of passion, desire and excitation. It takes a negative view of physical (i.e. 
bodily) excitements, passions and desires. Nelson sees parallels between Stoic philosophy 
and Plato's distinction between spiritual and bodily love on the one hand, and the equally 
dichotomous thinking of Christian writers who separate agape from eros on the other. In 
particular, he makes a link with Augustine19. He traces a line from Augustine to Aquinas 
and the development of a comprehensive theology that elaborated and promoted 
Christian attitudes to the body for future generations.
Even in the gospels, this tradition is found embedded. Luke, for example, betrays this 
same dualism in his pre-birth narrative. Luke’s concern becomes clear when one 
considers other texts he is presumed to have known, i.e. Mark, Matthew and Q.  Mark 
begins his gospel account with a baptism narrative, and Matthew with a genealogy 
followed by an account of a presumably miraculous conception and a visit to Bethlehem 
by clairvoyants or astrologers. Luke, on the other hand, begins with two unusual 
conceptions, the second of which is usually taken to be a virgin conception. This 
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understanding about Mary conceiving whilst remaining a virgin was circulating early in 
Christian history, although there are hints that it was not an understanding shared by all 
early believers. The argument against the "virgin" reading relies on a knowledge of the 
Hebrew text of the prophecy (Is. 7:14) which refers to "a young woman" bearing a child, 
whereas the Septuagint translators used parthenos, "a virgin". Such a usage in the Greek 
speaking world would promote the notion of miraculous conception and could fuel a 
legend.  This conflicting understanding about Mary's status could explain the Lucan 
reference at 3:23 "[Jesus] being, as was supposed, the son of Joseph" as a parenthesis by 
a Greek-tradition editor, i.e. one who believed in the virgin conception of Jesus.
Caird argues that, to a Jewish believer, even the Lucan material relating to the 
"overshadowing" of Mary by the Holy Spirit would not suggest an alternative to the usual 
pattern of human begetting20. A question therefore arises regarding Luke's choice of 
words and phrases. Why did he cite the Septuagint version of the Isaianic prophecy? 
What is at issue here is not the first century use of proof-texts in Jewish circles. Since 
Luke is writing in Greek, one may conclude either that he did not know the Hebrew 
behind the text, or that he did know but chose to let the text stand without comment21. 
Either way, he presumably attached some significance to parthenos. And, even if the "as 
was supposed" of 3:23 is a later gloss, thus reducing the support for an argument that 
Luke is a virgin-conception advocate, the text still suggests something in the original 
which attaches significance to virginity. What is undeniable is that the two texts together 
form an insistence that was significant to early readers. This is not, of course, proof of a 
doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary (see, for example, Lk 8:19 regarding Jesus' 
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brothers), in Luke’s gospel. But it is suggestive of a pericope (or established unit) of 
tradition, with an embedded message to a community that placed store by the virginity of 
Mary. It attaches importance to Jesus coming to birth by means other than that involving 
the physical coupling of a woman and a man.
If Luke's gospel carries some implicit teaching about the significance attached by the 
recipient communities to virginity22, it follows that it is important to look for a context in 
which such an emphasis finds its place. That context may be found in the significance for 
a great many early Christians of sexual abstinence. In referring to this matter, Brown 
follows a widely accepted tradition that the third synoptic gospel was the work of the 
author of Luke-Acts, a native of Antioch and a companion of Paul on some of his travels 
around the Mediterranean. The gospel, in this view, dates from around 80 CE23. It was, 
importantly for present purposes, the same gospel which Marcion so drastically edited 
but which, one may presume, most closely matched Marcion’s theological priorities24. 
Brown makes two points about the Lucan emphasis on virginity. First he links it with 
prophecy in the Church, and second he examines Marcion's assumption that to be 
baptised is, by the same token, to enter into a life of celibacy. 
Of the first point, Brown's citation of Lk. 1:34-35 seems not to support any connection 
with prophecy. But this point soon melts into insignificance when, a few verses later, 
Luke offers the Song of Mary which is a prophetic call for justice and the rule of God. As 
to Brown's second point, he demonstrates how, by the end of the first century and 
onwards, it seems that there were communities of Christians for whom baptism into their 
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faith entailed a ministry linked automatically to celibacy25. He also demonstrates that, 
within many churches and wandering between churches, there were organised groups of 
celibates, particularly in eastern Mediterranean countries. These celibate groups were not 
a suspect fringe but part of the mainstream of Christian praxis. Such persons regarded 
Mary as virgin and presumed Jesus to be celibate. The virgin and the celibate were the 
role models offered to the Body of Christ in the church's preaching and written teaching. 
The body is therefore in this view ideally virgin and celibate for life.
Sexual renunciation is a strand in Christian history about the body that contrasts with 
contemporary Christian and pagan views of the Roman familia (family and also 
household, including its slaves). Its outlines may be glimpsed in some Pauline writings26
and in the pseudo-Pauline epistles27. More written evidence becomes available in later 
decades when renunciation was debated in the case of the Manichees28 and other 
Encratites29. What was signified by renunciation varied according to time, culture and 
religious emphasis. Many Christian teachers enjoined sexual constraint on (their) 
disciples, while others, e.g. the Encratites and Augustine, urged sexual abstinence 
(continence) on married people, and this despite Paul's specific advice to married 
Corinthian Christians. A more radical renunciation of sexuality was to be found in 
Christian circles all round the Empire. Young women who had not married declared 
themselves to be virgin members of their churches and assumed a peculiar status both in 
the church and in the wider community30. The popularity of this movement can be readily 
understood in the light of expectations regarding marriage and childbirth. Another reason 
was the occasional difficulty of finding suitable Christian marriage partners. Paul had 
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advised that to marry a non-Christian might well be the salvation of the non-adherent 
partner, but, in the sexual politics of the day, that was more likely to be true of a Christian 
man marrying outside his church than of a Christian woman doing so. Parents therefore 
were often supportive of their daughters achieving some eminence as part of a special 
group within the church and less willing for them to make unsuitable alliances outside it. 
A further reason for the popularity of these groups of virgins is seen in the consequence 
of Christian prohibitions against exposing infant girls (i.e. seeking their deaths by neglect 
or exposure to danger). Their survival had consequences in costly dowries given in order 
to secure husbands. If, however, the family consecrated a daughter as a bride of Christ at 
an early age, they could keep their options open. She would probably not be formally 
admitted to the "order" of virginity until her childbearing days were past, and her family 
could change their minds about her eventual destiny if a promising partner were found in 
the mean time. And, even though many daughters had been treated as a commodity, they 
could become people to be reckoned with as part of a powerful caucus within their 
church.
There were other groups of women in the early church communities. The author of 1 
Timothy writes of widows31 as though they were what later generations would term a 
church "order". A widow in this sense was a woman who, having married once, opted not 
to do so again after the death of her husband: instead she joined a defined group. Many of 
these women were old and doubtless some were destitute, and grateful to rely on the 
church for physical and emotional support. Others, however, were younger women with 
time, energy and money to spare, who became a force within the Christian community. 
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They could exercise a significant degree of leadership, challenging as well as supporting 
the role of the male clergy32. In the second and third centuries, some churches had many 
hundreds, some more than a thousand, women enrolled as widows33.
As well as virgins and widows, there were yet other groups who had renounced bodily 
sexual expression including the disciples of gnostic or quasi gnostic teachers. The details 
of their teaching varied from one part of the Empire to another, but the basic design was 
common and their regime rather like some present-day religious study or disciple groups. 
They were the Christian equivalents of the didaskaleia (discipleship group) that gathered 
around pagan philosophers. The gnostic study circle, led by its teacher, was a group of 
women and men committed to deepening their relationship with God34. They received 
instruction in biblical exegesis, Christian behaviour, prayer, and anything that might edify 
the Body of Christ. They were a part of the local church, but also a discrete entity within 
it and one less open to control by clergy. Because they were independent in their 
thinking, they were more likely to take up unorthodox stands on such matters as sexual 
behaviour35.
Part of their discipline was a distinctive sexual ethic. Gnostic teaching emphasised the 
redemption of the world by the transformation of earthly and physical existence to a more 
spiritual and mystical one. Women and men joined together for the purpose of thinking 
and studying and of transcending their bodily existence. They were effectively small 
mixed-sex religious orders. Here, as well as in groups of virgins or widows, we can see 
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how some Christian groups came to a different understanding of the sexes and their 
relationships36. 
Brock offers a critique of this kind of spirituality. In her work on erotic power, she shows 
how masculine spirituality and theology tend to dualism, splitting body and spirit. That 
dualism can lead men in the direction of dominance and control (even if only of 
themselves) rather than intimacy, whereas the healing of the gospel narratives is a healing 
of embodied persons. When people meet heart to heart - the example is one of healing -
"erotic power" emerges37. This is not to say that sexual union generates erotic power -
that might or might not be the case. What Brock shows is that, where sexual renunciation 
entails disembodiment, the dualism is life-denying.
Luce Irigaray is a feminist writer who holds together virginity and a non-dualist view of 
woman. This is exemplified in her "sexuate rights" of women38 where she is careful to 
define virginity in terms that emphasise its spiritual connotations rather than its purely 
bodily ones, thus acknowledging a seemingly inevitable tussle with a dualism inherent in 
language. Irigaray's work indicates a point in the thirty-year history of feminist theorising 
about the body. Recent work by feminist scholars has examined a range of topics 
including sex and gender differences and their status, racism, the normative pressures of 
heterosexuality as well as the tools or symptoms of a patriarchal order observable in 
politics, education, legislation, the abortions debates and pornography.
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Radical feminists have usually focused some of their analysis of patriarchy on the ways 
in which it has oppressed women's bodies. Much of the rejection of Freud and of 
psychoanalytic theory has been on the grounds that Freud's theories (and still more those 
of Lacan) are phallocentric, and that they marginalise women and their bodies. This 
critique extends into other areas such as the medical profession where male consultants 
dominate in areas devoted to women's health and women's bodies, even - especially - in 
gynaecology and obstetrics. Radical feminists similarly identify and confront male 
violence (especially, though not exclusively) towards women. They have campaigned 
vigorously against the pornography industry. They are not content merely to see 
pornography confined to some hidden sphere away from public media and the gaze of 
women and children. Their grounds are that it makes women into sexual objects whose 
bodies are there for men to use as men see fit. In short, they have brought to light the 
ways in which male oppression is enacted in the bodies of women.
Such feminist critics have reclaimed their bodies / women's bodies, and have made 
progress in the public consciousness and public service provision in the direction of 
remedying these ills. However, they have not met with universal support from other 
feminists because they have come close to creating - or have actually brought about - a 
new and potentially oppressive situation. The risk they have run in confronting 
patriarchal oppression of women's bodies is that of reification into a new essentialism. 
That is to say, they have made a new entity called women's bodies which is a relatively 
fixed, discrete something grounded in a biological sphere. In the view of their critics, 
they have created (or supported the creation of) a further essence that is biological 
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science. What they did not do was to expose biology itself as a cultural product, the 
outcome of forces that are also formed by a patriarchal culture. The rescue of women's 
bodies left them still in the domain of patriarchal essentialism where all is controlled by a 
process of division, classification and control on the basis of a specious doctrine of 
objectivity and "the natural order". 
Liberal feminists are, by definition, less open to the impact of these problems. With their 
focus on equal rights and justice for all, they would naturally argue for the right of a 
woman to deal with doctors (or other professionals) of her own sex. They take issue with 
the dualistic abjection of women and of the feminine, but do not go on to integrate 
women's bodily experience into a notion of the experiencing subject. Nor do they focus 
on the framework of patriarchal culture and the colonisation or subjugation of discourse 
which, it can be argued, makes it impossible for women to have a place of their own on 
which to stand.
Irigaray has sought to identify a point at which women can stand that is outside the frame 
of reference of patriarchal systems. Specifically, as a part of the Ecole freudienne in 
Paris, she offers a critique of Lacan's "phallologocentrism". Lacan's re-working of 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory perpetuated rather than replaced notions of the primacy 
of the phallus. In her view, Lacan did not intend to indicate a physical phallus whose rule 
dominates the unconscious life of children, but a principle defining infant development 
including the development of language. Irigary saw both that the effect of Lacan's 
approach was much the same as Freud's and that, as with early Freudian theory, girls and 
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women are defined as "lack" (of phallus) and thus as secondary. She set out to develop a 
theory of femininity distinct from, and as robust as, existing theories about masculinity. 
Her feminist critics pointed out, however, that she ran the risk (run by cultural feminists) 
of creating another essentialism whose effects would be to subvert her own aim. Graham, 
however, points out that "such feminist renderings of the body … deliberately draw upon 
the psychoanalytic fusion of psyche and soma" and that the effect of Irigaray's work is to 
give a voice to self-knowledge stored in the unconscious. Such theories subvert the 
tendency of older psychoanalytic theories to polarise self and society, accepting that our 
bodies are both constrained and determined by social pressures and also free to transcend 
our cultures, thus undermining the argument about a new (deterministic) essentialism.
Kathy Davis suggests that, where the body is concerned, there are three major 
"problematics" in such scholarship: difference, domination and subversion39. Drawing on 
the work of Butler, Cixous, Grosz and others, she offers a critical examination of the 
different positions taken by feminist scholars on these points. On the matter of difference, 
for example, she contrasts Butler's radical refusal of gender difference and her views 
about how women appropriate "the cultural prescriptions on sex"40 with Nicholson's view 
of the body as a substrate upon which gender is expressed. In a similar way, the 
problematic of domination entails the familiar ideas of women's bodies as the site of male 
domination and oppression as well as a more recent phenomenon of the appropriation of 
"male" styles of power by which women may "master" themselves (especially their own 
bodies) and others. In her examination of subversion, Davis argues that women's 
struggles with cultural gender norms and prescriptive heterosexuality have led some to 
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active subversion of the norms by embracing queer theory or treating the body as a 
"statement, text or performance of gender"41. 
These differing feminist views of the body cannot be mapped precisely onto schools of 
feminist theology. As critiques of older, patriarchal traditions about the body in Christian 
theology, they present powerful challenges to those assumptions. They have great 
potential for doing new theology about the body. It is not important or necessary for the 
purposes of this thesis that there be one unified voice among feminist theologians on the 
importance or meaning of the body. What matters here is that the body is itself a core 
idea and one that generates ongoing debate.
6.3 Core ideas in feminist theology: the place of gender
In the consideration of feminist theology, it is evident that, however central are human 
experience, women's experience and bodily experience, there is no single unproblematic 
statement from a feminist viewpoint that can be made on any of these matters. Perhaps 
the only consensual point to be made is that all of the above matter. All of them figure in 
feminist theology. From the consideration of experience and particularly of bodily 
experience, a further core idea is evident. Given the pervasiveness of patriarchy in the 
historic cultures of the Bible and of Christian traditions down to the present day, it is hard 
to imagine any view of experience or of the body that is blind to gender. In other words, 
the bible and the Christian traditions studied by feminist theologians and critics are 
shown to be a collection of texts constructed and edited by people who made or held 
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assumptions about the ways things were in their societies and how things should be. For 
those people, as for us, there could not be a "view from nowhere". No matter how 
unconscious or how implicit in their texts and other cultural artefacts (painting, songs, 
statuary, organisation, legal codes etc), they held views and perspectives that shaped the 
ways they constructed the world around them. This means that their views of God's 
nature, God's will and God's activity reflect their cultural norms. From the perspective of 
the twenty-first century, those cultures are predominantly, although not exclusively, ones 
that take the male as the norm of humanity, and that privilege male over female and 
masculine over feminine. 
It is irrelevant to argue against this that notions of patriarchy and male sexism derive 
largely from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and should not be applied 
retrospectively to traditions that reach back more than two thousand years. It may be 
irrelevant to those writers, editors and other creators: but we who live in the twenty-first 
century have to take account of what we know here and now, and then make sense of our 
inheritance. It would be as futile to disregard feminist criticism of earlier Jewish and 
Christian cultures as it would be to "forget" modern physics and cosmology when 
approaching the creation myths. Modern science does not, from a Christian standpoint, 
cancel out Genesis, but it does forbid us to flee from thinking when we come to our 
religious apprehension.
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Feminist critics demonstrate that all human experience is gendered and feminist 
theologians show how this affects religious belief and behaviour. King, focusing on 
religion (as distinct from theology), writes about religious experience:
Progress in the study of religion is slow, but there is no doubt that the perspective 
of gender is of increasing importance in theoretical and empirical studies, not only 
for the growing number of women scholars, but also for many men.......Until very 
recently the study of religion has been undertaken in general terms, without 
specific attention to gender. Now many new questions arise, and new knowledge 
is discovered in relation to the gendered dimension of religious phenomena.42
Later she turns to the methodologies of studies of religion and religious experience and 
finds that these too are gendered. There are two problems. One is that the subject matter 
of research is set in an androcentric framework, shaping the task as the researcher 
attempts to deconstruct and reconstruct the material. The other problem lies with the 
attitude of the researcher. Scholars, who have been mainly men with androcentric views, 
have developed methods of study which focus quasi-objectively on texts or the 
phenomena of experience. Approaches adopted or pioneered by feminist scholars begin 
with the subjectivity and reflexivity of the scholar herself43. Both these problems are 
addressed by Graham's "feminist pastoral practice".
All forms of praxis..... seek in various ways to reappropriate and recast 
traditional forms of Christian pastoral activity in the name of affirming the full 
humanity of women and correcting androcentric distortions. 44
As with the related question of the body, feminist theologians are aware of the debates in 
feminist circles about what is meant by gender. Some theorists make relatively simple 
distinctions between gender as a social construction that is mapped on to the body whilst 
others see sex itself as a cultural phenomenon. These concerns point again to ongoing 
work in feminist theory that prompts and supports theological reflection in, for example, 
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the journal Theology and sexuality. For the purposes of this thesis, it is concluded that 
gender is a core idea in feminist theology.
6.4 Core ideas: the personal and the political
As we saw in the previous chapter, feminism is by definition political. This is true almost 
regardless of the particular school of feminism or its location on Evans' axis of equality / 
difference. Even the most liberal (equality) feminist engaged in a campaign for equal pay 
regardless of sex is committed to a political stance and, presumably, a corresponding 
activity. By the same token, a liberal feminist focusing on her personal relationships with 
men is taking a political stand and one whose effects are likely to be felt beyond the 
boundaries of her personal relationships. That feminism is intrinsically political is yet 
more evident in the case of, say, cultural feminists where some separation between 
women and men is likely.  The separation of women and men in, for example, political 
activity is itself political as well as being a defining feature of the personal lives of the 
women involved. In both instances the matter of the politics is personal in two senses.
First, feminist critics attribute importance to personal and social relationships as political 
fact and an arena of political commitment and activity that should not be split off into a 
private zone distinct from the external world. There is a perceptible holism in feminist 
writing which, with varying emphasis, challenges a once broadly accepted / imposed (and 
patriarchal) tenet to the effect that there are two spheres of life - the public and the 
private. Each sphere had its own priorities and each its own morality.
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Second, feminist critiques interrogate the agenda of patriarchal politics and propose 
different agenda. This is likely to be most evident where those critiques arise from 
socialist or cultural feminism or, indeed, from postmodernist feminism. From any of 
these viewpoints, it would be important to confront, for example, a politics that purports 
to be based upon the objective criteria of market forces and global economic factors. 
Such critics would challenge the reification and essentialism that place "forces" and 
"factors" above argument and would seek to identify the persons and groups behind the 
labels. In so doing, they should not be taken as denying the existence of market forces. 
They would vary as to what course of political action might be taken to deal with them, 
but would probably agree that it is important to lay them open to scrutiny and to 
democratic intervention.
6.5 Core ideas: confronting patriarchy
Feminists vary as to the attention they give to the concept - and experience - of 
patriarchy. The term refers to social constructions of some antiquity that are still 
pervasive in many areas of life. Liberal feminists are typically more concerned with 
dealing with the practical consequences of these structures (e .g. denial of access to 
hitherto male preserves in the field of employment) than they are with the philosophical 
and psychological existence of a system called patriarchy. More radical feminists are, 
however, concerned with confronting and, in their different ways, combating it. There are 
a number of areas where feminist theologians struggle against patriarchy.
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One important example of this struggle is their identification of male-as-norm thinking. 
As the references to King's work in chapter 5 showed, patriarchal forces have dictated 
both the content and the process of religious studies. One characteristic of patriarchal 
definition of a discourse is that it takes on a male-as-norm approach. In theology and in 
religious studies, male-as-norm thinking defines how people (male and female) are 
believed to have experienced God and are expected to continue to experience God. 
Judaeo-Christian history has also, in its male-as-norm approach, marginalised and 
occluded women and their ways of experiencing. In place of a balanced understanding of 
God and God's creation is a one-sided view in which maleness and a species of alienation 
are normative.
This alienation can be seen in a number of strands running through biblical stories and 
acting normatively in Christian culture. One such strand is evident in the Genesis stories 
of Adam and Eve. Adam blames Eve for his downfall in God's eyes, and the punishment 
for both Adam and Eve is a species of alienation. Both are dismissed from the garden. 
Adam is promised a life of hard toil in which he is alienated from a natural order that 
works against him, and Eve is punished with hard labour of a different kind, one that sets 
her body against herself. This is the starting point for the human race: at that start, man is 
already seeing himself as superior to woman and holding her responsible for his 
experience of alienation.
Some of the atonement theologising of the New Testament builds upon alienation as a 
given of the human condition. It is argued that, far from being a distortion due to 
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patriarchal forces, alienation is actually central to human experience. Against such a 
view, one can argue that Jesus' own spirituality, as demonstrated in the gospels, is the 
antithesis of alienation. The relationship of this man to Abba speaks of relatedness and of 
intimate connection, not alienation. Even in the desert temptations, Jesus is portrayed as 
having a sense of connection to Abba. Only in the desolation on the cross is there a sense 
of separation which could properly be called alienation. That one exception, potent and 
pivotal as it is, must, however, be seen in the context of a lifetime of intimate connection 
with Abba and with others. If, in some sense, Jesus took the weight of human sinfulness 
on his dying shoulders, then alienation would indeed be the proper name for his 
consequent experience. Christians who take such a view also tend to believe that it was 
that alienation which died on the cross and, as a consequence, relatedness, connection and 
integration came through death and destruction, offering those possibilities to believers 
now.
Accounts of substitutionary atonement and of "Christ dying for my sins" stand in contrast 
to a view of Christ as the expression of God's erotic power. Brock, like many feminist 
theologians, de-emphasises notions of a fallen human nature and corollary doctrines of 
atonement. She characterises God's activity in human lives as one of reducing alienation, 
including that of women, children and men45.
Another area in which patriarchal and feminist theological ideas differ widely is in 
reference to notions of God's justice. Both viewpoints see justice as something central to 
the nature of God and to God's concern for human relating. But the word "justice", its 
231
nature, how it is conceived and how it is expressed, clearly signifies quite different 
thinking and values. What is noticeably absent in the work of, for example, McFague46 is 
a notion of condemnation and resultant alienation as part of God's just judgement. It may 
be argued that this is unrealistic, and that any act of judgement must carry the threat of 
alienation, if only as a last resort. Even the wisest mother might end by saying to her 
child, "if you persist in this destructive activity, you will alienate yourself from me - or 
me from you". It may therefore be impractical and ultimately false to polarise these two 
views of justice. One is admittedly masculine and carries patriarchal notions of justice 
involving punishment and alienation. The other displays the more feminine and 
conciliatory attitudes of such writers as McFague and Sharon Welch47. Perhaps one of the 
outcomes of confronting patriarchal male-as-norm attitudes is to rescue and, in a new 
context, rehabilitate elements that are important and, actually, true to life. Alienation may 
be the end of the line, but in an imperfect world it may have to be the last resort of the 
processes of justice after attempts at mediation, reparation and reconciliation have failed.  
This may be the self-selected "hell" inherited by, for example, war criminals who refuse 
the claims of international justice. It would not be useful to shut one's eyes to such harsh 
realities and dismiss them as just another example of patriarchal evils, even if the war 
crimes were shown to be the extreme consequences of patriarchal attitudes and activities. 
A further example of feminist theology confronting patriarchy is seen in its approach to 
theology itself. It is common to find in feminist approaches a holistic vision in which 
spirituality, politics, daily life and the concerns of the academy are integrated in ways 
uncommon in the Christian West before the critiques of the liberation theologians and 
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feminists. Leech comments on this48 and examples abound, for example in Brock49 and, 
in the context of women's discipleship, in Byrne50.
However, caution should be observed here. This has been more of a problem in Western 
theology than in the theology of the Orthodox, although it might be hard to argue that 
orthodox theology is noticeably less patriarchal than that of the West. It is evident that the 
integration of daily concerns, of political and economic life, are the bread and butter of 
pastoral theology. Much as pastoral / practical theology has taken seriously feminist 
critiques, this has not always been the case, nor is it true that all pastoral theology is 
feminist theology.  What we are left with, therefore, is a recognition that the
confrontation of patriarchy is central to feminist theology and that this is one factor in a 
growing integration of aspects of theology which have been historically divorced in the 
West.
6.6 Core ideas: commitment to change
Commitment to change is the next core idea to be discussed. Again, caution must be 
exercised in examining this concept. Feminist theologians do not have a monopoly on 
change, since a call to change is a starting point for many people coming to Christianity 
for the first time and is evident in the gospels. Change in the way we view and treat other 
people is a major theme in Christian thinking. One has only to consider the example of 
the Clapham sect of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to see that radical 
change in political and economic activity is part of a lively Christian belief and not only a 
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feminist concern. Nevertheless, it must be allowed that a commitment to change is also 
built into feminist theology.
Feminist critiques start with dissatisfaction at the state of society and the world and they 
offer alternative visions. The degree to which individual feminists are committed to 
personal engagement must surely vary from person to person, and the kind of changes to 
which they are committed will vary in accordance with their political and social goals. 
The essence here is that few feminist critics are likely to be satisfied simply with making 
(i.e. writing) the point: they themselves or their supporters and followers would expect to 
enact their visions. It is this idea of practical difference which accounts for the frequent 
appearance in books of personal narrative (the author's or someone else's experience) of 
such novel features as exemplary liturgies (as means of expressing perceived spiritual 
realities), and of references to work with students or in women's groups.  Although by no 
means a universal feature of feminist theological writing, it has become so common that 
it is easy to forget that, twenty years ago, it would have seemed unusual. It is linked 
directly to the primacy of experience as epistemology, and it also represents the 
embodied expectation that doing theology is about making change.
Another example of change oriented theologising is found in a client-first or client-
centred pastoral practice51. It should not be assumed, however, that all feminists think in 
this way or that all who think like it are necessarily feminists. Nevertheless, part of the 
commitment to change in feminist theological thinking is seen in such an approach to 
pastoral practice.
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There are solid reasons why feminist theologians are likely to take such an attitude. First, 
it is evident from the development of counselling theory and of educational theory that 
people are able to become self-directed and increasingly autonomous when they learn in 
ways that respect their experience and personal authority. Second, people develop more 
strongly and surely when they are encouraged, provoked or otherwise facilitated to 
unlearn and learn for themselves new ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling and acting. 
These two related reasons were axiomatic for the liberation theologians working with 
oppressed people in Latin America and elsewhere. Many feminist theologians operate 
along the same lines for the same reasons. Writers who espouse and promote these 
principles are themselves engaged in learning. Those white feminist writers who came to 
see that their vision drew on too narrow a sample of the female population of the world, 
and that there are many constituencies of women with many oppressions illustrate clearly 
how teachers are also learners. Their commitment to change for white, middle class 
women became a wider commitment to change for all women, and especially for those 
who were most oppressed. Such commitment is, in the nature of things, without end: that 
is to say, its only end can be in the realised rule of God and not in any set of human 
achievements.
6.7 Core ideas: Jesus and the messianic community
Countryman and Brown both show how the early Christian communities were different 
from those around them. Brown in particular also shows how those early communities 
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were similar to the cultures in which they were set. In the tension between similarity and 
difference, we may find much that is central to early Christian identity. A close reading 
of Paul and the pseudo-Pauline writings gives insights into this tension. What might 
otherwise be characterised as Pauline self-contradiction and confusion can be understood 
as evolving thought over a quarter of a century, and as an attempt to live both in the 
world as we find it and as God's will might have it be.
Early Christians lived with neighbours and family they had grown up with, and also had 
to accept that "new birth" might lead to radically transformed social relationships. 
Examples of these tensions are seen in Pauline arguments over the place of "the flesh" in 
Christian life. New Testament scholars examine the two "flesh" adjectives Paul uses and 
suggest that one may be a negative reference to (sinful) flesh while the other may simply 
suggest "bodily" existence. However, the root problem never was a semantic one. There 
is a tension in living two lives. It was inevitable, given a philosophical background of 
neo-platonism and stoicism, that the early Christians struggled with their identity and 
their discipleship. The same tensions exist today for a number of Christians (and people 
of other faiths). The attempted resolutions must be thought through, although they are not 
purely intellectual. The apparent simplicity of a (possibly idealised) messianic 
community offers guidelines in this complex situation. For a number of feminist 
theologians, a community which apparently saw itself as a continuing expression of the 
life, values and will of Jesus after his death is an attractive source of norms and ideals. 
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The "early church" has traditionally enjoyed high status in Christian circles as a putative 
source of authenticity. Hampson, as we have seen earlier, regards this as part of the 
disqualification of the church to speak with authority to women. On the other side, 
Fiorenza (1983) represents a number of writers who seek to reconstruct the outlines of 
early communities and to recover their ideas and values. She sees the tension referred to 
above played out between the messianic community and the settled city / colony churches 
with their paterfamilias leader / presbyter.
Hampson sees the church as a lost cause for women (which makes it, logically speaking, 
a lost cause for men who are not satisfied with the hegemony of patriarchy). Fiorenza 
sees it as an institution containing within it an ongoing struggle between the forces of 
institutionalisation and those of the radical dynamics of the messianic community. 
Fiorenza, Ruether, and Heyward52 not only believe in the ideas and ideals they attribute 
to Jesus and the early Christian communities: they seek to enact those ideas, and to create 
alternatives to what they have inherited. However, their inspiration remains an 
abstraction - from the gospels, the prophetic writings, parts of the Pauline corpus and 
what can be deduced from contemporary literature.
This reservation about the messianic community and about what can be known about 
Jesus is, however, a reservation that must also be acknowledged in relation to pre-
feminist or non-feminist traditions. "Received" ideas about, for example, the church, its 
leadership and the place of women have no greater intrinsic authority than feminist ones. 
Their proponents may claim that their ideas are somehow more obvious, but this 
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argument is quickly countered by considering that what we have "received" is text and 
every text has its author and editors. Each author and editor has his (in this case, most 
usually and tellingly, "his") context and these contexts cannot be neutral. In the end, what 
matters most is not whether feminist critics are telling us exactly what Jesus and his early 
followers were like, but whether their intellectual and moral coherence is as great as, or 
greater than, that of their opponents as both parties wrestle with the traditions.
In this light we may understand Brock's feminist christology with its grounding in a 
distinctively feminist notion of eros (discussed in chapter 5). As we have seen, she is not 
unique in this: Heyward's work offers radical ideas for the transformation of pastoral 
practice, especially as she relates it to interpersonal relations in the context of therapy and 
healing53. Brock develops the feminine idea of playful eros in contradistinction to the 
more masculine idea of logos (word) with its overtones of reason and logic. Again, we 
see a theologian wrestling not with diametrically opposed or mutually exclusive entities. 
Her Christ is not one opposed to logos, but one who incorporates the warning of the poet 
Auden: "the Word was made flesh and we have made him Word again". This 
christological idea links clearly to that of embodiment discussed above.
It is also important to notice that messianic ideas in feminist theology are frequently 
corporate ones, i.e. they are founded in communities and groups. This is most obvious 
perhaps in the work of writers such as Hellwig (referred to in chapter 5) who offers the 
image of a Christa community. But it is also clear from the work of more mainstream 
feminist theologians such as Ruether that it is the community founded by or arising from 
238
the ministry of Jesus which offers models that are potent for Christians today.  These 
models are potent in two senses which reflect the content / methodology interconnection: 
what the community believes, lives and teaches is important for the disciple today; and 
the fact of these dynamics arising in and extending from a community suggests strongly 
that disciples today are / should be in communities. There is also a strong inference that 
what was transmitted by those early communities arose from their experience which has 
today a self-authenticating quality. Just as the communidades de baso (base communities) 
found the courage to speak the prophetic texts for themselves (in their Latin American 
context), so women in community may find a similar courage to regulate themselves by 
what they understand of the messianic community and to become themselves self-
authenticating.   
In summary, we may conclude that the person of Jesus remains problematic for some 
feminist theologians. The fact of his maleness constitutes a difficulty for some, while for 
others the difficulty lies in what Christians have done about or to his maleness. Whatever 
the difficulties, the messianic community as a sign of God's will and God's rule may be 
important, in part because it offers models for community now and in part because it 
opens up the messianic function from the individual to the group.
6.8 Core ideas: God/dess
As discussed in chapter 5, a few feminist theological critics have abandoned notions of 
God on the grounds that God-talk, like Jesus-talk, has been irretrievably compromised by 
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the forces of patriarchal hegemony and male oppression. Others, perhaps the majority of 
those who write theologically, have uncovered or recovered understandings of the divine 
characterised by the freshness that can accompany a religious revival. McFague, Hellwig 
Brock, Heyward, Jantzen, are among those who have engaged in re-imaging or re-
imagining what has been referred to as God.
These are images that arise out of both positive and negative feminist criticism. Positive 
criticism includes the identification, for example by Old and New Testament scholars, of 
aspects of the divine that offer to women and / or to all people a message of hope and 
affirmation. We have seen, for example in section 6.5, how the prophetic notion of justice 
is important for any community that has experienced expropriation and oppression. It is 
one that offers to people the dignity of humanity as made in the image of God. Negative 
criticism indicates the process whereby "traditional" imagery that is oppressive of women 
and other people is rejected. Fiorenza was candid in her view that whatever affronts 
human worth and dignity, no matter how revered it has been, should be discarded. 
Jantzen shows how many of the oppressive and dehumanising aspects of belief in the 
divine rest upon a fundamental philosophical basis54. Her views, though not necessarily 
shared in detail by all feminist theologians, represent a negative criticism of 
"mainstream" western philosophy of religion, and her positive construction of an 
alternative basis for such philosophy is representative of a radical feminist approach to 
the subject. In some ways her approach is similar to that of Mary Daly in the USA. The 
nub of her argument is that we have all inherited a philosophy based upon our mortality, 
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i.e. it is focused on the certainty that we shall all die. Whilst this assertion is obviously 
true, it has profound implications. Suppose, says Jantzen, our understanding of God arose 
from the equally obvious assertion that we are all born, what then? On this simple but 
profound premise, she constructs a life-affirming theology of relatedness. In this she 
parallels the work of Brock, Heyward, Hellwig and McFague. Moreover, not only in her 
title - Becoming divine - but also in the direction of her argument, she resonates with 
some aspects of (eastern) orthodox theology regarding the divinisation of our humanity in 
what the west refers to as the life of grace.
Overall, Jantzen's God is a God of life, love and relatedness. Gone are notions of fallen 
humanity (though necessary understandings of human sin and alienation remain). The 
price paid for the construction of such a theo-logy is that much theological work of 
previous centuries (including Augustinian and Thomist ideas thought by many to be 
essential to Christian theology) are sidelined or rejected. Hampson, in discussing the 
place of the Bible in Christian sensibility and praxis, noted how Christians so often refer 
to the Bible as though finding support for their life choices there would make it alright 
and not finding that support would seriously undermine one's position.
The same principle must be extended to some of the work of the Church Fathers and to 
later generations of theologians. There are choices to be made. If we stand by our trust in 
the God whom Jantzen indicates, then we cannot (and presumably would not wish to) 
have the God whom we inherited from the Church of, say, the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Nor should we imagine that such choices are new: the Reformation 
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process, whatever else it entailed, put people in similar positions of choice. It seems that 
what Jantzen confronts us with is one further example of a process, often 
unacknowledged, which has always been present, though not always so starkly put.
Another important feature of feminist theology includes a sense of God as one whose 
incarnate or immanent presence is such that this God may be described as "reflexive" - at 
least in relation to the cosmos and to people and other beings within that cosmos. What is 
referred to may not, by its very nature, be reduced to a list of categories or attributes. The 
term signifies something richly nuanced which includes dimensions of transcendence and 
of immanence, of spirit and embodiment, of justice and of mercy, of co-inherence and, in 
the strictest sense of the words, sympathy and empathy. The suffering of the cosmos is 
God's suffering and the evolution of the cosmos may also be the evolution of the divine55. 
The inclusiveness of divine reflexivity is the counterpart of a more analytic approach to 
theology that distinguishes, divides and classifies.
Important for the thesis, as one further feature of the divine in feminist theology, is the 
transcendence of gender categories. Most theologians of any description would probably 
agree that, in God, notions of male and female have very little meaning since they relate 
to plants and animals. They might further agree that masculine and feminine qualities 
may equally be attributed to God. However, it is evident that such agreements have not 
been such as to subvert historic patriarchal attitudes and policies. Saying that masculine 
and feminine are likewise subsumed into the divine has in reality meant that the 
masculine has subsumed and even suppressed the feminine. A number of feminist 
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theologians have worked at this aspect of re-imaging the divine, hence the reference in 
the title of this section to God/dess. These (in Christian circles) neologisms are part of an 
attempt to redress a balance brought about by a patriarchal hegemony. They arise out of a 
lived experience in which women have been unable to see themselves as made in the 
image of a God who is presented by the church and by its theologies as something 
ineffably male.
Feminist images are projected out of women's consciousness and self-consciousness. 
Attacks such as Oddie's56 on these images are not to be taken at face value. Oddie wishes 
to know what will become of God, by which he means the God about whom he has 
learned through theologies steeped in patriarchal assumptions. Where he has a stronger 
case is in his recognition that a God who has no connection with the male half of the 
human population of this planet is also not sufficiently rounded to meet (the needs of) 
God's people. This has, of course, been the experience of women for centuries. Oddie is 
also incorrect in his sense that this is a new development. The history of women in the 
church contains a number of examples of such re-imagining57, and he is mistaken if he 
believes that the "traditional" images arose by any other means, except that the image 
makers were men. 
One further point needs to be made with specific reference to God as imaged by feminist 
theologians, and it concerns Evans' axis of equality and difference. If God does in some 
sense transcend our humanity and the kinds of distinctions that are fundamentally 
important to us, then presumably God contains or subsumes both difference and equality. 
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One way of expressing this is to imagine that God is different to God, i.e. contains 
difference. Of course, one can only write this from a human perspective. But one can 
imagine that God "is" both father and mother. The word "is" is in inverted commas as a 
warning about reification into some essentialist view of the divine58. By the same token, 
one can imagine a God who subsumes equality into the divine in the sense that without 
the justice and right dealing entailed in notions of equality, there would not be God. 
This interest in what might be called the nature of God is not of universal concern among 
feminist theologians. It is naturally particularly important with philosophers of religion 
such as King, Daly and Jantzen. The ground of their work is in the relationship between 
what women and other people experience, need and hope for, as well as in what may or 
may not be revealed or otherwise presented in experience. The issue may therefore be 
seen as one of realism vs. non-realism, or of psychology and metaphysics. In what sense 
is the God in whom Oddie believes real? Is this the sense in which the God imagined by 
McFague is real? All theologians ultimately base their understanding of the divine on the 
resolution of the question about the nature of what we experience. It is noticeable that 
those theologians whose awareness is formed by postmodern perspectives (e.g. Cupitt59) 
or (post-)liberationist perspectives (e.g. Matthew Fox60) share much with more radical 
feminist writers, whereas those who wish to re-assert "traditional" metaphysical views 
(e.g. Millbank61) seem least sympathetic to feminist perspectives. 
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6.9 Conclusion
This chapter examines core ideas found in feminist theology. The purpose of this task is 
to provide an academic basis on which to establish the practical-values of feminist 
theology. The discussion centres around the place of experience; the body as a specific of 
feminist epistemology; the place of gender; the personal and the political; confronting 
patriarchy; commitment to change; Jesus and the messianic community; and God / dess. 
The sections analysing these ideas illustrate the diversity and conflict inherent both in 
feminist theories underlying the theology and also between feminist theologians. This 
diversity and conflict can be understood both in terms of the schools of feminism 
discussed in the preceding chapter and as theological conflicts.
In the following chapter, the practical-values of feminist theology and of gestalt are 
drawn out from these core ideas. This is done in such a way that the practical-values may 
be compared and their compatibility assessed.
                                                
1 Hampson (1990) p.170.
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COMPARING PRACTICAL-VALUES
7 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to establish that a particular school of psychotherapeutic psychology -
gestalt - is compatible with the theological discipline of feminist theology. It seeks to establish 
this compatibility on the basis of practical-values. Part One of the thesis concerns the theory and 
practice of gestalt therapy and the analysis of its core ideas. Part Two examines feminist 
Christian theology with a view to analysing its core ideas. In each case, the examination shows 
that neither gestalt nor feminist theology is a simple or single discipline with a single set of ideas. 
Each discipline has complex origins and each speaks with many voices. Yet in each case, it is 
possible to analyse core ideas that represent the range of theory and practice. These core ideas are 
more than mere ideas: the rhetorical mode of their proponents and a careful reading of their 
content suggest that they are value-laden ideas. Each discipline has practical-values, which is to 
say that these are the values that inform the ways in which people live and practise within those 
spheres. Practical-values are closely related to the core ideas that are analysed in chapters 4 and 6.
In the present chapter (the first half of Part Three), practical-values are deduced or drawn out 
from the core ideas so that they may be compared, and an assessment made of their compatibility. 
This leads on to a statement of the conclusions of the thesis in chapter 8. It is shown that, on the 
basis of their practical-values, gestalt and feminist theology are compatible disciplines and 
therefore appropriate partners in interdisciplinary work. 
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In order to pursue the question of compatibility it is necessary to ask whether or not comparing 
gestalt with theology is comparing like with like. To accomplish that, we have first to ask 
whether or not gestalt and theology are systems of the same order.  It is evident from earlier 
chapters regarding their philosophical backgrounds that each offers not just a world-view but a 
complex range of such views. These take in the minutiae of everyday life as well as the great 
questions about what it is to be human, to live in relationship and to be part of the cosmos. The 
point about the scope of disciplines involved in interdisciplinary work is a fundamental 
consideration. Had it been demonstrated, for example, that gestalt is simply a set of techniques 
useful in counselling practice, it would be of only limited use to enquire whether or not it is 
compatible with feminist theology. Such a question would, in those circumstances, be no more 
than a question of practical ethical standards. The comparison of gestalt and theology contained 
in this thesis is less straightforward, but much more promising in its outcomes.
With the assurance that these are two disciplines of a similar order or scope, the next question is 
to define an approach to the matter of their compatibility. This is done with Pattison's warning in 
mind regarding the selection of suitable partners for interdisciplinary work1. It might be possible 
to begin the task with, for example, some definitions, or with some indication of their histories. 
Whilst it becomes clear in this chapter that historical coincidence plays an important part in 
assessing compatibility, there are more obviously functional indicators for this project. In 
examining the core ideas analysed from the two disciplines, it is evident that each relies so much 
on, and refers so much to, human experience, that it is both more obvious and more useful to 
consider how each functions in the communities that most often use it. 
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We see in chapter 4 that, although there is no gestalt credo, there are core ideas that are central to 
gestalt. Each of those ideas contains within it, often implicitly, assumptions about values. These 
too are not spelled out in a credal statement. They are found in the theory and practice of gestalt. 
They can be deduced in practice, but are more than operant assumptions of simply technical 
interest. These values are not proclaimed in therapeutic, educational or managerial dialogue. 
They are usually implicit in any such dialogue. It is useful to think of them as values that are of 
practical significance - of significance in practice. They are therefore referred to as "practical-
values". It will be necessary to consider only those practical-values that are explicit, i.e. are 
readily supported both in practice and text2. 
In the following sections of this chapter the question of compatibility is explored by deducing or 
drawing out, comparing and discussing the practical-values entailed in each discipline. In section 
7.1, the practical-values derived from the place of experience in both disciplines are identified 
and compared. Here it is possible to see a direct correspondence between core idea and practical-
value, a one on one correlation. In some of the practical-values that follow, the correlation 
becomes more complex as practical-values are deduced from a number of core ideas. In the 
following section (7.2), there is a discussion of the practical-values associated with body / mind / 
spirit holism and with feminist understandings of embodiment. Section 7.3 examines the value 
aspects of feminist understandings about gender and seek correspondence and support in gestalt 
theory and practice. Links between the personal and the political form the focus of section 7.4 
where practical-values are derived from both disciplines as they relate to these issues. Practical-
values are defined that relate to the personal / political / theological on the one hand and personal 
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/ interpersonal / political on the other hand. The practical-values associated with a commitment to 
change are compared in the next section (section 7.5). These differ as between gestalt and 
feminist theology, but it is evident that the different perspectives do not undermine their intrinsic 
compatibility. Section 7.6 opens with the juxtaposition of feminist theologians' interest in the 
messianic community and the gestalt commitment to here and now. There is no suggestion that 
these core ideas are one and the same, but the practical-values derived from these disparate 
sources are compared and shown to be compatible. In section 7.7, the place of God/ess and the 
gestalt understanding of response-ability are taken as starting points. The associated practical-
values are drawn out and compared: from this comparison emerges their compatibility.
In the conclusion to this chapter (section 7.8) there is a summary indicating both the coincidences 
of practical-values between the two disciplines and also some of the divergences between them.
This summary leads into the final chapter of the thesis with its review of the thesis, statement of 
conclusions, and indications of areas for further research.
7.1 Practical values: the place of experience
Chapters 4 and 6 respectively show that each of the two disciplines takes the notion of human 
experience as a foundation for its epistemology. Although it must be acknowledged that such 
reliance is to a degree problematic, it remains the case that the truth claims of gestalt and of 
feminist theology rest upon human experience. In both cases, that may include experience of 
whatever transcends our humanity, and that too may be problematic. In this section, the focus 
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shifts away from experience itself and turns to the values that arise from or are contained in such 
a core idea. The emphasis here and in subsequent sections is on the importance of such values for 
the people who live them in practice. It is this practical rather than purely theoretical approach 
which gives rise to the term practical-value. The term also echoes the frequent use by a number 
of feminist writers of the words practice and praxis - again with a focus on lived ideas (conscious 
or otherwise) rather than purely intellectual constructs of belief and value. For Graham, "practice"
refers to what we do and what we experience whether as participants in human cultures generally 
or in Christian circles in particular. In paying attention to practice we may discover that 
"symbolic and material reality is both mediated and reconstituted"3. Experience, from this 
perspective, is active as well as passive and is reflexive. In developing a theology of practice, 
Graham focuses on human experience in order to identify both "sources" ("various authoritative 
and definitive resources which inform theological discourse and practice") and "norms" ("...the 
principles upon which sources are designated authoritative and binding")4. Her sources and 
norms are derived from a number of liberation, feminist and narrative theologies: what is 
significant for the present argument is that all of these arise directly from human experience. 
The prime importance of experience as the basis of knowledge in gestalt, i.e. as having 
epistemological status, is evidenced in frequent statements concerning its phenomenological 
nature5, and in the original practice (practical) demonstrations of gestalt therapy by Perls6.
The German philosophers who began the earliest discussions about gestalt (and who are 
discussed in Part One of the thesis) were familiar with Schleiermacher's emphasis upon the 
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experiencing subject in the face of the experienced object. Schleiermacher's interest arose from 
his concern with how Christian people could connect directly with what was in the biblical texts. 
For him, the business of understanding the bible became a matter of interpreting and 
appropriating scripture. He moved the burden of the text from words and ideas "out there" to a 
concern for how a Christian lives her life in practice. This combination of simultaneous 
modification of the subject / object relationship and practical appropriation informed gestalt 
philosophy and was ultimately appropriated by the founders of gestalt therapy. 
Although one could say that most therapists - not just gestaltists - are dealing with little except 
human experience, gestalt has a particular history in the way it has placed the subject at the centre 
of her experiential universe. In the films of early gestalt workshops and in the literature from 
Perls (1976) onwards, the patient is asked time and again, "What do you feel / see / hear / 
imagine?" Each person is discouraged from interpreting these experiences. They are encouraged 
to let them be what they are - statements announcing raw experience. They may then, perhaps, 
want to respond to them or to express some emotion connected with them. Each person is also 
encouraged to trust that experience. Therein lies one of the problems about experience as 
epistemology that is common both to gestalt and to feminist theology. 
Because of the fundamental importance of the practical-value concerning experience as 
epistemology, the problem is discussed here in some detail. It is epitomised by the crisis that 
occurred in psychotherapeutic and counselling circles in the 1990s when a growing number of 
allegations were made by people who claimed to have "recovered memories" of childhood sexual 
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abuse. There were critics who insisted that these allegations were, in some instances, not based 
on memories. Such critics maintained that some (perhaps most) of the allegations were the 
fantasies of neurotic people, or were the products of therapeutic conversations in which ideas 
about abuse were either implanted or confirmed by therapists. However, much public sympathy, 
as well as professional opinion, tended to favour the account of the person with the memories. 
The issue was plainly a sensitive and painful matter for many people. Underlying it were two 
non-therapeutic issues that were frequently confused in the minds of commentators and in the 
public media. These were the status of memory as a part of human experience, and, in 
consequence, the veridical status of memory generally. 
The status of memory is the more readily resolved issue. Memory, in the usage of clinical 
psychology, is shorthand for a series of neurological systems (usually thought to number four) 
that performs a complex range of functions. One aspect (or, perhaps, construction) of this 
complex function is a sense of personal history, i.e. of being a person who has a history. That 
leads on to the second, and more controversial, issue. The psychological disciplines had barely 
recovered in the 1990s from the arguments over Freud's treatment of reports of childhood sexual 
abuse, when the arguments raged again. At the heart of them was the concern, referred to above, 
not to ignore memories of great suffering (hitherto suppressed), whilst also exercising caution in 
ascribing evidential weight to what might be imaginative retrospective creations based upon a 
sense that all was not well. The balance of psychological opinion on the issue (rather than on 
specific cases) was that people can and do create memories that are important to them - but which 
are factually inaccurate. The extent of such inaccuracy is usually minor and commonplace. Most 
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people have had the experience of recounting clear memories of childhood only to have them 
either radically modified or even flatly contradicted by others who were involved and who have 
no interest in the accuracy or otherwise of the memory. For example, "No, it was Auntie Ellen 
who gave you the teddy, not your Aunt Kathy".  It is reasonable to suppose that similar mistakes 
of identity can occur where the psychological investment is greater: and it is also reasonable to 
suppose that the event itself can be mistaken. For example, "No, it wasn't a teddy, it was a 
monkey", or even "No, your aunts never gave you any presents". By extension, objects and events 
of greater import can be confused in memory.
Some of these problems about memory have significant judicial implications, for example 
regarding the appearance and thus the identity of offenders. We can believe sincerely that we 
remember the face and demeanour of a person even if it is later proven that we are mistaken. 
Some of the most poignant examples of this debate were in trials of alleged World War Two war 
criminals in the late twentieth century: a few trials resulted in great hurt from stirred up memories 
which the courts decided were either unreliable or simply inaccurate. What is at stake in such 
trials, beside the guilt or otherwise of the accused, is the status of the "experience" of people who 
suffered terribly and, with it, their self-image as persons whose sense of being persons is tied to 
their belief in their memories.
Although memory is only one aspect of experience, i.e. it relates to experience in the recent or 
distant past, it is crucial to our understanding of the status of experience generally. Some people 
are able to live comfortably with the belief that their memories have some basis in fact ("shared 
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reality", might be a more useful concept) but with the understanding that those memories may 
differ from the memories of others who claim to have lived through the same experiences. Such 
people are unlikely to become emphatic in their claims to factuality or objectivity. For most, our 
memories - except when they feel hazy - feel like an accurate and reliable source of data about 
the real world. They are the basis upon which we operate. And yet our memories are, in large 
part, stories we have told ourselves, and, moreover, which we re-write with surprising frequency 
and with large revisions.
So far as feminist theology is concerned, these considerations bear directly upon the status 
accorded to the experience of women in or at the hands of the church. The literature on this 
subject includes critical views of the ways in which the church has dealt with women throughout 
its history and continues in some measure to behave today, e.g. the Church of England's reception 
and treatment of its women priests. Feminist theology has played its part in modifying belief and 
practice in the church. However, because of the oppressive nature of their experience, many 
women have no interest in a theological viewpoint: it is at best an irrelevance and even an 
offence7. However, Hampson's challenge about what or whose experience forms the basis of 
feminist theology, reminds us that it is insufficient to speak in an unqualified way about 
experience.
Some feminists have used their (and other women's) experience of the church and of theology to 
construct feminist theologies. They come at this project from one of two directions. These can be 
seen as positive and negative in their method. The first takes the form of pooling and then 
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extending ideas that crystallise out of narrative, especially out of stories about the lives of women 
and their reflections on their lives. Loades (1990) give a number of such accounts. Ruth Page's 
account of Elizabeth Cady Stanton8 epitomises this approach, and there are other examples by 
Phyllis Trible9, Toni Craven10 and Nicola Slee11.
The negative approach involves deconstructing the dominant traditions. From these ruins arise 
other versions of events and ideas, frequently attenuated, and often the subject of imaginative 
reconstruction in the face of earlier attempts to suppress a tradition. This process of recreating an 
occluded tradition is seen in feminist approaches to biblical hermeneutics, and it allows women's 
experience once more to be read in the pages of the Bible. Fiorenza's (1983) book is an extended 
example of this recreation, and the work continues in Fiorenza's (1994) work of biblical 
hermeneutics12. Other examples include Ruether (1983)13, Karen Armstrong14, Sallie McFague15
and Beverly Wildung Harrison16.  It should be noted that some of these writers adopt both 
positive and negative approaches at different times.
It is evident from these references that feminist theology, like gestalt, rests upon philosophical 
presuppositions or axioms about the primacy of experience. However, this reliance requires some 
qualification. Each discipline is open to the charge that what is held is (merely) the subjective 
experience of a group of people. Such criticisms, exemplified by Oddie (1984), are founded on 
the notion that the experience of a group of people is to be contrasted (unfavourably and 
unreliably) with "truth" or even "revealed truth", i.e. truth owing its origin in some direct way to 
God.  However, from the perspective of many feminist theologians and from that of gestaltists 
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(and others in scientific disciplines), truths can never be more than provisional17. All that is 
required for a re-think is the assertion by another community or group that they have a different 
experience and understanding. For the gestaltist, this process of bringing together conflicting 
experiences and integrating them into a new synthesis is simply a continuation of the process 
whereby a Gestalt undergoes deconstruction and dissolves into the field, out of which new 
Gestalten will eventually emerge taking new data into account. This has been demonstrated in the 
feminist field also. For example, the womanist18 critique showed that received feminist ideas had 
been limited by the experiences of too narrow a community. The old, however temporary, 
certainties collapsed and the view taken subsequently (the new Gestalt) has begun to take its 
place. The reliance on human experience as basis for our epistemology favours or even requires, 
a dialectical and provisional stance regarding truth and certainty, whether in the field of gestalt or 
of feminist theology.
This practical-value may be summarised by reference to how people (from whatever discipline) 
live. It is in our daily lives that we have to base our epistemology upon experience. Living on this 
basis means that we live with a recognition that our "truths" are of necessity conditional or 
provisional. They are, however, the most reliable basis we can establish.
7.2 Practical values: holism and embodiment
This second practical-value concerns the integrity of human nature and our embodiment. As we 
saw in sections 3.3 and 4.4, Perls was influenced by the notion of holism expounded by Smuts 
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and also by the teaching of Reich (section 3.4). From a gestalt perspective, it is axiomatic that we 
are embodied.
Health is an appropriate balance of the coordination of all of what we are. You notice that 
I emphasized a few times the word are, because the very moment we say we have an 
organism or we have the body, we introduce a split - as if there's an I that is in possession 
of the body or the organism. We are a body, we are somebody...19
Yontef's articulations of gestalt therapy are more developed and extend Perls' view of human 
embodiment. He states at one point that "In Gestalt therapy, metabolism is used as a metaphor for 
psychological functioning"20. In practice, this is more than metaphor. The distinction between 
signifier and signified diminishes because the psychological processes which Yontef describes 
are also physical ones, integrated in the body. Yontef shares Perls' sense of our embodied 
humanity, and that sense is encompassed in the gestalt notion of holism21.
By holism ... Perls referred to the whole being greater than a sum of the parts, to the unity 
of the human organism, and to the unity of the entire organism / environment field. He 
regarded Gestalt therapy as correcting psychoanalysis' error in treating psychological 
events as isolated facts apart from the organism.... 22
Section 4.4 demonstrates that the "spirit" element of the mind / body / spirit unity is a feature that 
later gestaltists recognise. That recognition has its problems, notably those of reification and the 
risk of alienation from the process orientation that Perls propounded. What is important at this 
point in the argument is to note that the assumption of holism in human nature is as much a value 
statement as an ontological one. The alienation of one of these "elements" of our nature 
constitutes ill-health for the individual and thus for her community. There are undoubtedly 
situations where an ability to split off our emotions from our thinking (e.g. when a doctor is 
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engaged in surgery) is useful, but this is an example of a functional "detachment" rather than a 
neurotic one.
Similar concerns for an integration of thinking and feeling are linked to the importance of 
embodiment in feminist theology. Theology too has traditionally been comfortable with body 
imagery. The image of Body is a major strand in Paul's understanding of the Church. At the same 
time the framework of body theology has been androcentric. Much pastoral teaching and practice 
has been about controlling the body / our bodies. Even the governance of the church has, in 
practice, been about the control of the body by its head(s)23. An alternative and arguably less 
androcentric approach might have been to trust the body to be a self-regulating organism 
operating in an environment in a homeostatic fashion. Yet neither in church governance nor in 
pastoral practice have such views figured large. Graham notes how social theorists increasingly 
refer to the human body but nevertheless fall into the trap of abstraction to the point where the 
body itself becomes another abstraction. Section 6.2 illustrates how feminist theorists have 
adopted a range of positions regarding the body: it is evident that they raise important issues for 
our culture and for our politics. In the context of pastoral theology, Graham urges that we 
"remain concrete" regarding not "the" body but "my / our bodies". These "crucial actors" 
influence profoundly our activities and relationships, and this holds true for all our historical and 
cultural contexts including religion and theology24.
Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel articulates a specific theology of embodiment and offers this 
definition of her subject:
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A theology of embodiment does not seek to outline a new theology, but it does seek to 
open up a forgotten place which is important today, from which there can be theological 
thought and action: the human body. It seeks to draw attention to our origin, to the fact 
that we are born from mothers, a fact which is constantly forgotten in a culture of fathers 
but which shapes us all our lives, whether we are women or men.25
She asserts that "the human body is repressed and misused in the Western Christian tradition". 
This misuse is not uniform as between the sexes, since "woman's full personhood has been 
denied her on the basis of her body" whereas "man's body has been glorified, made a norm, 
instrumentalized and also misused". She links the ways in which bodies are represented in our 
culture to body ideals and to our understanding of achievement. She sees a contradiction between 
these observable experiences and the Christian conviction that, no matter how absurd or 
scandalous it may seem, God became incarnate. This leads her to offer a negative criticism of 
much that is basic to earlier theology26. 
Brock and Heyward also focus on the experience of embodiment. Brock is not using the terms 
"heart" and "erotic power" simply as analogies. Her understanding of these terms is that they refer 
as much to the activity and experience of the body as they do to the emotions or the mind, and 
that, in any case, these are intimately linked. Heyward's language is also the language of the 
body27. The references to heart and to eros and the grounding in bodily experience suggest that 
human experience - unless irreparably distorted by the splitting effects of patriarchy - cannot be 
other than bodily experience28.
From this examination of the practical-values of feminist theology with regard to holism and 
embodiment, there are five points that emerge for comparison with the practical-values of gestalt. 
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First is a conviction that, for good and ill, the body is the locus of human experience. Second, it is 
unrealistic to attempt to split body, mind and spirit. Third, it is evident that, when a culture 
becomes disembodied or alienated from the physical, bad consequences ensue. Fourth, women 
and men often have different awareness in these matters. Fifth, most societies have traditionally 
devalued women's bodies, even when they purport to honour them, and have overvalued men's 
bodily attributes.
For gestalt practitioners and others versed in Perls' writings, there can be no doubt that, in theory 
and practice, the body is indeed the locus of human experience. The analogies, the therapeutic 
observations and practices are focused in and on the body. As was seen in earlier chapters, 
gestaltists do not think of us as having bodies. We are bodies - and more. Attempts to split the 
person in two or three parts are seen as neurotic disturbances and as recipes for ill-health. On 
these points, gestalt is in accord with feminist theology. However, it has little to say on the fourth 
and fifth points above, namely the differences between women and men regarding bodies, and the 
ways in which patriarchal cultures have devalued women's bodies and overvalued men's bodily 
attributes. These points are not well illustrated in gestalt literature, for reasons discussed earlier in 
this thesis, namely that, for cultural and historical reasons, they were not issues at the top of the 
gestalt agenda. They doubtless were and are for individuals and groups of practitioners in their 
training and work, as well as in their professional practice.
It would be unrealistic to pretend that gestaltists are more at ease with human embodiment than 
are feminist theologians, even though, at the level of theory, both disciplines have similar or 
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compatible positive views. In practice, there are theologically educated Christians and gestaltists 
(including Christian gestaltists) who live out a mixture of ease and suspicion with regard to their 
bodies and those of other people. Such people demonstrate both the positive practical-values 
affirming human holism and embodiment and the difficulties and negative valorisations of our 
embodiment.
Despite the fact that one cannot match the practical-values of feminist theology point for point 
with those derived from gestalt, it is evident that, on the main points, they are entirely compatible 
and that, in other areas, there is no conflict. In both disciplines, the body is the focus of important 
practical-values.
7.3 Practical values: gender
The third practical-value follows from some of the difficulties about embodiment, namely the 
assumption that all human experience is gendered. This is a fundamental tenet for feminist 
writers, and a view shared by most feminist theologians. Thus King, focusing on the study of 
religion (rather than Christian theology alone), writes:
Progress in the study of religion is slow, but there is no doubt that the perspective of 
gender is of increasing importance in theoretical and empirical studies, not only for the 
growing number of women scholars, but also for many men.......Until very recently the 
study of religion has been undertaken in general terms, without specific attention to 
gender. Now many new questions arise, and new knowledge is discovered in relation to 
the gendered dimension of religious phenomena.29
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Later she turns to the methodologies of studies of religion and religious experience and finds that 
these too are gendered. These present two challenges. One is that the subject matter of research is 
set in an androcentric framework, shaping the task as the researcher attempts to deconstruct and 
reconstruct the material. The second challenge is contained within the attitude of the researcher. 
Scholars, who have been mainly men with androcentric views, have developed methods of study 
which focus quasi-objectively on texts or the phenomena of experience. Approaches adopted or 
pioneered by feminist scholars begin with the subjectivity and reflexivity of the scholar herself30.
Feminist understandings vary as to how gender relates to sex and to the body. As we have seen in 
earlier sections, there is a range of theoretical positions in this matter. Some writers see 
difficulties in biological assumptions about male and female sex. They point out that biology 
itself is not a neutral discipline, free of values. Indeed, the very language of biology (like that of 
the study of religious experience cited above) has been criticised because of the patriarchal 
assumptions that have shaped its expression31. However, for many feminist writers, the existence 
of male and female persons with gonads appropriate to their sex provides a baseline for the 
discussion of gender32.
That baseline has, however, been used for centuries to support what can now be seen to be 
spurious notions of gender. The stereotypes of patriarchal culture are linked to sex as though sex 
of itself gives rise to gender attributes. Notions of the stronger and the weaker sex, the cultivation 
of stoical (male) rather than emotional (female) personalities, inequitable property laws and legal 
rights are just three examples of arrangements arising from the values of patriarchal religion and 
265
patriarchal science. It is conceivable that these values once derived from a (now irretrievable) 
part of our animal inheritance that had survival value for our species, but, for the time being, this 
is speculative and its discussion inconclusive33.
Whatever their origins, these old cultural values have been subject to rigorous criticism for 
several decades. That criticism demonstrates that these values are not God-given nor are they 
scientifically or rationally derived. They arose historically and in the demonstrable interests of a 
dominant social group, i.e. men, and must be regarded as discredited social constructions.
Despite this long period of criticism, it is evident that gender does not figure greatly in gestalt 
discourse. The reasons for this are largely historical. As was stated earlier, the Perls developed 
their work during the 1940s and 1950s, but it was in the 1960s that it came to public prominence. 
This was the period when, in the United States in particular, second wave feminism also came to 
public attention. In other words, the development of second-wave feminism and gestalt overlap 
geographically and chronologically. The question which must be answered is, do they overlap in 
their understandings and solidarity regarding gender issues?
Accounts of the behaviour of gestalt practitioners in the 1960s suggest that, for the most part, 
they were unaware of gender issues. Tapes, films and written records of gestalt demonstrations 
suggests that those early practitioners were able people and even dazzling models of 
perceptiveness and skill, but they also demonstrate masculine characteristics of dominance and 
control that jar with present-day sensibilities. Such behaviour undoubtedly contributed to the 
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occlusion of women's skills and potential and to the suppression of femininity. Unsurprisingly, 
there is little in gestalt literature that refers to these matters34.
However, this does not mean that gestalt practice continues untouched by current gender 
awareness. The historical overlap of gestalt and second-wave feminism, referred to above, means 
that gestalt was influenced from the outset by feminist critiques. The impact of feminism in 
gestalt training and practice has brought about many changes, as has, for example, an increasing 
awareness of post-colonialism and multi-ethnicity. Gestalt theory is not about gender - or 
ethnicity. It is simply applied to these issues as constituents of the landscape in which people live.
Awareness of second wave feminism has grown and its claims for justice and new awareness 
have been heard. Gestalt practice, like other professional practices, has embraced and integrated 
its thinking and practice. It is unthinkable that a gestalt therapist in the twenty-first century fails 
to integrate feminist critiques into her / his thinking and practice35.
The present situation is illustrated in Yontef's approach. Writing in the 1990s, he looks back at 
the "turn-on" culture of the 1960s and is critical of those unaware biases. He posits a model of 
practice that is egalitarian and dialectical. It is one in which power gradients between therapists 
and patients and between women and men are open for inspection, and in which gender issues 
form part of the therapeutic agenda. This change has come about as part of the evolution of a 
community rather than as the end product of scholarship: intellectual support has come from 
feminist writing generally rather than from some specifically gestalt feminism.
267
The gestalt approach to gender can be summarised by saying that gender is a Gestalt. Chapter 3 
demonstrates how, from a gestalt perspective, human perception is not a simple matter of images 
falling on the constant surface of a camera obscura. It is instead a complex process whereby 
physical interactions with the environment at the sensory surfaces (contact boundary) of the 
perceiver are linked with psychological processes. The net result of these interactions, themselves 
influenced by other contemporary and past interactions, is a perception which is often 
communicable in some form to other perceivers. Physical examples of this process, though 
complex enough, are relatively easy to describe. Far more difficult are the more complex 
perceptions of, for example, the qualities of humans relating to each other.
It is in this realm that the perception of gender lies. From a gestalt perspective, the perception of 
gender is the outcome of a process of construction36. This does not mean that the constructive 
activity is conscious: more often than not it is automated and the perceiver or constructor is not 
conscious of doing anything. For many people, it may seem that what is masculine and what is 
feminine is obvious and requires no explanation. In the language of gestalt therapy, these 
“obvious” recognitions requiring no explanation are termed “confluences”: they are part of what 
defines a culture, a generation or a sub-group. We recognise that we are such-and-such a group 
because we have the same beliefs and ideas, including assumptions about what constitutes 
masculinity and femininity. We are unlikely to be aware that we hold such norms unless
something occurs to disturb our confluence37. Only then does that norm become figure in the 
ground of our community. At such a point, it can be seen that gender is a Gestalt which we made, 
one figure created in the ground of potentially infinite possibility.
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It is when differences in perception occur that people are most likely to notice how different 
individuals make Gestalten sometimes more, sometimes less similar to those of their neighbours. 
Gestalt theory is well placed to tolerate and anticipate variety and difference. Whilst the created 
Gestalten "masculine" and "feminine" differ from one person or group to another and can even be 
contradictory, the categories “masculine” and “feminine” are not arbitrary. These exist because 
there are enough consistencies in the patterns to give a sense of convergence, at least within a 
given group or culture, so that one can assert that gender is socially constructed and, from a 
gestalt perspective, could be nothing else.
In the matter of the gendered nature of human experience, there is compatibility between gestalt 
and feminist theology. The historical engagement of each in this matter differs considerably, 
although concerns about gender issues, their centrality in western cultures and their effects of 
people's lives, concern people in both disciplines. Their compatibility is evident - despite the 
paucity of writing on the subject from the gestalt side.
7.4 Practical-values: personal, interpersonal, political and theological
This practical-value concerns the interconnectedness of people. Perls, his colleagues and 
successors were working in an environment dominated by a highly individualistic view of 
persons. This view was associated with psychoanalysis (although it would be inaccurate to 
portray to-day's psychoanalytic writers as holding such a view). Gestalt's particular contribution 
was to emphasise the dialogical nature of persons, i.e. that we are who we are, not just as the 
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product of a series of interpersonal encounters (at heart an essentialist view), but that we are (in) 
a continuous process of interaction with others. That process is who we are and who others are 
also38.
From the outset, the early practitioners of gestalt were interested in a praxis that both maximises 
personal autonomy and also extends the possibilities of democracy. Fritz Perls' experience of a 
repressive childhood and his experience as a Jewish citizen of Germany undoubtedly contributed 
profoundly to these concerns. As was discussed earlier in the thesis, the first flowering of gestalt 
took place in New York City and in the state of California (as well as other American and 
Canadian centres) during the 1960s and early 1970s where, from a different perspective, there 
were concerns about autonomy and democracy.
Perls was consistent throughout his career in asserting that, fundamental to the business of 
therapy, is the movement from inappropriate dependence towards self-support. Inevitably, there 
were distortions of his theme, some of them unjustifiably visited upon him. However, he did 
open himself to criticisms of individualism and of supporting narcissistic self-concern, for 
example with his so-called Gestalt Prayer39. Such criticisms should nonetheless be placed in 
context and with some allowance for the culture of the time as well as Perls’ promotional 
intentions. The movement to autonomy has little to do with pathological individualism: instead, it 
confronts the basis of neurosis, i.e. the difficulty we experience at times in dealing head on with 
the real issues at hand. In those circumstances, we learn to manipulate, avoid, pass the buck or 
play stupid. At the time of their invention, these devices are triumphs of creativity: only later can 
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others see that we are not in all respects self-supporting, responsible and autonomous beings. The 
gestalt approach assumes that most people have their neurotic areas in which they play such 
games40.
There is an intrinsic link between this gestalt understanding of autonomy on the one hand and a 
commitment to democracy on the other. The link is found in the model of a mature 
interdependence in which we relate directly to others, with maximal awareness and minimal 
neurotic manipulation. The focus on the realisation of a personal autonomy that is not narcissistic 
selfishness makes precisely for democratic responsibility and ultimately a world-view based on 
contact and dialogue. Democratic politics is not merely the macro analogue of such an 
understanding: it is hard to imagine a well constructed democracy unless it is built on such a 
foundation. 
The belief that the personal is political - and the values that statement implies - form, as chapter 6 
discusses, an important plank of any feminist platform. It is therefore a short step for Christian 
feminists to assert that the personal is also theological. Such a form of words may be accepted 
widely in the sense that all theology can be said to be - in some sense – personal, i.e. about the 
person or personae of the Triune God, and about the person of Jesus, and about us as persons. On 
the face of it, this may seem to offer a point of unanimity for feminist and non-feminist 
theologians, until, that is, one bears in mind King's two problems referred to above. The 
meanings attributed by the term "personal" point to both content and methodology and they point 
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also to what King called "one's own subjectivity and reflexivity"41.  We shall consider these 
points in two examples of this practical-value. 
The personal and the political are linked in feminist theological discourse at the level of content. 
Some examples illustrate the range of these links and point to the values they uphold and 
promote in practice. First, there are a number of formal and informal liturgies designed to 
celebrate events that are distinctly personal. One such is the coming to puberty of girls published 
by the St Hilda Community42: such a liturgy is arguably of great importance to the girls in 
question and to their friends and families. The publication of such a liturgy brings into a public 
arena something that has, in our culture, been confined to private obscurity and even abjection43. 
This is a political act that challenges profound and often unconscious prejudices in the minds of 
men and women about women's sexuality, fertility and place in society. That such liturgies are 
infrequently held suggests either - or both - that women and girls are reluctant to celebrate such a 
rite of passage because they believe these things are private and not to be shared publicly, or that 
men (and women) are keen to continue a species of abjection of women. The fact that there have 
been some such celebrations demonstrates that linking the personal and the political can be a 
powerful intervention in the public arena.
A less contentious and personally exposing link between the personal and the political is 
evidenced in the debates surrounding women's ordination of women. Theological emphasis 
varies as to whether it is the individual who is called to ordination or whether the individual 
responds to a need within the church for people to be ordained - a call from God perhaps, but one 
mediated through the church and with a corporate feeling about it. When women began to say 
272
that they felt called to seek ordination to priesthood in the Church of England, they were 
sometimes told that they must be mistaken since this was not the historic practice of that church. 
It was stressed that they were individuals and had an individual sense of vocation for which they 
must find other outlets. A number of such women, and some sympathetic men, realised that this 
individuation was a political tactic to keep women out of the priesthood.
The sense of vocation was indeed personal, but it was more than that, and it was the political 
dimension of these personal stories that prompted the founding of the Movement for the 
Ordination of Women in the late 1970s. It was clear at the foundation of MOW that the 
movement was of enormous political import for the Church of England. When the movement's 
aims were largely met in 1992, the BBC clearly felt that this personal issue was one of political 
significance, and gave the Synod debate live coverage on Radio 4 throughout that November 
afternoon as well as extensive news coverage before and after the debate and the vote. There was 
a sense in which the Church of England was either acting on behalf of English society, or else 
was marking a transition already underway in that society and which continues still. The process 
in question is about the place of women in society, about women's leadership and about women 
taking power. These personal issues are clearly political.
Gestalt and feminist theology are clearly compatible and convergent on links between the 
personal, the interpersonal and the political. However, gestalt cannot follow feminist theology in 
assertions about the personal and political being also theological. On this third point, an 
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appropriate gestalt response to theological dimensions is that of open-minded dialogue and a 
willingness to listen.
7.5 Practical values: commitment to change
The discourse of gestalt is paradoxical about change (section 4.6). Gestalt therapists are often 
asked by patients how they may change. A typically gestalt response is to urge that patient to stay 
the same and avoid change as much as possible. This is a deliberately paradoxical injunction that 
may lead to the patient's enhanced awareness not only of how they are (in ways they do not like) 
but also how they maintain those positions. Despite the paradox, gestalt is founded on a belief 
that change is the norm of the human condition. That is what lies behind notions of homeostatic 
self-regulation and Prägnanz.
Perls' view of the human condition is a growth model, not in itself uncommon in his day44. An 
unusual feature was Perls’ insistence that growth is a normal and commonplace function, the 
means by which each person evolves from moment to moment and throughout a lifetime. The 
means of growth he describes as contact which, as we see in section 4.2, is central to gestalt 
theory45. Perls found support for his ideas in his work at the Esalen Institute with colleagues in 
what was called the Human Potential movement46. He found links with, for example, Maslow's 
notion of "peak experience" which he likened to "aha moments" or "satori"47. He accepted that 
human beings have extraordinary experiences as well as ordinary ones that contribute to or mark 
the passage of their development as persons. His particular contribution lay in stressing the 
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ordinary, incremental processes of individual evolution. Change is the given of our lives but, he 
insisted, "…we cannot deliberately bring about changes in ourselves or in others"48.
Feminist theology is also committed to change  (section 6.5). This commitment is evidenced in 
deconstructive and constructive modes. The deconstructive is epitomised in the broad feminist 
analysis of history and tradition that identifies the formative influence of patriarchy49. Even 
though feminist theologians differ as to their hopes or means in this connection, they share a 
commitment to redeeming human communities from such distortions50. An example of the 
constructive mode is the creation of a theological space in which new models of humanity and 
divinity are made available to women and men. Both modes are addressed by Graham's "feminist 
pastoral practice", a notion that encapsulates much of what is meant by practical-value. "All 
forms of praxis..... seek in various ways to reappropriate and recast traditional forms of Christian 
pastoral activity in the name of affirming the full humanity of women and correcting androcentric 
distortions" 51. 
The core ideas of feminist theology and gestalt differ - though without contradicting - regarding 
change, but it is clear that, at the level of practical-values, both disciplines move beyond analysis 
of the human situation (individual and corporate) and see change as essential to human 
flourishing. 
7.6 Practical-values: the messianic community, here and now
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One of the important features of some feminist theological writing is the prominence it attaches 
to the messianic community. It is evident in the discussion in chapter 6 that, whilst this is largely 
irrelevant for those theologians who find Christianity irretrievably patriarchal, for others it forms 
the focus of their deconstruction of Christian theology and of the creation of a feminist 
theological space. Criticism of such theology often challenges the notion of a messianic 
community on textual and historical grounds.
As is stated in chapter 6, there can be no such entity as the messianic community - unless one 
thinks only of Jesus and his immediate followers. There were undoubtedly many communities 
that saw themselves as living out the ideals of the Christian messiah and these are discussed in 
earlier chapters. The phrase "messianic community" in the present context points to the efforts of 
a number of feminist scholars who attempt to isolate it from its patriarchal context. They discern 
outlines of early Christian groups including the (technically pre-Christian) group around Jesus 
himself. They seek to define the mores of such groups and, in particular, their attitudes to key 
issues such as gender relations and their priorities for social and communal life. The dangers of 
such undertakings are discussed in section 6.7.
So far as practical-values are concerned, reference to the messianic community suggests that 
there are values associated with that community that inform current feminist theology. These 
values include those of gender relations and more broadly of communal and social life. There is a 
suggestion that the messianic community reveals values for human community now. This is well 
illustrated by Fiorenza52 who sees the "Jesus movement" as a renewal movement within Judaism. 
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She also shows how the new Christian community, with its transformed and transforming 
relationships between women and men, engaged as a missionary movement53. These new and 
distinctive relationships were intrinsic to the impact that Christianity made in the social and 
political climate of Hellenistic Judaism and the wider Roman Empire. 
Gestalt has neither a messiah nor a messianic community. However, there are two points that, at 
the least, complement the reliance by some feminist theologians on such a notion. The first is that 
gestalt therapy was initially promoted as a group experience in two senses. It was convenient to 
demonstrate the new ideas and practices in the setting of a smaller or larger group. Further, by 
working in a group and using that group's resources, patients were able more expeditiously to 
identify and work through the various projections and other modifications of contact that 
impeded them.
The second point to be made about gestalt and messianic community is that Perls famously 
attempted to found a community at Cowichan Creek in British Columbia that would live out the 
practical-values of gestalt54. There is an implicit suggestion here that some of Perls' students and 
patients might have seen him as a messiah figure. Perls was possibly less alert than Jesus to the 
dangers of such projections. Less implicit is the sense that Perls, nearing the end of his life, 
wanted to see how such a community would work out away from the pressures and media 
sensationalism of Esalen and California.
Gestalt communities of different types and of different duration have formed since that time. 
Every group of student therapists forms a type of community, as does each therapy group. Groups 
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of managers or social workers committed to a gestalt model of working constitute a more or less 
conscious gestalt community. However, they do not look back to the earliest gestalt groups as a 
paradigm for their life and work. They deliberately focus instead on Now and Here (typically the 
current gestalt group or community) rather than focus on their own history or that of gestalt 
predecessors. 
This practical-value derives from the early work of Fritz and Lore Perls on Concentration 
Therapy in their South African period. It rests philosophically upon their understanding of 
existential philosophy with its focus on the present. The shift from past concerns to present 
experience is of great clinical significance. The Perls did not deny that the past had significance 
for sick (and well) people, but they confronted what they saw as a pitfall in psychotherapy that 
was capable of supporting people to live emotionally as though the past were the present. The 
quest here is not for logical exactitude, but for the most powerful place to stand in order to face 
reality. If I feel past anger now (because I could not finish it then), what can I do with it? Where 
does it go and where does it belong?  Those are the important questions for the sufferer now. By 
extension, it can be argued that corresponding questions are the important ones for managers or 
social workers or teachers.
Closely linked with now is “here”. The topical or geographical may be extended to include, for 
example, us (here) or this institution or group. If, to continue the example above, I am angry now 
(though my anger comes from some past time and place), how may I finish this anger here?55  It 
has to be “here” very often (typically in this group or community) because it is not possible to re-
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visit the original locus. That is because the original locus was not just a place but a particular set 
of circumstances involving relationships which might not be capable of reconstruction. 
Sometimes, of course, it is important and possible to re-visit a particular place in order to finish 
or let go some experience associated with it and to which we still feel tied.
Plainly the ways in which feminist theologians view the messianic community are not equivalent 
to a gestalt view of Now and Here. They are not the same thing, but they are nonetheless 
compatible so far as their practical-values are concerned. Broadly speaking, the gestalt approach 
seeks to unhook people from entrapment in the past (or future) in order to locate themselves at 
the only point where they are able to act effectively, i.e. the present. The feminist view of the 
(past) messianic community is that it is a resource that can lend support to present critiques and 
engagements, i.e. that it can sanction opposition to present behaviour that does not accord with 
"messianic" principles. However, the messianic community is not a refuge from the present: 
feminist critics can only act now and in the here of their context. The same strictures apply to 
gestalt practitioners: they may have access through text or film or personal memory to some past 
events and people, but these are only useful insofar as they tend to support or critique present 
engagements. And that is, in fact, how the growing corpus of gestalt knowledge functions for 
them.  In the matter therefore of the feminist appeal to the messianic community, there is no 
incompatibility in gestalt's focus on Now and Here: in fact, that present focus can enhance and 
support feminist positions. The practical-values of the two disciplines are compatible in their 
appeal to historical precedent and in their focus on the present.
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7.7 Practical-values: transcendence and responsibility
Theology is, broadly speaking, a discipline that seeks to address all the important aspects of 
human experience. These include personal relationships; community and social life; political and 
economic life; life and death, sickness and health; corporate wholeness and fulfilment; justice 
and right behaviour; concern with what transcends human experience and comprehension; an 
impulse to worship and a sense of creatureliness.
Most feminist theologians look to a God (God/ess), although beliefs range from what Cupitt 
terms "realism"56 to atheism57. Wherever there is even an implicit transcendent dimension, there 
is also a belief that transformation of the present situation is possible or even predicated in the 
order of things. Such possibilities are seen as those of the God/ess as well as representing the 
hopes and desires of the theologian. They are intrinsic to Christian theology rather than only to 
feminist theology: where feminist theologians may differ from others is in the shape of that hope. 
It would include hope for a community free, for example, of distortions based upon patriarchy 
and male domination. In feminist and in other liberationist circles, such beliefs may arise from 
action critiques as much as from purely intellectual struggle
From the point of view of practical-values, however, it is important principally to ask what flows 
from such beliefs. It has already been noted that change in certain valorised directions (e.g. for 
peace and justice and against oppression and injustice) is predicated, i.e. held to be in the very 
280
"nature" of such a being / process. Such predicates also subsume to some extent an earlier 
practical-value, that of commitment to change.
So far as gestalt is concerned, there may or may not be a God, and gestaltists are found in both 
camps. If these notions correspond to a reality in the cosmos, then it is understood in process 
terms (and thus finds echoes in some theological circles, e.g. Tillich, Cupitt). From a gestalt 
perspective, the possibility of a God, however beneficent such a being is held to be, is fraught 
with difficulties.
First, if a God were omnipotent, (s)he could threaten the (already limited) predictability of the 
universe. Moreover, a being that could create the universe would be likely to invite fearful 
dependence on the part of people and thus undermine their autonomy and responsibility as 
responsible actors in the universe in the fields of scientific research or medicine, psychology or 
the arts, personal relationships or communications technology. However, no sooner does one 
construct such a list of fields where religious belief can be positively harmful to a person, than 
one realises that this is true whether from the perspective of a gestalt practitioner or from that of a 
feminist theologian. These are the difficulties that certain images of God raise for many people, 
and they are not confined to a gestalt perspective.
Perhaps then it would be more profitable to consider what there is in the gestalt framework that 
could positively support the notion of a transcendent process or entity. There are two promising 
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points of contact: one is the gestalt notion of responsibility and the other lies in the notion of 
Gestalt itself. 
The gestalt notion of personal responsibility is sometimes distorted to suggest that we are all 
responsible for ourselves in the sense that there is nobody else to blame (so whatever is painful or 
unsatisfactory must be our own fault). Such misunderstandings were rife when gestalt workshops 
were part of the new psychology scene with their message of instant turn-on and easy cure. These 
facile views did not do justice to Perls' position even during his promotional workshops. He liked 
to spell the word as response-ability58. He was interested to discover what a person could do by 
way of responding effectively to life situations. He encouraged people to pay attention to their 
responses where they did not achieve the result they desired. They could then explore how such 
undesirable consequences arose and what would have to be different to arrive at desirable 
outcomes. The role of the gestalt practitioner is to assist by drawing attention to questionable
assumptions and self-defeating ploys59 - and certainly not to add to existing burdens of guilt 
about not being more effective.
The experience of response-ability extends to any situation where people have to deal with each 
other at home, at work or in political life. And here we can link response-ability to the second 
point of contact, that of the concept Gestalt. Section 4.2 (on contact process) and parts of 
chapters 2 and 3 showed that each Gestalt of experience is part of a wider Gestalt in an infinite 
succession that is as large as the universe itself. Wertheimer's view is that we experience as 
though we have within us a pre-existing Gestalt that is triggered by certain inputs. This view 
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leaves open the possibility of something transcending human perception. At the least, no 
thoroughgoing gestalt approach can a priori rule out the possibility of a realm beyond ordinary 
sensory awareness. More positively, it allows for the possibility of religious experience and 
religious viewpoints as normal apprehensions or as pointing to a process irreducible to mere
subjectivity. 
Whatever view they take of Wertheimer's idea, gestaltists agree that, ultimately, we are all 
connected to everyone else and to everything and every event. This sense of co-inherence and 
connection is remarkably close to the mystical visions of people as culturally distant from gestalt 
as, say, Hildegard of Bingen and Teilhard de Chardin60. The gestalt vision is remarkably close to 
one espoused by, for example, Hellwig, whose myth is examined earlier in the thesis61. The 
gestalt view has other features in addition to its possible appeal to people outside any religious 
framework. It is not gender specific; it is not hierarchical and therefore requires a different 
approach, for example to justice; and it undermines the kind of dependence that is the pitfall of 
many other images, replacing it with images of relationship and connectedness.
In the matter of God, therefore, it is evident that gestalt and feminist theology are compatible 
regarding their practical-values, sharing many priorities and remaining open to dialogue on points 
where there is not - and need not be - agreement.  
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7.8 Conclusion
This chapter draws out from the key ideas of feminist theology and gestalt their practical-values. 
There are strong similarities in the first two practical-values concerning the epistemological 
status of human experience and the body. It is evident that both these practical-values are 
problematic, and yet the importance of both to gestalt and to feminist theology provides firm 
foundations for their compatibility. The process of analysing their core ideas and deducing from 
them their practical-values demonstrates how wide-ranging their conceptual grasp is.
Their concerns and emphases differ in a number of ways so that they cannot be thought of as 
coterminous. Later practical-values, e.g. those arising from the gendered nature of our 
experience, are less straightforward: in this instance the gestalt perspective has to be arrived at 
with little textual support. In the matter of links between the personal, the political and the 
theological, there are other problems, most notably that gestalt as a discipline does not take a 
view on the theological. Where a commitment to change is concerned, the gestalt perspective is 
paradoxical but nonetheless clearly compatible with that of feminist theology. The differences 
between gestalt and feminist theology are most challenging when practical-values connected with 
the messianic community and with God are considered. The links made between the messianic 
community and a gestalt view of the group are not of the same order, although it is argued that 
there is nonetheless a practical equivalence. Much the same may be said of the section on 
God/ess and gestalt notions of transcendence.
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However, the aim of this chapter is not to seek or force into existence some unanimity between 
gestalt and feminist theology. What this chapter demonstrates is that their practitioners can claim 
that they respond to and deal with a wide range of existential concerns in ways that are 
compatible. Their compatibility lies in their scope, their heuristic approach and their treatment of 
human experience. They are disciplines of a similar order and, as such, proper candidates for a 
test of compatibility. This compatibility lies demonstrably in their practical-values62. 
The final stage of this thesis lies in the next chapter. In chapter 8, there is a brief summary of the 
whole. The main conclusions of the thesis are set out and further research, outside the scope of 
the present work, is identified.
                                               
1       First section of chapter 1.
2       There are also what may be referred to as implicit practical-values. These could be deduced 
by a study of gestalt practice and would include, for example, a regard for personal 
boundaries, a respect for the religious or aesthetic sensibilities of others, and an 
appreciation of paradox as a given of social life. These and others may be thought of as 
subsumed under the headings of the broader explicit practical-values.
3      Graham (1996) p.111.
4      Ibid p.112.
5      For examples, Yontef (1993) pp.130-131, pp.186 et seq, pp.196 et seq; Perls (1971) pp.54-
55. In this last Perls discusses awareness as the gestalt mode of apprehending experience: the 
"talks" in this book are, in fact, all examples of the fundamental importance of human 
experience and his view of its epistemological status. 
6      Perls (1971). The dreamwork transcripts which make up the bulk of this book illustrate  the 
point.
7       If Christianity is only an irrelevance, it is unlikely that a woman would bother to write a 
book about it. Hampson (1990) speaks for herself, of course, but also gives voice to many 
people who find that Christianity is not so much irrelevant as irredeemably patriarchal and 
thus unfitted to be a religion for people who have rejected androcentric and patriarchal 
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8       Loades (1990) pp.16 et seq.
9       Ibid pp.23-29.
10      Ibid pp.29-40.
11      Ibid pp.41-47.
12      Part III, Scrutinizing the Master's Tools: Re-thinking Critical Methods is apposite here,  
although all the essays support this point.
13      The "feminist midrash" that opens the book is a more imaginative piece of 
reconstruction, less constrained by textual details. 
14      In Loades op cit pp.83-88.
15      Ibid pp.255-274.
16      Ibid pp.194-213.
17      HACKING, I. "The self-vindication of the laboratory sciences", In PICKERING, A (ed). 
Science as practice and culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, esp. 
pp.57-58.
18      The critique by black feminist circles in the USA, Africa and elsewhere, e.g. COLLINS, P 
H. Black feminist thought: knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment. 
London: Unwin Hyman, 1990 and Jacquelyn Grant's christology in Grant (1989).
19      Op cit p.6.
20      Yontef op cit p.141.
21      This matter is explored at greater depth in section 3.4.
22      Yontef op cit pp.86-87.
23      A notable exception to this type of teaching is Nelson (1978) cited earlier.
24      Graham (1995) p.145.
25      MOLTMANN-WENDEL, E. I am my body.  London: SCM, 1994, p.103. Also, Cooey 
(1994) p.31.
26     Moltmann-Wendel, op cit, p.104. Reflection on embodiment as a central Christian topic 
prompts mistrust of Western Augustinian theology that begins with the fall instead of 
creation and the pleasure God takes in this creation. A creation-based embodied theology 
does not see sin as a general fate which is suffered as a matter of principle, rooted in sinful 
human flesh and in the structure of its drives. Such a theology recognises the potential for 
destruction in human beings, but sees this as a problem arising from a lack of relationship, 
beginning in an earlier phase of life. It acknowledges a lack of relationship between human 
beings, between humans and other animals, and between humans and their environment. 
Fox (1983) echoes these ideas: the spirituality and theology he develops is likewise 
contrasted with Augustinian theology.
27      Brock (1991). Heyward (1989). This latter so entirely assumes this point that it is simply 
there as a substrate of her text, appearing at times like an outcrop, e.g. pp.10, 17, 25. 
28      Some men have taken seriously the criticism voiced by feminist writers about the alienated 
nature of male-dominated theology. One example in this context is Nelson (1978). In his 
Preface, Nelson, an ethicist, explains his need to go beyond the traditional limits of sexual 
ethics to what he terms "sexual theology". This "too-narrow focus" (p.9) is another feature 
of the splitting of experience concomitant with an over-masculine or patriarchal theology.
29      King (1995) p.5.
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30      Ibid pp.21-22.
31      BIRKE, L. Women, feminism and biology: the feminist challenge. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 
1986. Birke argues that both the subject matter and the methodologies of biological science 
have been androcentric. The tools of androcentrism have been determinism, reductionism 
and essentialism. She is concerned to establish a scientific methodology that subverts these 
"received" approaches.
32      This cautious phrasing refers to back to Davis (1997) cited in chapter 6. Much of the 
argument may be seen as a form of the nature / nurture debate or the "essentialist" debate. 
HARRISON, B. W. “The power of anger in the work of love: Christian ethics for women 
and other strangers” In Loades op cit pp.194-213 states "....I do not share Mary Daly's 
reverse Thomism - that is,  ..I believe that the major differences between men's and 
women's behaviour are rooted in culture and history rather than in a relatively fixed 'nature' 
....." (p.213).
33      REITER, R R (ed). Toward an anthropology of women. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1975. This book takes, as its title suggests, an anthropological approach toward women: 
but, more interestingly, looks at a hidden tradition of women as anthropologists, many of 
whom were either ignored or, in some cases, plagiarised by men. Among its themes is a 
serious challenge to received notions of human history which turn on man / male as hunter-
gatherer.
34       POLSTER, M F. Eve's daughters: the forbidden heroism of women. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1992.
35      ZINKER, J C.  "Fritz Perls in 1993" In  British Gestalt Journal 2:2 (1993) writes a dialogue 
with Perls (who died in 1970) which touches on this. In response to Zinker's challenging 
Perls' non-inclusive language, Perls retorts that it is a preoccupation of the 1990s - and 
anyway he "was never very much concerned with being socially correct" (p.133).
36      The language of gestalt predates some current distinctions. Its language in the matter of 
Gestalt formation moves between that of constructivism and social constructionism. This 
tension was evident in some early debates, but it was cast in terms of the relationship of the 
inner and the outer. There were arguments over how reality is represented within the 
perceiver, and about what type of correspondence exists between those representations and 
what may or may not be absolute realities "out there". In terms of current debate, there is 
little doubt that the process of Gestalt formation corresponds closely to constructivism as 
defined in COLMAN, A M. A dictionary of psychology. Oxford: OUP, 2001. It is, 
however, also illustrated in BERGER, P & LUCKMANN. The Social construction of 
reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge. London: Allen Lane, 1967. At the social 
level of gestalt thinking, however, discussion of social phenomena frequently suggests 
social constructionism (Berger & Luckman, 1967). KVALE, S (ed). Psychology and 
postmodernism. London: SAGE, 1992, pp.46,150-151 illustrates these distinctions in 
current psychological thinking. GERGEN, K J. Social construction in context. London: 
SAGE, 2001 defines, in a series of essays, how social constructionism operates at three 
levels in current discourse as a metatheory, as social theory and as societal practice: so far 
as gestalt is concerned, it is the second of these where there is correspondence. Elsewhere, 
Gergen confirms this by stating that the "terms in which the world is understood are social 
artifacts, products of situated interchanges between people" as a result of which 
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"psychological processes differ markedly from one culture to another". (Cited in FOX, D & 
PRILLELTENSKY, I. Critical psychology: an introduction. London: SAGE, 1997, p.277.
37      An example of breaking confluence for a number of church congregations is the presence 
and status of gay and lesbian people. Many congregations had never consciously considered 
such sexuality and gender issues, but are now taking them seriously. What had been 
background (and thus in confluence) has become figural (i.e. a focus created by attention).
38      This position is stated strongly here for the sake of emphasis. It should not be read as 
denying, for example, the obvious continuity we have as persons from one engagement to
the next: it is, however, stated in opposition to the reification of an essence or core. From a 
gestalt perspective, process is the key to understanding personhood. Examples of such a 
view regarding process and dialogue include: Yontef op cit pp.35-36; p.131; pp.221 et seq, 
p.331 ("human structures are process"); Perls (1971) p.17 refers to the self-actualising 
organism (in a context which clearly implies interaction with others).
39      Referred to in chapter 4, note 25.
40      Perls et al (1973) p.296 et seq points out that the patient comes for help because he cannot 
help himself. The approach of the therapist is immediately to enlist him as an active 
experimental partner, thus reversing one of the main planks of the neurotic structure that 
entails helplessness. This helplessness is not feigned or in any way insincere. The therapist, 
at the outset, envisages and seeks to create situations in which it is, however, impossible. 
This rather stark confrontation is perhaps typical of illustrations offered in the early days of 
gestalt writing: it may suffice in the case of mild neurotic disturbance. It would not be an 
appropriate approach, however, with a person experiencing a more profound disturbance. 
Yontef op cit pp.419-488, esp. pp. 484-487 discusses working with people with character 
(personality) disorders where such robust confrontation could be very destructive.
41      King op cit p.20.
42      St Hilda Community. Women included: a book of services and prayers. London: SPCK, 
1991.
43       CONDREN, M. Julia Kristeva on abjection. Paper at the annual pastoral studies 
conference of The British and Irish Association for Practical Theology, Dublin, 1999. 
The reference is to KRISTEVA, J. Powers of horror: an essay on abjection. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982. 
44       P.D. OUSPENSKY, for example, had an understanding based on growth which he 
develops in his The psychology of Man's possible evolution.  London: Arkana, 1991. 
However, Ouspensky did not think such (individual) evolution possible for many people. It 
was only for those who would make efforts, who would seek help and who had the unusual 
capacity for recognising what in their experience is new (rather than understanding it in 
terms of what was old, already known) pp.7-12. Perls was familiar with Ouspensky's 
teaching but clearly departs from it with his own theories about the ordinariness of 
evolutionary growth - as well as his recognition of the universality of neurotic 
developments in place of healthy growth.
45      Perls et al (1973) p.275.
46      Shephard (1976) pp.113 & 115 et seq.
47      Perls (1971) p.43, (1976) pp.68 & 100. Perls et al (1973) pp. 429-430 also has a section 
entitled "Self as Actualization of the Potential" where it is stated that "the self can be felt 
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only as a potentiality; anything more definite must emerge in actual behaviour."
48      Perls (1971) p.20.
49      Fiorenza op cit pp.288 et seq.
50      For instance Ruether (1983) p.37; Hampson (1990) pp.9-11.
51      Graham (1996) p.172.
52      Fiorenza (1983), pp.105-159.
53      Ibid pp.160-204.
54      STEVENS, B. Don't push the river. Berkeley, CA: Celestial Arts, 1970, and 
BAUMGARDNER, P & PERLS. F.S. Legacy from Fritz & gifts from Lake Cowichan. 
Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behaviour Books, 1975 both describe from their authors' 
viewpoints the work that was done there.
55     Examples in O'Leary (1992) pp.66 et seq & 74. Also LEDERMAN, J.  "Anger and the 
rocking chair"  In Fagan & Shepherd (1972) pp.328-338.
56      Cupitt (1998), pp.152-154.
57      The same range of beliefs may, of course, be found among gestalt practitioners.
58      Perls (1971) p.56.
59      Examples in ibid. pp.1-76, but particularly pp.18 et seq.
60       HILDEGARD. Scivias: the English translation from the critical Latin edition. Tr. 
Hozeski, B. Santa Fe, NW: Bear & Co, 1986; de CHARDIN, T. The phenomenon of 
Man. London: Collins, 1959 and Le milieu divin. London: Collins, 1960.
61      Section 5.4
62      This claim is made here for gestalt, but should not be taken as applicable only to gestalt. 
Much work has been done on religion (and specifically Christian theology) and 
psychotherapeutic psychology. In chapter 1, reference was made to Halmos(1965) and Lake 
(1966). A survey of this field may be found in LYALL, D. Counselling in the pastoral and 
spiritual context. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995, especially ch.1. More 
recently, some critical issues in this relationship were explored in LYNCH, G (ed). Clinical 
counselling in pastoral settings. London: Routledge, 1999. Some of the theoretical 
problems are indicated earlier in the thesis in reference to Pattison's (1986) warnings in 
section 1.3.
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CONCLUSIONS
8. Introduction
This chapter reviews the thesis as a whole, tracing the outlines of the arguments and then sets out 
the principal conclusions. After this introduction, section 8.1 summarises the arguments of Part 
One, and in particular chapters 2 to 4 following the development of gestalt philosophy, 
psychology and therapy. The work on the development from gestalt philosophy to gestalt therapy 
is important for the thesis as a whole. This is because no other single work was found that brings 
together these three gestalt elements in sufficient detail to establish a secure foundation for the 
subsequent discussion of compatibility with feminist theology. It is necessary to establish the 
credentials of gestalt as a world-view able to stand comparison with so developed and broad a 
discipline as feminist theology. Part One concludes by articulating a gestalt view of the self, and 
then analysing the core ideas of gestalt.
Section 8.2 follows the discussion through Part Two (chapters 5 and 6) on second-wave feminism
and feminist theology. It recapitulates the discussion of the variety of feminist schools or 
viewpoints. These schools represent, in effect, philosophical positions ranging from a liberal, 
reformist stance through socialist and cultural feminisms to postmodern critiques. What is 
important for the argument of the thesis is the effect such critiques have on the development of 
distinctive feminist theological voices. It is argued that a one on one mapping of feminist 
perspectives on to feminist theology is unnecessary. It is more important for the purposes of the 
thesis to demonstrate the breadth of feminist perspectives before examining the range of feminist 
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theological voices. Out of this variety, it is nevertheless possible to analyse some core ideas in 
feminist theology and to indicate where these are widely supported and where they are subject to 
ongoing criticism.
Section 8.3 moves to Part Three of the thesis (chapter 7 and the present chapter). At least two 
earlier works bring gestalt and theology into proximity1. But the concerns of their writers are 
different to those of the thesis and they do not deal with issues of compatibility nor provide 
means of assessing compatibility such as those in chapter 7. They are more concerned to 
celebrate the apparent fit between Christian pastoral concerns and gestalt than to identify and deal 
with whatever problems arise in such a conjunction of disciplines. Section 8.3 therefore 
recapitulates the process of deducing practical-values from the core ideas of each discipline. It 
makes distinctions between an assessment of compatibility on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, confluent movement between the disciplines or easy assumptions about their unanimity.
At a number of points throughout the thesis, there is discussion on the problems inherent in the 
specific task at that stage or in the overall task of the thesis. Often, it is not possible to assume 
consensus even on a fundamental matter (e.g. belief in a God (/ess), and it is unrealistic to 
anticipate unproblematic outcomes to the thesis as a whole. Section 8.4 discusses some of the 
problems and notes the weaknesses and strengths of the approach adopted throughout the thesis. 
It also discusses some of the challenges inherent in interdisciplinary study. Then follows a section 
containing the main findings of the thesis (section 8.5). These findings are stated with references 
to the discussion in the thesis. The final section of the work (section 8.6) identifies themes and 
topics in the thesis that merit further research.
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8.1 Gestalt: origins, development and core ideas
Part One traces the origins of gestalt in an empirical philosophical enquiry among Brentano's 
students in Prague. Questions are asked about the nature of mental acts as personal experiences
that could be quantified and qualitatively assessed. Von Ehrenfels uses the common German 
noun, Gestalt, to support a view opposed to contemporary scientific atomism or reductionism. He 
suggests that perception was a more active and complex matter than had previously been 
supposed. He does not deny that external events and objects (the fundamenta of sensory data) 
may be built up to produce more complex images or impressions. However, he focuses on an 
evident quality of wholeness in perceptions - even when some fundamenta are absent. He argues 
that we perceive wholes, and that these are given in the experience of perception2.
After 1918 the Prague faculty broke up and the universities at Graz and Berlin became home to 
the two poles of development in gestalt psychology. The former was associated with "production" 
theories of Gestalten, originally associated with Meinong and Benussi. The Berlin school became 
part of the first school of experimental psychology in the modern sense of that term. Wertheimer 
and two of his research students, Koffka and Köhler, were primarily responsible for the 
development and promotion of gestalt psychology. Like von Ehrenfels, they took an overall view 
that the whole perception is given in the sensory experience. It was Wertheimer who, anticipating 
recent neuroscientific research, spoke of perception being organised von oben nach untern (from 
the top downwards)3.
Gestalt psychologists demonstrated how perception is the work of the perceiver. Seeing, hearing 
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and understanding were shown, on the basis of empirical research, to be active constructions. 
This construction often proceeds without any need of awareness or conscious effort on the part of 
the agent. Goldstein was among the first people to develop therapeutic applications of the new 
psychology. The effects of combat and acquired brain injury among military personnel in the 
Great War4 drove Goldstein's neurological work. Goldstein approached his patients as people 
whose behaviour was based on perceptions with their own psychoneurological basis and logic.
Fritz Perls worked, briefly, at Goldstein's clinic in Frankfurt where he met Lore Posner, his future 
wife. She had been Goldstein’s associate and was familiar with gestalt psychology in a clinical 
setting. Perls brought to the partnership his psychoanalytic training and his experience as a 
patient of, inter alia, Reich. With this experience of body-centred therapy, he brought also his 
passion for theatre and performance and his excitement with the philosophy of Friedlaender as 
well as that of the existentialists centred in Frankfurt.
Following their enforced flight from National Socialism, the Perls set up practice in South Africa 
and defined their own way of working as analysts. They departed increasingly from European 
norms of psychoanalysis. They were influenced by Smuts' holism. It supported their view that 
psychoanalysis, though speaking of the body, concentrated on mental and emotional processes as 
though these could be separated from the body. The scene was set for a synthesis that developed 
as they moved, after the war, to New York City. There they established the New York Gestalt 
Institute, and Perls wrote, with Hefferline and Goodman, his second book5.
Chapter 3 of the thesis examined the other main influences in the formation of gestalt therapy, 
293
e.g. Lewin's field theory and Reich's psychosomatic approach. These influences are very 
important but do not diminish the unbroken line from the ideas in Brentano's seminars to those 
promulgated in the 1960s and 1970s on the West coast of the USA when gestalt therapy emerged 
as one of the new, humanistic approaches. The diverse background of gestalt meant that its 
founders could claim they had established ("rediscovered") more than a school of therapy. Perls 
and his colleagues proclaimed it as a serious and well-founded discipline, a fact sometimes belied 
by the furore of publicity they deliberately attracted. It was important to demonstrate the depth 
and breadth of gestalt as a discipline with the scope to stand comparison with feminist theology.
One of the strengths of gestalt is its understanding of the self - the small s denoting Perls' 
resistance to any reification of ideas. The self is process, the sum of all the contacts between 
organism and environment. The notion of contact is central to gestalt thinking, as are the 
modifications of contact to a gestalt understanding of neurosis and other dysfunctions6.  We are 
the sum of our contacts: we are constituted in and by them and are engaged in the constitution of 
other selves. The grounds for this assertion run deep in gestalt theory, and support for it is found 
in the writings of Perls et al (1973) as well as in the modern theorists, notably Yontef (1993).
The remainder of chapter 4 contains an analysis, on the basis of previous sections and chapters of 
core ideas in gestalt. This analysis forms a basis for the derivation of practical-values in chapter 
7. The core ideas begin with the primacy and epistemological status of experience in gestalt 
theory and practice; and the holism of body / mind / spirit. A further holism - of personal / 
interpersonal / social and political - is established. The concept of self-regulation towards 
homeostasis and the notion of an optimising Prägnanz are examined in their turn. Other core 
294
ideas are those of individual and social evolution, the importance of Now and Here, and the 
notion of response-ability and its transcendent possibilities. This analysis opens the way for a 
similar - though not identical - approach to feminist theology. 
8.2 Feminist theology: origins, development and core ideas
Part Two of the thesis begins in chapter 5 with a discussion of the wide range of ideas 
encapsulated in the phrase "second wave feminism". Following Evans' taxonomy along an 
equality-difference axis, these viewpoints or schools are viewed in relation to one another and to 
corresponding political and philosophical standpoints. It is demonstrated that the range of voices 
in feminist theology reflects the variety of feminist thought and commitment outside the field of 
theology. The chapter then explores feminist perspectives in the church and in theology and 
amplifies this with a review of feminist critiques and contributions in the specific fields of New 
and Old Testament studies, pastoral theology and christology as well as in the field of spirituality. 
Throughout this discussion, it is shown that, in feminist theology at least, content and 
methodology are intimately - and often overtly - linked.
The following chapter, chapter 6, moves forward to analyse the core ideas of feminist theology. 
These are identified as central to most feminist theological writing, although it would be 
unrealistic to hold up any as commanding universal assent. These core ideas are examined with a 
view to using them as sources of practical-values in the following chapter. The core ideas begin 
with the epistemological status of experience in feminist theology, the place of embodiment and 
the body's epistemological possibilities. This leads on to the importance of gender issues 
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affecting both the content of feminist theology and its methodologies. The next core idea 
concerns the integral links between the personal, the political and the theological in much 
feminist theological writing. The core idea of the embeddedness of patriarchy in structures of 
thought, governance and behaviour, and the necessity of confronting them is linked to another 
core idea, namely the intrinsic commitment to change. This core idea is in turn linked to the place 
of Jesus and the messianic community in feminist theological writing, and to ideas of God (/ess). 
Several of these ideas are shown to be problematic and to generate a good deal of critical 
discussion. Some major problems are examined in the chapter, notably concerning the first two 
core ideas of experience as epistemology and feminist debate about the body. Part Two ends with 
a conclusion that looks forward to the deduction of practical-values in Part Three.
8.3 Practical-values and the compatibility of gestalt and feminist theology
The core ideas of feminist theology and those of gestalt are brought together in Part Three of the 
thesis. Chapter 7 opens with a discussion of values and the definition of practical-values as 
identified and developed in this thesis. The chapter continues by drawing out from the core ideas 
of each discipline a number of practical-values found in those ideas. Each practical-value is 
examined in turn and as it applies to both disciplines, in such a manner that, as the chapter moves 
forward, the degree of compatibility between the two becomes clearer. There is no suggestion in 
this that feminist theology and gestalt are identical, e.g. consisting of the same ideas and practices 
but simply using different words. Their histories and priorities are different, but they are shown at 
most points of comparison to be far more similar than dissimilar in the values they espouse and 
embody.
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As well as the similarities, there are also some marked differences. Perhaps the clearest example 
is that of gender. A cursory visit to any university bookshop or academic library demonstrates 
that gender studies is a major subject area and that the matter of gender is fundamental to 
feminism, including, where it can be found to have a separate section, feminist theology. The 
same cannot be said of gestalt, although gestalt psychology and gestalt therapy are usually 
classified under psychology. This is an example of how a flexible practical-values approach can 
be useful in interdisciplinary work. The extent to which the literature can be lined up to 
correspond across disciplines is not the sole consideration in the method. What is of more 
importance is how, despite differences in history and applications, the two disciplines are 
analysed to show a practical correspondence in what they demonstrate to be important and 
valuable. Even in the matter of gender, it is shown that gestalt and feminist theology are 
compatible despite a lack of equivalence in the weight of literature available on the two sides.
8.4 Problems, weaknesses and strengths
This thesis relies heavily on literary sources. Another possible approach would be to carry out a 
literature review and, on the basis of emergent themes, to pilot and then set up a quantitative and 
qualitative study aimed at two communities of people - gestalt practitioners of various types and 
feminist theologians. Doubtless such an empirical approach would produce a great deal of 
interest to gestaltists and to feminist theologians. One of the drawbacks of such an approach, 
however, is that it would be beyond the resources of a single researcher because of the numbers 
of people in each community necessary for outcomes that could command confidence. Even a 
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representative sample of each would necessitate several hundred participants in each arm of the 
enquiry in order to evoke response numbers sufficiently high for qualitatively reliable results.
The chosen literature-based methodology is both informative about the situation under review 
(namely the compatibility of gestalt and feminist theology), is direct in its approach and, is 
applicable to other areas of interdisciplinary work. Given the ongoing interest among ministry 
students and practitioners in counselling and therapeutic psychology, tools are needed that can be 
used to assess the fit between chosen schools of counselling and therapy and (equally chosen) 
theological perspectives.
However, no approach is without its weaknesses, and that is true of the present method. These 
weaknesses lie in two main areas. First, there is the possibility that the writer has overlooked or 
inappropriately ruled out work of potential significance for the study. This is always a challenge 
for the researcher. Whilst care was taken to review the available anglophone literature, it is not 
possible completely to rule out bias or oversight or the possibility that another researcher is about 
to publish in the same area.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, there is the possibility that the literature does not 
represent what people actually do in their lives: perhaps the words and the praxis do not match. 
This is a limitation endemic to a literature approach. The thesis counters this possibility by its 
approach to compatibility expressed in terms of practical-values. The writer practised and taught 
gestalt theory and therapy for three decades in addition to studying theology and returning to 
academic work to resume that study in the light of feminist critiques. Nevertheless, it remains 
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possible that an empirical study of the same subject area might challenge some of the present 
findings.
One of the challenges of a thesis arising from research in such a broad field is that there are 
inevitably problems at every stage. To return to an earlier analogy of a brick built structure, it is 
important that the foundations are sound and that the bricks themselves are of sufficient strength 
for their role in forming the structure. Foundations must vary according to what they have to 
carry. In this case, the foundation represents the chosen methodology. The chosen approach is not 
suitable for every kind of study, but has proved equal to the weight it has to bear in this study. 
However, it has become clear that each of the bricks has its strengths and its weaknesses. Let us 
consider, for example, the importance accorded in feminist theological circles to embodiment and 
the place of the / my body in feminist discourse. It is evident that, whilst many feminists are clear 
that the body is central to their thinking and living, there are other feminists for whom the matter 
is of less importance7. It is hard to see how a theological perspective that does not accord 
importance to the body could be compatible with gestalt. And yet, on the gestalt side, there are a 
number of senior practitioners and teachers who, while proclaiming the importance of 
psychosomatic holism, distance themselves from the ideas and practices of  body-oriented 
colleagues. Their practice, seen in seminars and demonstrations, seems like psychotherapy in that 
the focus is entirely on words and on psychological processes. If there are sufficient of these 
bricks in the structure, it will not stand the test of time.
At each point in the argument of the thesis, there are conflicting voices. The writer has to choose 
how much weight to give them and whether their ideas offer serious challenge to the views 
299
adopted. Where these voices are thought to be important, and to be heard alongside the main 
point, they have been indicated.
With all these reservations, there remain considerable strengths in the approach of this thesis. 
First, it tackles a problem that has either been overlooked or else avoided in the past. The thesis 
makes visible what has often been invisible. Feminist theology and psychology (by which is 
meant therapeutic, interpersonal, organisational and social psychology) are two key disciplines in 
the development of pastoral / practical theology. Pastoral theologians move in and out of a 
number of disciplines in which they may or not be formally trained. There is evidence that they 
are unaware of crossing boundaries when they do this, and that words, phrases and ideas may 
have different meanings in different contexts. Crossing these boundaries is of the essence of 
pastoral theology - an interdisciplinary discipline or else nothing. But the boundaries represent 
realms of meaning and it is essential when venturing into another realm to ensure that this can be 
done without prejudice to the integrity of either discipline. It is necessary therefore to test for 
compatibility. That is the case where feminist theology and gestalt are concerned and would 
doubtless also be the case with, say, political theology and monetary economics or the study of 
governance.
8.5 The main findings of the thesis
8.5.1 What is established in Part One is the existence and strength of a direct line from von 
Ehrenfels to Perls8.  Three chapters of the thesis (chapters 2-4) examine in detail the roots 
of gestalt therapy. The development of gestalt began in the late nineteenth century, 
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although gestalt therapy did not appear under that name until the late 1940s. The first 
published work establishing the title was in 1951. One of the most influential of its 
sources was the gestalt psychology of the Berlin school and, before that, the gestalt 
philosophy that emerged from the German University in Prague. This is important for 
gestalt therapists who need to know where their philosophical and psychological roots lie 
as gestalt theory continues to develop. It is also an important conclusion of the thesis that 
gestalt has been demonstrated to be not simply a therapeutic approach, still less a 
collection of dramatic counselling techniques. It has been shown to be a world-view 
arising from fundamental notions about the homeostatic nature of the cosmos and of 
human beings. That view is of persons as organisms-in-an-environment which at once 
links and differentiates people, other creatures and the so-called inorganic environment. 
These perspectives suggest also other possible connections for interdisciplinary work, e.g. 
in the environmental movement. Finally, this conclusion is in contradiction of previously 
received views regarding these connections, and is a contribution to existing knowledge.
8.5.2 Of the other major influences in the shaping of gestalt therapy, psychoanalysis represents 
the greatest contribution to a gestalt perspective on intrapersonal dynamics9.  This is not 
to deny that there are strong links between Perls' views of the self and those of other 
psychologists, especially the originators of other humanistic therapies. However, Perls' 
radical criticisms of Freud's theories - most vehemently expressed in the 1960s and 1970s 
– should not occlude what is more obviously the case, that the two schools approximate 
to each other more than they differ. Examples of this approximation are the psychic 
mechanisms of projection, introjection, retroflection and sublimation. Significant 
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differences exist regarding, say, repetition compulsion or understandings of 
consciousness on the one hand and awareness on the other. It would be difficult, 
however, to imagine where gestalt understandings in such matters could have come from 
except as criticisms and refinements of the earlier work. The position arrived at in the 
thesis represents a contribution to an ongoing debate in gestalt circles regarding gestalt 
and psychoanalysis.
8.5.3 Gestalt therapy was novel in embracing existentialism, field theory and holism10, and in 
its reliance on the previously neglected work of Friedlaender11.  For its psychology, it is 
also indebted to Reich, in particular for his emphasis on psychosomatic unity12.  Gestalt 
therapy promotes a notion of the human self as a responsible and responsive agent 
existing (only) in an environment, a concept that includes relationships with other 
selves13. This is, so far as can be ascertained, the broadest discussion yet available on 
these philosophical connections and draws together a number of strands referred to in 
Part One. The reading of Friedlaender (still apparently unavailable in English) fills out 
Perls' statements on that score. The author has found no other such undertaking in 
English.
8.5.4 In turning in Part Two to Christian traditions, the thesis recapitulates much existing work 
that demonstrates how Christian scriptures and traditions have been deeply imbued with 
patriarchal assumptions. If these assumptions are not challenged they support the 
perpetuation of sexism and other forms of oppression in church and society14. Some 
feminists find it impossible to stay within the church. Others remain and continue to offer 
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a critique of Christian behaviour (including institutional and corporate behaviour),
attitudes and thinking. Feminist scholars have recovered traditions that were not inimical 
to women and have exposed examples of cruelty and oppression15. This part of the thesis 
forms the basis for understanding why feminist theology has come into existence and 
continues to be an important part of academic and ecclesial projects dedicated to human 
flourishing.
8.5.5 Feminist critiques bring about a re-valuing of women and, by the same token, the re-
valuing of femininity (in both sexes). There are several areas of discourse where such 
change is found: they include philosophy, theology and psychology. Patriarchy, by 
contrast, entails devaluing (often by both women and men) the feminine, and a polarising 
of masculine and feminine so that they become indistinguishable from male and female. 
The discussions about the status of sex as an aspect of body are touched on, although they 
are not of direct relevance to the thesis. However, the nature of gender is important to the 
argument. From both feminist and gestalt perspectives, it is seen that gender is not an 
absolute, something immutable given at birth. It is always relative.
From a gestalt point of view, it is based on a differentiation of figure from ground. It is 
the outcome of a process located within persons and agreed between them. This comes 
close to constructivism. However, there is another strand of gestalt thinking that sees 
gender operating as a cultural introject at the level of human societies and their politics. 
As such, it comes close to social constructionism. Gestalt, qua gestalt, does not make 
these distinctions, any more than it takes issue with neo-Darwinian or evolutionary 
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psychological views of gender. From a feminist perspective, it is evident that gender 
definitions are a social, economic and political matter. From a feminist theological 
perspective, gender is all these things and, in a sense, less, since God, in whose image 
people are made, is presumably beyond gender, subsuming and transcending all human 
attributes. The contribution of the thesis at this point is in bringing together two 
disciplines with diverging investments in philosophical discourse and, notwithstanding 
those differences, identifying their compatibility.
8.5.6 In bringing together gestalt and theology, it is found, by comparing their practical-values, 
that the two disciplines are compatible. However, there is a corollary. They do not have a 
complete identity of purpose. It may be that gestalt can speak of matters which it is more 
difficult for theology to encompass and vice versa. It is shown that gestalt is not inimical 
to ideas of God and indeed that it presupposes an ever-widening Gestalt whose 
boundaries are the mysterious ones of the cosmos itself. Moreover, gestalt theory and 
practice recognise our need of transcendence as well as its facticity (the organism is not 
an end in itself, but exists only as organism-in-an-environment). This basic premise and 
its related concept of response-ability open the way to compatibility with theological 
disciplines at levels once thought either impossible or irrelevant. It is likely that models 
of God developed by some feminist writers are more likely to engage gestaltists in 
dialogue than those imbued with patriarchal associations and history.
8.5.7 The most fundamental points of meeting between gestalt and feminist theology are the 
places accorded to human experience as an epistemological foundation, and to the human 
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body as site of that experience and truth. Whilst neither of these fundamental points is 
unproblematic, the weight of argument favours them and supports the accord between the 
two disciplines both concerning their interests (bodies and experience) and their 
methodologies (starting where we are and working outwards rather than the opposite).
8.5.8 Both disciplines tend to an holistic view not only of the person (mind / body / spirit) but 
also to her context in society, the world and, ultimately, the cosmos. This holism is 
perhaps more apparent in feminist politics than in the gestalt consulting room, but is 
nonetheless potent in both contexts. If a gestalt therapist narrows her vision to the point 
where the patient is the problem, then any changes she makes are unlikely to be 
efficacious: she lives in an environment full of other people, and it is there that she must 
make the changes she needs. Jesus' view of the identity of the neighbour motivates many 
Christians into political activity, including feminist politics: for the gestaltist too, we are 
all connected and can be response-able in all situations.
8.5.9 What is sure, from a gestalt perspective, is that our tendency is towards self-regulation in 
any context. We do not necessarily have to work at this since, in health, our Prägnanz
operates automatically to ensure optimal adjustment in each context. Our flexibility and 
adaptability is, of course, finite and we may find ourselves in intolerable circumstances. 
However, for most of us, the common problems are those we bring to a situation, i.e. our 
modifications of contact such that we do not deal with the real situation but one formed in
part by our fears and other self-related difficulties. This view of life is not reflected in the 
corpus of feminist theology, although we can find a clear commitment to the radical re-
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structuring of the world as we have inherited it. We do not have to take what is given as 
though we had no choice. So many apparently objective and immutable customs, ideas 
and practices have been subjected to rigorous criticism that has exposed their arbitrary 
and oppressive nature. Through solidarity with other women, and sometimes with the 
support of men, women have deconstructed much that is oppressive of humanity in the 
churches and in theology, as well as in the wider world - although there is further work to 
be done.
8.5.10 Finally, in this summary of the main findings, it is shown that there is an approach to the 
difficulties inherent in interdisciplinary work which, given sufficient understanding and 
familiarity with the disciplines entailed, can be effectively deployed. This is the approach 
that identifies the practical-values of each discipline and tests them for compatibility. 
From one perspective it can be seen as an ethical approach, and from another it is an 
expression of a (British) pragmatic tradition. It arises from practice and is intended to 
speak to practice by getting theory into practice. Practice, without due consideration of its 
intellectual infrastructure, is inevitably compromised. The practical-values approach is 
capable of extension and of application to a range of interdisciplinary situations.
8.6 Areas for further research
A major piece of research suggested by the present thesis is a follow-up study using both 
quantitative and / or qualitative approaches into the fundamental thesis question studied here, 
namely the compatibility of gestalt and feminist theology. It may be argued that the question has 
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been addressed sufficiently thoroughly in this thesis and that the commitment of the necessary 
resources requires justification beyond the value of an empirical check on the present findings. 
However, there would be a second perceivable gain, and that is the possibility of pursuing the 
question of compatibility further. Put briefly, the hypothesis states that anything that can be said 
in theological language can be said equally in psychological language. This hypothesis would 
take researchers into the philosophy of religion and into questions of realism and non-realism, but 
in a strictly empirical fashion. This qualification is important because of the gaps between what 
people believe and think and how they live their lives. This last is not a matter of insincerity but 
of cognitive dissonance. It concerns the accuracy of our awareness and self-perception.
Part One of the thesis brought together a range of sources and ideas from the history and practice 
of gestalt. The research underlying this part of the thesis has produced solid evidence, for 
example linking Perls back to von Ehrenfels. This link is not supported by some writers in the 
field of gestalt therapy, nor by one of the principal researchers in the fields of gestalt psychology 
and philosophy16. However, Ash's comments on gestalt therapy amount to little more than an 
aside since they were not central to his work at the time. This question merits further research and 
such work would encourage debate in the gestalt practitioner community on the philosophical 
underpinnings of practice.
There is an unresolved conflict as between the Graz and Berlin poles of the argument about 
gestalt. It is possible that the view taken in this thesis may ultimately prevail. That is to say, it is 
probably not necessary to take a view as to whether Gestalten are "produced" from the 
fundamenta, or whether they are given in the experience “von oben nach unten”. What is evident 
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is that modern gestalt theorists, typified by Yontef, are following the Wertheimer line (though not 
with polemical intent), whereas cognitive psychologists are more interested on a day to day basis 
in what gestaltists recognise as production studies (building up percepts from sensory bits). This 
argument has practical implications in, for example, National Health Service provision of clinical 
psychology to persons suffering phobic symptoms. They may be treated as persons who produce 
erroneous percepts from innocent fundamenta or they may be regarded as persons who project 
von oben nach unten some terrifying Gestalt on to innocuous elements in their environment. 
There are at least two quite different therapeutic responses here, and the choice has implications 
for outcome - and cost. The unfinished task is to discover if a synthesis of the two schools may be 
achieved that does not undermine the theoretical integrity of constructs founded upon one or 
other of them. The necessary neurological techniques and knowledge are now available to make 
relatively simple what had to be done by painstaking experiment and surmise in the student days 
of Koffka and Köhler. 
The advent of sophisticated mechanisms and techniques for neuroimaging have opened up 
avenues of research with potential for generating new techniques of management and new 
treatments for schizophrenic conditions, dyspraxias, dysphorias and other neurological states. 
Gestalt approaches to perception and mental construction might well furnish useful and important 
conceptual frameworks for understanding the outcomes of physical and empirical enquiry. 
In the sections bearing on feminist theology, it is apparent that there are a number of significant 
writers for whom Christianity is so founded upon and constructed by patriarchal assumptions that 
it is no longer possible - or worthwhile - to consider its reform. Some have moved to other types 
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of religious practice whilst others have remained as critics on the edge of the church. The witness 
of such people is important, both to those who choose to remain identified as church and to yet 
others who are more interested to discover more about an apparent need for transcendence. The 
thesis identifies common ground between gestalt and feminist theology regarding the possibilities 
of transcendence. In so doing, it suggests further questions to be pursued.
The next piece of possible further research is linked to the question of transcendence. Some of 
the most important elements of feminist theological critique are at the level of the philosophy of 
religion. By this is meant two things: first, the philosophical import of feminist critiques even if 
they are not expressed primarily in philosophical terms (e.g. the epistemological implications of 
theologies founded upon the experience of women) and, second, explicit philosophical criticism 
such as that of Jantzen. There is more work to be done in both of these areas, and it is likely that 
the outcomes of such research would have formative influence on religious praxis in the future. 
Linked to this last paragraph is the issue concerning the place of the body in feminist theology 
and, in particular, the body as a sexual body. It is arguable that the integrity (in both usual senses 
of the word) of the Anglican Communion has been threatened by a series of issues that are, in 
part at least, sexual. In the 1920s and 1930s, contraception and divorce were two issues that 
threatened to divide the communion. The issue of contraception was not settled until the Lambeth 
Conference of 1958. The issue of divorce has also been divisive and remains to be resolved: in 
this connection, each new accommodation in a province of the communion seems to raise further 
debate suggesting that it is work in progress. Currently, the most divisive single issue is that of 
the status of homosexuality and the place of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual people in the 
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church. Loosely referred to as "the gay issue", it is more probably a wide range of issues that 
connects to the most profound levels of human identity and of theology. The gay issue raises 
questions about the use and status of the Bible that are examined for a different purpose in this 
thesis. It puts theological traditions into significant confrontation with psychological theory and 
practice. It interrogates assumptions about the place of the body as an epistemological touchstone 
and challenges old (if sometimes inaccurate) notions about original sin. The gay issue not only 
has potential for schism between the churches of Africa and Asia on the one hand and the USA 
and Europe on the other, but also between parts of the same church (e.g. the Church of England) 
potentially divided along traditionalist and liberal lines. The work of Brock and of Heyward in 
particular represents part of a liberal position in a necessary and ultimately important dialogue. 
These feminist writers may undercut what has become an argument about sex and sexuality and 
offer instead a more nuanced discourse about what it is to be a sentient being in a divine 
dispensation.
There is a great deal of research to be done in this complex area. Some of this research could lead 
to clearer understandings about the place of the Bible and of other content of Christian traditions, 
and it would probably lead to greater discrimination by evangelical parts of the church and, 
perhaps, intellectual debate. It would highlight weaknesses in the new conservative theologies 
and promote dialogue between open evangelical positions and those of liberal and liberal catholic 
theologies. Such dialogues would cut across the denominational lines of Christianity and would 
also have implications for engagements between religions.  Finally, such work would inevitably 
and quite properly have wider importance in the United Kingdom where, it is arguable, what 
appear to be internal dialogues of a minority body (the church) have vicarious significance for 
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people who never associate with the church. 
                                               
1      Walker (1971); Davidson (1991).
2       von Ehrenfels (1890).
3       Chapter 2.11
4       It had also prompted important developments in the work of Freud (1922), particularly in the 
area of repetition compulsion as was evidenced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
5       Perls et al (1973).
6       This was discussed in chapter 4.
7      Section 6.2. 
8      Section 2.14.
9      Section 3.2.
10      Sections 3.4, 3.8, 3.9.
11      Section 3.5.
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13      Section 4.1.
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16      Ash, 1995, p.xi.
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